ANZAC Peacekeeping: Trans-Tasman Responses to the Bougainville Crisis in 1997 and the Subsequent Evolution of Australia's and New Zealand's Regional Peacekeeping by Baird, Rosemary Anne
ANZAC PEACEKEEPING: 
TRANS-TASMAN RESPONSES TO THE BOUGAINVILLE 
CRISIS IN 1997 AND THE SUBSEQUENT EVOLUTION OF 
AUSTRALIA’S AND NEW ZEALAND’S REGIONAL 
PEACEKEEPING 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts 
in History in the University of Canterbury 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROSEMARY BAIRD 
__________________________________________________ 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 2008 
Table of Contents 
 
 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………1 
 Abbreviations………………………………………………………………………….2 
 Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..4 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..5 
1. Historical Themes…………………………………………………………………...13 
Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific……………………………………………13 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship………………………………...21 
The creation of Anzac………………………………………………………………..27 
2. Historiography………………………………………………………………………33 
Australian and New Zealand views of the Pacific…………………………………...34 
Australian and New Zealand defence thinking………………………………………40 
The development of the Anzac legend……………………………………………….49 
3. The TMG in Bougainville…………………………………………………………..55 
Background to the Bougainville conflict……………………………………………..57 
Australian and New Zealand tensions………………………………………………..62 
Trans-Tasman cooperation in spite of difficulties……………………………………69 
New Zealand’s Pacific advantage……………………………………………………72 
4. Trans-Tasman Peacekeeping after Bougainville………………………………….78 
Background to the East Timor conflict and INTERFET…………………………….80 
Lessons learnt from Bougainville……………………………………………………82 
The trans-Tasman relationship in East Timor………………………………………..83 
Background to Solomon Islands conflict and RAMSI………………………………91 
Lessons learnt from previous peacekeeping missions………………………………..94 
The trans-Tasman relationship in the Solomon Islands……………………………...95 
5. Anzac Peacekeeping……………………………………………………………….103 
Official Anzac connections…………………………………………………………103 
The Anzac Spirit: celebration, rivalry and differentiation………………………….104 
The wider implications of Anzac Peacekeeping……………………………………118 
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….123 
 Appendix 1: Table of Interviewees…………………………………………………130 
 Appendix 2: Interview Questions…………………………………………………...134 
 References…………………………………………………………………………..136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Maps and Figures 
 
Map i.1: The Pacific Ocean/Oceania as seen from Solomon Islands……………………………..12 
Map 3.1: Vicinity of Bougainville Island ……..………………………………………………56 
Figure 3.1: The New Zealand Land Rovers at Buka, March 1998………...………….………….68 
Figure 3.2: The New Zealand Light Tactical Raft, Buka, March 1998….……………..…………68 
Figure 3.3: NZDF Haka at Ruruvu School, central Bougainville, March 1998………...…………75 
Map 4.1: Vicinity of Timor…..………………………………………………………………79 
Map 4.2: The Solomon Islands………………………………………………………………90 
Figure 5.1: NZDF Haka at their departure from Loloho, April 1998………….………………...109 
Figure 5.2: Anzac Day celebrations at Sohano Island, 25 April 1998…………………………...109 
 
 
1 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am indebted to a great number of people for their aid in helping me to complete this thesis. 
 
Many thanks to my supervisors, Professor Peter Hempenstall and Professor Philippa Mein 
Smith for their encouragement, advice and expertise in the field of trans-Tasman history. 
Thanks is due to Sheryl Boxall of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MFAT) for helping organize my Wellington interviews. Also, thanks to Jim Rolfe for giving 
me access to his personal research notes on the TMG. Jan Gammage and  Dr. Bob Breen in 
Australia were invaluable in expanding my list of interviewees. Indeed, particular thanks 
must also go to Dr. Bob Breen for his kindness in sharing with me his extensive knowledge 
of peacekeeping in Bougainville and commenting on the draft of my third chapter. Thanks to 
Andrew Rice for allowing me the use of his wonderful photographs of his experiences in 
Bougainville. I am very appreciative of the financial assistance given me by a MFAT 
historical research award and BRCSS Masters scholarship. These grants enabled me to visit 
Canberra and Wellington in order to conduct my interviews. I am also grateful to family 
members, friends and postgraduate colleagues who tolerantly supported my year-long 
fascination with peacekeeping and kept me smiling. 
 
And, lastly, my especial thanks to all the men and women who made time in their busy 
schedules to talk to me about their involvement in peacekeeping missions. This thesis would 
not have been possible without their generosity and perspicuity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abbreviations 
 
ADF   Australian Defence Force 
AFP   Australian Federal Police 
AIF   Australian Imperial Force 
ANU   Australian National University 
ANZAC  Australia, New Zealand Army Corps 
ANZUS   Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty 
AusAID  Australian Agency for International Development 
ASPI   Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
BIG   Bougainville Interim Government 
BRA   Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
BRF   Bougainville Resistance Force 
CANZ  Canada, Australia, New Zealand group at UN 
CDF  Chief of Defence Force 
CDR   Closer Defence Relations (Australia and New Zealand) 
CSS   Centre of Strategic Studies 
DFAT  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
DJFH   Deployable Joint Force Headquarters 
DSN   Defence Secret Network (Australia) 
FALINTIL  Forças Armadas para a Liberaçã Nacional do Timor Leste (paramilitary wing 
of FRETILIN) 
FRETILIN  Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for 
an Independent East Timor) 
HMAS  Her Majesty’s Australian Ship 
HMNZS  Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship 
IFM   Istabu Freedom Movement 
INTERFET  International Force in East Timor 
IPMT   International Peace Monitoring Team 
MEF   Malaitan Eagle Force 
MFAT  New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
3 
 
MFO   Multinational Force and Observers (in Sinai) 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NZDF  New Zealand Defence Force 
NZEF   New Zealand Expeditionary Force 
OPRES  Operational and Preparedness Reporting System  
PLA   Panguna Landowners Association 
PMC   Peace Monitoring Council  
PMG   Peace Monitoring Group 
PNG   Papua New Guinea 
PNGDF  Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
PPF   Participating Police Force (in RAMSI) 
RAME  Royal Australian Mechanical Engineers 
RAMSI  Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
RAR   Royal Australian Regiment 
RNZAF  Royal New Zealand Air Force 
RSA   The Royal New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association 
RSIP   Royal Solomon Island Police 
RSL    Returned and Services League of Australia 
SAS  Special Air Service 
SDSC   Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 
SNO  Senior National Officer 
SPPKF  South Pacific Peacekeeping Force 
TMG   Truce Monitoring Group 
UDT   União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union) 
UN   United Nations 
UNAMET  United Nations Mission in East Timor 
UNTAET   United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor  
USS   United States Ship  
 
 
4 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the evolution of Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping 
operations in the Pacific through a trans-Tasman lens. Both Australian and New Zealand 
sources are used in order to understand the relationship and interaction between the two 
nations. This study has a particular focus on the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) sent to 
Bougainville in late 1997. This New Zealand-led operation was the first long-term regional 
peace initiative of recent times, and set the stage for future regional interventions by Australia 
and New Zealand.  The thesis also considers more broadly the subsequent involvement of 
Australian and New Zealand peacekeepers in the International Force in East Timor 
(INTERFET) and Regional Assisted Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). These two later 
operations are considered with particular attention to lessons learnt from previous 
peacekeeping experiences and the changing tenor of trans-Tasman relations.   
 
Since this is a history thesis it sets the argument within a historical and historiographical 
framework. It seeks to identify long-term trends surrounding Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
relationship with the Pacific, defence connection and Anzac heritage.  
 
A further aim of this thesis is to investigate whether joint Australian and New Zealand 
peacekeeping in the Pacific revived the Anzac relationship first formed at Gallipoli. By 
looking at evidence taken from interviews and first-hand accounts with Australian and New 
Zealand participants in the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI, this thesis argues that hallmarks 
of the earlier Anzac relationship did re-emerge, though in a slightly different form. The 
phenomenon of New Zealand’s reputation as having a cultural advantage in the Pacific is 
explored in some detail as this is an important aspect of the Anzac relationship.  
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Introduction 
 
In Time Magazine’s 2006 ‘Person of the Year’ issue ‘Anzac Peacekeepers’ were nominated 
as ‘people who mattered.’1 The use of the term ‘Anzac’ in this context is interesting. Anzac 
usually refers to the experience of Australian and New Zealand forces during World War I, or 
is used as a general synonym for ‘Australia-New Zealand’. The aim of this thesis is to test 
whether the concept of ‘Anzac peacekeepers’ is an accurate representation of today’s trans-
Tasman military operations in the Pacific. This can be done in two ways: firstly by 
investigating the extent to which recent Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping in the 
Pacific region became increasingly shared and co-dependent; and secondly by identifying the 
continuities and changes in the Anzac relationship as experienced by those participating in 
these regional peacekeeping missions. 
 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s regional peacekeeping missions have been written about 
fairly extensively, but usually from a nationalist point of view. Celebrating Australia’s and 
New Zealand’s individual achievements is more important than profiling the trans-Tasman 
relationship. Political scientists and strategic analysts have written about Bougainville, East 
Timor and Solomon Islands extensively but their focus has tended to be on short-term issues 
of national and regional security. The discourse on regional peacekeeping is dominated by 
Australian authors. In terms of military histories, there are a few good books on East Timor, 
but very little on Bougainville or the Solomons. This will be rectified on the Australian side 
shortly by Bob Breen’s volume for the official Australian peacekeeping history on Pacific 
operations. Also the idea of Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping operations as an 
Anzac force has not yet been investigated. 
 
This thesis fits within the current historiographical trend of transnational history, which 
attempts to chart the movement of ideas, goods, technology and people across national 
borders.2 The links between Australia and New Zealand are so strong however, that while 
this thesis fits within the transnational tradition, it does not rely on it. Rather than fo
interpretations of connectedness this study highlights existing trans-Tasman regionalism in 
both the past and present. The aim of this thesis throughout is to include New Zealand where 
it has been previously ignored but also to avoid overt New Zealand nationalism and the 
rce 
                                                            
1 E. Keenan, 'People Who Mattered: Anzac Peacekeepers', Time,  (2006), 60.  
2 ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’, American Historical Review (December 2006),1440-1464. 
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‘Aussie-bashing’ that frequently accompanies it. This study identifies patterns of connections, 
competitiveness and cooperation between the two Tasman neighbours.  
 
The peacekeeping missions in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands were regional 
efforts but this thesis does not include in-depth studies of coalition members apart from 
Australia and New Zealand because of the trans-Tasman thematic focus. Fiji, Vanuatu, 
Solomon Islands and other Pacific nations made important contributions to the TMG, 
INTERFET and RAMSI. Although their numbers were small, their presence legitimised the 
mission as ‘regional interventions’. Moreover, the Pacific islanders’ language skills and 
cultural knowledge proved to be invaluable to the operations.  It should be stressed that the 
Anzac peacekeeping described in this thesis need not negate the existence of regional 
peacekeeping. It is possible for national, trans-Tasman and regional identities to co-exist. For 
reasons of time and space this thesis cannot do the Pacific Island countries’ contributions full 
justice but this in no way diminishes their achievements.  
 
The first chapter of this thesis traces long term historical trends in Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s defence relationship, engagement with the Pacific, and Anzac comradeship. The 
treatment of these three themes is chronological and wide-ranging. The reason for this is not 
only to provide a solid historical background for recent regional peacekeeping, but also to 
make clear that there are recurrent continuities in Australia’s and New Zealand’s perceptions 
of their regional roles and defence responsibilities. Many recent decisions and actions 
undertaken by Australia and New Zealand in their region, while seeming ‘new’ in a short-
term context, have underlying similarities with past actions. Likewise, the historical 
development of the Anzac fighting force and legend are outlined in order to demonstrate that 
the ‘new’ Australian and New Zealand relationship forged during peacekeeping operations is 
in fact linked to, and part of, the old Anzac bond forged in World War I. 
 
The second chapter is an historiographical overview, once again arranged around the three 
themes of Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship, engagement with the Pacific, 
and Anzac connection. A broad trans-Tasman comparison is important to identify differences 
and similarities between Australian and New Zealand sources. Furthermore, a 
historiographical overview enables a clear view of Australasian ideas about the Pacific, 
defence and Anzac. Long established patterns of thought become discernible behind 
seemingly different responses. Indeed, one of this thesis’ arguments is that recent 
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peacekeeping cooperation between Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific is part of a 
longstanding concern about, and shared defence responsibility for, threats to Pacific security.  
An overview of the recent work on Anzac reveals the need for a more integrated study of the 
concept which explores its continuing relevance. Moreover, a firm grasp of historiography is 
important as Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence and Pacific policy is often affected by 
academic arguments. 
 
Chapter three gives an account of the trans-Tasman planning process of the Truce Monitoring 
Group (TMG). There have been two books published of personal recollections about the 
Bougainvillean peace process; one from New Zealand and other Australia. There is also an 
extensive body of work on the Bougainville conflict and its causes and a few articles on the 
peacekeeping operation. As of the moment, however, there is no full account of the planning 
and performance of the peacekeeping operation. This chapter describes the trans-Tasman 
process of preparing and running the TMG up until early 1998. The narrative is organised 
around the three main types of Australian and New Zealand interactions experienced. Trans-
Tasman relations were characterized by tensions, cooperation and differentiated cultural 
interactions with local people. Bougainville is often portrayed as a success story of 
Australasian cooperation. While this is an accurate judgement, this chapter also highlights the 
serious difficulties faced by Australians and New Zealanders, which needed to be overcome 
during the preparatory and early stages of the TMG. Bougainville’s significance is that it was 
the first of a number of regional operations. It provided tactical, logistical and strategic 
lessons and was the starting point for increased trans-Tasman cooperation. 
 
Chapter four assesses the joint Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping operations in East 
Timor and Solomon Islands but on a less detailed scale than with Bougainville. Once again, 
for both missions, the trans-Tasman relationship was marked by tension and cooperation. 
However, generally, INTERFET and RAMSI were more collaborative than Bougainville. 
This was due to strengthened government support and Australians’ and New Zealander’s 
growing experience at working in the Pacific and with each other. The theme of New 
Zealanders being more culturally sensitive than Australians also continued in both missions.  
 
The final chapter argues that the Anzac experience was renewed by Australians’ and New 
Zealanders’ recent participation in peacekeeping operations in their region.  The idea of a 
new Anzac relationship in the Pacific is considered at two levels. Firstly, the official 
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organizational and operational integration of the Australian and New Zealand forces is 
outlined by drawing on the trans-Tasman relationship described in chapters three and four. 
Secondly, the idea of the ‘spirit of Anzac’ is tested by analyzing qualitative data on Anzac 
experiences. This chapter rests heavily on the recollections of those involved in Pacific 
peacekeeping operations and their perceptions of the Anzac spirit. The existence of the 
‘Anzac spirit’ is investigated through participants’ memories of Anzac celebrations, rivalry 
between Australians and New Zealanders and the differentiated stereotypes held by 
Australian and New Zealand personnel. In particular, the chapter examines the widespread 
idea that New Zealanders are more culturally sensitive in the Pacific than Australians. 
 
The methodology used is two-fold. Firstly the thesis includes a wide-ranging survey and 
analysis of secondary sources (including both history and strategic studies) on the trans-
Tasman defence policy, relationship with the Pacific, and Anzac heritage. This identifies 
historiographical trends and provides a background within which to identify continuities and 
changes. Secondly the thesis uses primary sources such as government defence papers, 
reports, and interviews to examine trans-Tasman involvement in Bougainville and other 
regional peacekeeping missions. Interviews are also used to assess whether these should be 
described as Anzac peacekeeping operations.  The focus is mainly on the preparatory and 
initial stages of the missions as this is a neglected area in the historiography and provides 
necessary parameters on a potentially vast topic. The methodology is also consciously trans-
Tasman, relying on both New Zealand and Australian secondary and primary sources. There 
is a slight tilt towards New Zealand sources for several reasons. Since Australian 
historiography dominates the field this thesis attempts to compensate for the lack of New 
Zealand material. Moreover, the Australian-New Zealand relationship is asymmetrical. 
Australia is more important to New Zealand than vice versa. Therefore, writing on the trans-
Tasman relationship tends to be by New Zealanders.  
 
The original intention of this thesis with regards to primary material was to base analysis of 
trans-Tasman peacekeeping on government reports and accounts of the relevant meetings. 
Unfortunately, after initial approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to 
examine these files, the Ministry did not have the capacity to check the relevant papers in the 
limited time-frame available. This resulted in a shift to oral evidence as the main source of 
primary material. As a result I interviewed a number of New Zealanders and Australians who 
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had been involved in peace support operations in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon 
Islands.  The interviewees included diplomats, government officials, academics, members of 
the New Zealand and Australian defence forces and civilians. A full list of the interviewees 
and their roles may be found in Appendix 1. I gave participants a list of questions 
highlighting areas I was interested in; however I did not require them to answer every 
question. Often interviewees used the questions as a basis on which to gauge my research 
interests, and then spoke freely about their experiences, including in their narrative key 
anecdotes or comments which were relevant to my thesis. The list of the questions used can 
be found in Appendix 2. 
 
I chose to talk to a wide range of participants rather than do a just a few interviews using true 
oral history methods. 3 The interviews were not recorded or transcribed due to issues of 
sensitivity, convenience for the participants, and inadequate resources.  Recording requires a 
reliable recorder, microphones and quiet surroundings, which were unavailable during the 
interview process. Many of the interviews were held, at participants’ requests, in coffee 
shops, gardens or secure government offices; contexts not conducive to recording.  An 
estimated six to eight hours is needed to transcribe each hour of interview as well as more 
time to audit-edit the transcripts.4  Breadth of information and getting both New Zealand and 
Australian viewpoints was more important to me than absolutely verbatim transcripts.  
Instead of recording the conversations I took detailed notes, typed these up and then sent 
them to participants for checking and amendment. Due to my more concise method I was 
able to conduct in-depth interviews with 29 participants in a relatively short space of time. 
 
Using oral evidence as a primary source results in methodological difficulties. Oral evidence 
has been vulnerable to criticisms of bias and fallibility. Nostalgia, personal prejudice, the 
intrusion of popular representations of the past and loss of memory may distort interviewees’ 
narratives and interviewers’ questions.5 Moreover, the intonation, volume and rhythms of 
speech are not reproducible even in the most faithful of transcripts.6 A major problem faced 
                                                            
3 Generally, an interview only becomes oral history once it has been recorded, transcribed, indexed and made 
available in a library or archive. D. A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History (2nd edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 24.  
4 This is a form of audio proofreading in which the recording is played back while simultaneously checking the 
transcript to check the two are consistent. Ibid., 65. 
5 R. Perks and A. Thomson, 'Critical Developments: Introduction', in The Oral History Reader (2nd edn.; New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 3. 
6 A. Portelli, 'What Makes Oral History Different', Ibid., 34. 
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is how to integrate the evidence of an individual into the wider social context; of moving 
from the particular to the general.7 Certainly in my interviews I did come across these 
problems. Nostalgia for the past and pride in peacekeeping achievements caused interviewee
to put a positive cast on their experiences. For individuals still employed in government 
related jobs, caution due to public service protocol probably often replaced frankness. I 
would watch people search for the right phrases in which to couch a criticism.  There were 
inconsistencies between different individuals’ recollections of some events. And I was un
to talk to everyone involved, including several key
s 
able 
 players. 
                                                           
 
Overcoming these difficulties meant a reliance on corroboration and breadth of sources. This 
thesis only highlights themes if they are present in a number of interviews and other primary 
sources. Indeed, my own oral research was often backed up with first-hand recollections 
found in books, articles and the unpublished work of other academics.8 I was also fortunate to 
conduct in-depth interviews with both Australians and New Zealanders. Visiting Canberra 
was a enormous help in gaining a truly trans-Tasman perspective. Talking with individuals 
from different spheres of influence also guarded against inadvertent bias of sources. It was 
important to talk to civilians involved as well as military staff. By asking interviewees the 
same questions, which often had specific focus on the early stages of the missions and Anzac 
relations, I was able to gain a good amount of evidence on the areas most pertinent to the 
thesis. 
 
Moreover, oral evidence also has real strengths. Its subjectivity is often seen by oral 
historians as an advantage, providing clues about how memory works and the relationship of 
the past to the present. Oral histories highlight the role of imagination, symbolism and desire 
in composing memory.9 Interviews often reveal information that is unobtainable in any other 
type of historical record. Indeed, the interviewer and interviewee collaboratively create a new 
historical source. A thoughtful participant is often able to contribute colourful anecdotes, and 
generate new ideas that a researcher may never before have considered pursuing.10 I found 
 
7 T. Lummis, 'Structure and Validity in Oral Evidence', Ibid., 255. 
8 The two most important books for this corroboration were R. Adams (ed.), Peace on Bougainville: Truce 
Monitoring Group = Gudpela Nius Bilong Peace (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2001). and D. Denoon 
and M. S. Wehner, Without a Gun: Australians' Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001 
(Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2002). 
9 Portelli, 'What Makes Oral History Different', 37., A. Thomson, 'Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory 
Theory into Practice in Australia', in The Oral History Reader, 252. 
10 Ritchie, Doing Oral History, 118, 22. 
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many of these positives to be true in my interviews. While not strictly a psychological 
history, part of my thesis is concerned with the perception of Australian-New Zealand 
relations and the idea of Anzac. Answers to this type of subjective topic are found most easily 
in individual opinions. With limited archival evidence available on peacekeeping operations, 
much of the information needed could only be found in the recollections of those directly 
involved. Moreover, many interviewees gave intelligent and reflective responses which 
pointed towards new insights.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to define some the key words used in the following chapters. ‘Trans-
Tasman’, ‘Anzac’ and ‘the Pacific’ are terms which are often used imprecisely, and with 
differing connotations depending on authors’ individual interpretations and agendas. It is 
common for ‘trans-Tasman’ to be used as shorthand for ‘Australia and New Zealand’. This 
thesis avoids this type of usage and instead employs this term in the context of describing a 
reciprocal relationship between Australia and New Zealand. Anzac is a complex term with 
layers of meaning. Originating as an acronym for the Australian and New Zealand Army 
Corps in World War I, it soon became a colloquial term describing Australian or New 
Zealand servicemen.11 Anzac has more recently also become a general adjective for joint 
Australian and New Zealand ventures; for example, an Anzac rugby match. This thesis uses 
the term Anzac in two specific ways. Firstly, it is used to denote the official collaboration of 
Australia and New Zealand in a military situation, and the joint forces, shared logistics and 
collaborative planning this entails. Secondly, this thesis uses the terms ‘Anzac spirit’ or 
‘Anzac tradition’ to refer to a special type of understanding between Australians and New 
Zealanders based on loyalty, mutual reliance, trust, rivalry and distinctiveness. Although the 
Anzac spirit was created at Gallipoli, it has endured in Anzac Day celebrations and 
subsequent Australian-New Zealand operations. This thesis also frequently refers to the 
Pacific. Explorers, governments and academics have employed many different boundaries to 
denote this area. The most popular paradigm for discussing the Pacific has traditionally been 
in terms of a division into Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian islands.12   This thesis 
defines the Pacific as the area which Australia and New Zealand treat as their ‘patch’ and 
includes all the islands south of the Equator in Map i.1. Thus, while East Timor is often 
grouped as part of Southeast Asia, for the purposes of this study it is included in ‘the Pacific’. 
                                                            
11 The Oxford English Dictionary, s. v. 'Anzac', (2nd edn., 1; Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989), 540. 
12These categories have been increasingly criticised for their artificiality. J. Linnekin, 'Contending Approaches', 
in D. Denoon and S. Firth (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 8. 
12 
 
Map i.1: The Pacific Ocean/Oceania as seen from Solomon Islands, courtesy of Graphic 
Maps.com, <http://www.doi.gov/oia/images/solomonsmap.gif>, accessed 13-2-08. 
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1. Historical Themes 
 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s recent regional peacekeeping initiatives are often examined 
individually and without a developed historical context by political and strategic scientists. 
Unfortunately, this type of analysis has a rather narrow, present-centred focus. For example, 
an exclusive focus on ‘failing states’ ignores the Pacific nations which have undergone 
decolonization peacefully. A wholly contemporary approach can lead one to label regional or 
international trends as new when in fact they have existed for centuries, although perhaps in a 
slightly different form. History provides the context for recent events and reveals 
interpretations that may be missed by current commentators. 
 
This chapter gives a brief summary of Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship and 
actions under three themes: the Pacific region, defence policy and the formation of the Anzac 
tradition. The end of each section highlights historical ideas relevant to regional trans-
Tasman peacekeeping. The chapter’s purpose is to provide a context for recent events and to 
highlight the development and continuity of past trends that are relevant to recent regional 
trans-Tasman peacekeeping.  
 
Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific  
 
From the mid-nineteenth century through to the early twentieth century, some Australian and 
New Zealand commentators felt that the Pacific should be their colonies’ immediate sphere 
of influence. This desire manifested itself in two concurrent propositions: some argued for an 
autonomous Australasian Empire; others pressured Britain to colonize Pacific islands.  Even 
before 1840, various writers and politicians claimed New Zealand had an imperial destiny in 
the South Seas. After the Treaty of Waitangi was signed some New Zealanders felt that their 
experience administering Maori gave them a claim to rule over all Polynesian peoples. This 
led early New Zealand colonists to favour trade and political activities in the Pacific Islands.1 
According to Pacific historian Angus Ross, nearly all the leading New Zealand politicians in 
the period 1870 to 1900 wanted to see their colony play a more active part in the South 
Pacific. They consistently sought a greater influence for New Zealand in the islands and 
                                                            
1 A. Ross, 'Introduction', in New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century (Auckland: 
Longman Paul for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1969), 1-2. 
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bombarded the Colonial Office with petitions and memoranda.2 The same trend can be found 
in Australia. One of the motives behind the federal movement in the late nineteenth century 
was Australian colonists’ desire to exercise greater influence in Pacific affairs.3 In 1909, 
Australia’s Prime Minister Alfred Deakin suggested that the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ be extended 
to the South Pacific and administered from Australia.4 Plans for an Australasian Pacific 
Empire were unsuccessful, but Australia and New Zealand persisted in pressuring Britain to 
guarantee security in the Pacific region.  
 
 Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific in the nineteenth century was 
also characterized by their concern to exclude foreign powers and exercise control via British 
imperialism. The Australasian colonies urged Britain from the 1870s onwards to annex 
Polynesian and Melanesian islands.  Australia criticized Britain for allowing France to claim 
Tahiti in 1844 and New Caledonia in 1853.5 In July 1870, the Australasian colonies, 
concerned about the breakdown of law and order in Fiji, recommended that Britain take 
possession of Fiji. Benjamin Disraeli’s Government assented in 1874. Australia and New 
Zealand then unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Britain to annex New Guinea and the 
New Hebrides. In 1883, following a spate of articles in German newspapers advising the 
seizure of New Guinea, the Queensland colonial government took possession of the eastern 
half of the island in the name of the British Empire. They then wired Britain for confirmation 
and offered to help pay costs. When they were turned down, New Zealand and Australian 
colonial representatives came together to discuss matters at an inter-colonial convention in 
Sydney.6 They resolved that ‘further acquisition of dominion in the Pacific, south of the 
Equator, by any Foreign Power, would be highly detrimental to the safety and well-being of 
the British possessions of Australasia’.7 Britain’s compromise in 1884 with Germany to 
divide colonial responsibility in New Guinea did not impress the Australasian colonies and 
they set up a Federal Council of Australasia to give advice on relations with the Pacific. 
Further attempts were made by Australia and New Zealand in the 1890s to persuade a 
                                                            
2 Ibid., 7-8. 
3 N. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976), 91. 
4 N. Meaney, 'Australia's Foreign Policy: History and Myth', Australian Outlook, 23/2 (1969), 175., T. B. Millar, 
Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1978), 72. 
5 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 57. 
6 Meaney, Search for Security in the Pacific, 16-18. 
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reluctant Britain to acquire the New Hebrides, Samoa and Papua.8 The sustained pressure put 
on Imperial Britain by Australia and New Zealand was a significant reason that it ended up 
with the most Pacific responsibilities of any nation.9 
 
Although initially eager to claim Pacific territories in the late nineteenth century and after 
World War I, Australia’s and New Zealand’s administration of their colonial mandates was 
generally marked by indifference and inexperience.  New Zealand was given responsibility 
for the Cook Islands and Niue in 1901. For the first 33 years, responsibility for these colonial 
dependencies was given to the Department of Maori Affairs. The islands were administered 
under the ‘taihoa’ or ‘go slow’ policy, which was characterised by ‘purposeful inactivity’.10 
Some work was done on improving primary education, health services and infrastructure, 
especially in the 1930s, but economic development of the islands was poor. Historians agree 
that New Zealand was ill-prepared for colonial administration.11 This was due to the lack of a 
Colonial Service, small budgets, inadequate anthropological and administration training and 
overconfidence due to experience with Maori culture. By 1920, New Zealand’s colonial 
enthusiasm had been tempered; it accepted the mandate for German Samoa rather reluctantly 
and only for strategic reasons. New Zealand’s early administration of Western Samoa was 
marked by its failure to respond effectively to the influenza epidemic of 1918 and the Mau 
uprising of 1929.12  
 
 Australia’s colonial record was also somewhat patchy. Australia was given the care of Papua 
by Britain in 1906, and its early colonial rule was largely determined by Hubert Murray, who 
governed from 1908-1940 through a regime of benevolent paternalism.13 After World War I, 
Australia was also given the mandate for New Guinea and joint responsibility for Nauru (with 
Britain and New Zealand). In New Guinea, little was done to develop the economy or 
infrastructure and it continued to operate as a plantation colony until the late 1930s.14 
Australian administration was initially harsh, with a reputation for being less native-friendly 
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than in Papua.15 One strength of Australian colonial rule in the Pacific was that from 1927 
onwards young colonial administrators were taken to New Guinea for a year-long local 
orientation, and then returned to the University of Sydney for further anthropological 
training. This program produced administrators with good knowledge of current affairs in the 
Pacific. 
  
Generally, war increased contact between New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific Islands. 
The prospect of war heightened Australia’s and New Zealand’s awareness of the strategic 
importance of the Pacific. Trans-Tasman policy reflected a concern to safeguard the Pacific 
region from outside powers.16  In World War I, British instructions to occupy Pacific Islands 
were obeyed speedily by Australia and New Zealand. On 29 August 1914, 1400 New 
Zealanders occupied German Samoa.  Three days after its entry to World War I, Australia 
received a cable suggesting that Germany’s wireless stations in the Pacific be seized. A naval 
and military unit of 1500 was hastily put together and occupied German radio stations at 
Rabul, German New Guinea and Nauru in the following months.17 Further links between 
Pacific Islanders and New Zealand were cemented when Maori, Cook Islanders and Niueans 
fought with the Pioneer Battalion, under a Pakeha New Zealand commander.18  During 
World War II, Australia in particular, became closely involved with the region through the 
Pacific War. War conditions partially eroded racial barriers and many Pacific Island 
collaborated closely with the Allied armed forces. Papuan and New Guinea infantry 
battalions were formed in 1944, together making up the Pacific Islands Regiment. Fijians, 
Tongans and Solomon Islanders fought side by side with Australians in the Solomons.  In 
spite of colonial Australians’ opposition to local personnel, the Australian media 
sentimentalized Papua New Guinean medical orderlies and messengers as ‘Fuzzy-Wuzzy 
Angels’.
people 
                                                           
19 War brought about a renewed awareness of the importance of good Australian and 
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After World War II, because of international and domestic expectations, New Zealand and 
Australia became more involved in administering, and later decolonizing, their Pacific Island 
mandates. In 1944, Australia and New Zealand signed the Canberra Pact in which they jointly 
claimed responsibility for leadership, post-war settlements, defence and social welfare in the 
Pacific.20 New Zealand in particular took its trustee role in the region seriously. In 1945, 
Peter Fraser, New Zealand Prime Minister, chaired the UN Trusteeship Committee. New 
Zealand, eager to enhance its good international reputation, cooperated closely with the UN 
in its treatment of Western Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.21 For example, New 
Zealand began an economic development programme building a fruit-processing industry in 
the Cook Islands in the mid-1950s and welcomed UN inspections.22 Australia was slower to 
attend to its colonial responsibilities in the Pacific.  Australia administered Papua and New 
Guinea together after World War II, but visiting UN missions noted that development was 
backward. Government remained colonial until the 1950s and there was little attempt at self-
government until an elected house of Assembly was created in 1964.23  
 
By the 1960s the international emphasis on decolonization meant New Zealand and Australia 
had to reconsider their Pacific trusteeships.  The international community praised New 
Zealand’s decolonization policies, largely because they were carefully designed to receive 
that result. UN spectators and missions were regularly invited to New Zealand’s colonies to 
demonstrate that decolonization was taking place appropriately.24 New Zealand had been 
preparing Western Samoa for independence since the 1950s and it became independent in 
1962. During the 1960s and 70s New Zealand worked with the Cook Islands, Niue and 
Tokelau to tailor individual settlements that would allow them to retain their free association 
with New Zealand.25 By contrast, Australia was less eager to decolonize its Pacific territories. 
Loath to lose its phosphate resources, Australia resisted mounting international pressure to 
decolonize Nauru.26 And, it was only in 1972, with the accession of Gough Whitlam’s 
Labour government in Australia, that plans for Papua New Guinea’s self-government were 
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fast-tracked for implementation in 1975.27 After their former colonies had become 
independent, Australia and New Zealand still sought involvement in Pacific Island nations. 
Australia and New Zealand massively increased their aid donations to the region in order to 
encourage political stability and discourage reliance on communist powers.28 They also 
retained a key role in the South Pacific Forum. 
 
Cold War concerns and nuclear issues were central to Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
relationship with the Pacific during the mid to late twentieth century.  The fear of 
communism greatly affected Australian and New Zealand regional foreign policy. Australia, 
unnerved by the spectre of Indonesian communism, supported Indonesia’s questionable 
claims to East Timor in 1975 so as to keep their bilateral relations on good terms.29 
Throughout the early 1980s, Australia and New Zealand operated a policy of strategic denial 
of Soviet power in the Pacific. Libyan involvement in Vanuatu and New Caledonia was 
strongly opposed by Australia and New Zealand who partly blamed it on the French. France’s 
clumsy handling of New Caledonian nationalism encouraged radical sentiments and opened 
the way for Libya to intervene in the domestic politics of the French Pacific.30 Australia and 
New Zealand became particularly concerned about Vanuatu’s non-aligned posture and the 
Soviets’ offer to do research in Vanuatu and Solomons waters in 1980.31 Greg Fry argued 
that this Australasian policy of strategic denial was actually an extension of the Monroe 
doctrine suggested years earlier in Australia.32 Throughout the Cold War, Britain, France and 
America also used the Pacific as a testing ground for their nuclear capabilities. The French
nuclear tests, because of their underhand nature, united most of the region in protest.
 
                                                           
33 
Members of the first South Pacific Forum meetings in 1971 and 1972 objected to French tests 
and in 1975 agreed to make the Pacific a nuclear free zone. Agitation developed more slowly 
in Australia than New Zealand partly because Australia exported uranium.34 New Zealand 
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crystallized its role as the leading anti-nuclear regional power when it refused access to the 
USS Buchanan in 1985 on the grounds of it possibly carrying nuclear weapons.35  
                                                           
 
 From the mid 1980s onwards Australia’s and New Zealand’s main concern in the Pacific 
region became internal instability. Decolonization had produced a series of new nations that 
were prone to economic problems, ethnic tensions and unstable governments. During the late 
1980s, two Fijian coups, civil unrest in Bougainville, violence in New Caledonia and 
turbulence in Vanuatu alerted Australia and New Zealand to the fact that their region was 
‘pacific’ no longer.36 Moreover, the end of the Cold War created an environment in which the 
Pacific Islands became less insulated from the outside world and more similar to comparable 
Third World countries.37 During the 1990s, Australia and New Zealand sought to resolve 
these problems while at the same time avoiding criticisms of neo-colonialism.38 Regional 
organizations and aid development projects were used to regulate Pacific Islands’ tendencies 
towards internal instability.39 However, towards the end of the 1990s, Australia and New 
Zealand became more willing to intervene in internal Pacific conflicts. The Tasman 
neighbours worked together on peacekeeping operations in Bougainville and East Timor. 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002, 
New Zealand, and Australia developed a more hard-line and interventionist ethos in the 
Pacific region.40  After 2002, Australia reconsidered its earlier refusal to provide assistance to 
Solomon Islands in controlling civil unrest. The result was the Australian-led RAMSI 
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mission of 2003.41 Alongside their continuing aid programmes, Australia and New Zealand 
also focused on controlling transnational crime, illegal immigration and law and order 
processes.42 Australia in particular now saw the Pacific’s ‘failing states’ as potential havens 
for international terrorist groups and justified preventative action on this basis.43 
 
A broad overview of Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific reveals 
several historical trends. Firstly, Australia and New Zealand have long regarded the Pacific 
south of the Equator as their patch and resented outside interference. This can be seen in their 
pressure on Britain to secure Pacific Islands during the nineteenth century, claims of colonial 
rights, provision of aid to prevent communist powers gaining access to Pacific islands during 
the Cold War, and fear of terrorism in recent years. The second point is that during times of 
war or regional instability Australia and New Zealand devoted more time, effort and money 
to their relationship with their Pacific neighbours. The two world wars, Cold War and War on 
Terror have all resulted in increased contact with Pacific Island nations and their inhabitants. 
Indeed a third and related point is that Australia’s and New Zealand’s policies towards the 
Pacific have often been affected by the international climate. Both Australia and New 
Zealand complied with international pressure to decolonise their mandates in the 1970s. New 
Zealand and Australia contributed to peacekeeping missions, especially since the 1990s 
onwards, in order to retain a good international image. Australia strove to fulfil America’s 
expectations of a secure Pacific during the Cold War and after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. There is a strong historical pattern indicating that Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s actions in the Pacific are affected by wider global concerns. Fourthly, Australia has 
always had more resources to initiate and fund projects in the Pacific. The Canberra Pact was 
an Australian initiated project. Australian colonial officers for the Pacific received more 
thorough training than their New Zealand counterparts. The peacekeeping interventions of 
recent years have been largely paid for with Australian dollars. New Zealand has fewer 
resources than Australia with which to engage the Pacific and thus has approached issues in 
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slightly different ways. Indeed, the last main theme is that New Zealand perceives itself as 
having a closer and more culturally-sensitive relationship with the Pacific than Australia 
although its colonial record is not necessarily much better. As a result it has historically been 
more sensitive to UN criticism of the way it operates in the Pacific and willing to take a stand 
on contentious issues such as nuclear testing. New Zealand’s regional policies are generally 
perceived as being more consultative and inclusive of local culture.  
Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship 
 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s responses to the issue of safeguarding their region from the 
late nineteenth to early twentieth century demonstrate both cooperation and differences. In 
the early 1880s, New Zealand and Australia worked together to increase their regional naval 
power. Aware that Britain opposed expanding its Navy, Australia and New Zealand felt 
inadequately protected. From the 1880s through to the early 1900s, however, New Zealand 
also worried about Australia’s decision to create its own navy. In 1908, Australia began a 
programme to build three destroyers. New Zealand feared that this would cause the British 
Royal Navy to justify withdrawal from the Pacific. If this happened, New Zealand, even if it 
cooperated with Australia, would be the junior partner and have less control and capacity for 
defence. Instead of building a national navy itself New Zealand chose to increase its subsidies 
to the Royal Navy. In 1909, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Joseph Ward offered a 
battleship to the Royal British Navy. Trans-Tasman competitiveness reared its head and 
Australian public opinion persuaded the Australian government to follow New Zealand’s lead 
and donate their own battleship. In 1914, New Zealand did create its own navy but made sure 
to emphasize that it was creating a local unit of the Royal Navy rather than an independent 
force.44 
In spite of their different decisions regarding naval defence, the period prior to World War I 
also saw close Australian and New Zealand defence co-operation. In 1908, the American 
Grand Fleet visited New Zealand and Australia at the joint invitation of their Prime 
Ministers.45 In 1914, Colonel Allen, the New Zealand Minister of Defence invited the 
Australians to send some of their fleet on a visit to New Zealand. Unfortunately, the proposed 
stopover was forestalled by the outbreak of war. Australia and New Zealand also worked on 
coordinating their military preparations. Both nations introduced compulsory military training 
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by 1909. Lord Kitchener, who visited the two countries in 1910, recommended uniformity of 
training and unit organization between the two nations to allow them to fight together. 
Following Kitchener’s visit, an Australian military college at Duntroon to which New 
Zealand might also send cadets was established. The training relationship which began at 
Duntroon was important in bringing the two countries’ forces closer together. The personal 
contact and shared experiences of officers who often reached high ranks in their respective 
forces laid the basis for friendly service-level relations.46 
 
World War I is often seen as a high point of Australian and New Zealand defence cooperation 
because of the Anzac campaign at Gallipoli. The Anzac Force initially came about as an 
organizational necessity, directed by British war policy.47 Very quickly however, a strong 
Australia-New Zealand relationship was forged which would have important consequences 
for the trans-Tasman defence relationship. This issue will be addressed in more detail in the 
Anzac section of this chapter. In France, from 1916-1918 the New Zealanders served 
separately from the Australian Forces but relations between the two groups remained close. 
In Palestine, a composite Australian and New Zealand mounted force fought the Turks. There 
were also less formal linkages with large numbers of New Zealanders serving in the ranks of 
the Australian Imperial Force and vice versa.48 
 
The inter-war years were characterized by a lack of co-ordination in Australian and New 
Zealand defence policies. The absence of danger in the 1920s removed the sense of urgency 
that had previously pulled the two forces together. At the end of 1921, New Zealand 
withdrew all its cadets from Duntroon and did not re-enrol more military staff for another 
thirteen years.49 During the 1930s as concerns mounted about Pacific security both Australia 
and New Zealand made a few unsuccessful attempts to improve their defence relationship. In 
1933, Australia suggested New Zealand participate in Australian defence supply and 
manufacturing. The New Zealand response was lukewarm. Supporting Australian industry, 
much of which was in competition with New Zealand or more expensive than other suppliers, 
did not seem sensible in the midst of a depression. Even British pressure failed to persuade 
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New Zealand to comply. The New Zealand and Australian defence relationship remained 
cool and the two nations continued to deal with each other through London. In 1937, it was 
New Zealand’s turn to propose closer links with Australia. New Zealand Prime Minister, 
Michael Savage suggested that Britain, Australia and New Zealand meet to discuss the 
strategic importance of the Pacific region. However, Canberra replied that the issue should be 
discussed in London, not Wellington, and that their senior officers were too busy. When the 
Pacific Defence Conference was held in Wellington in 1938 Australia sent only junior 
officers. The lack of collaboration between Australia and New Zealand is reflected in that 
there was no official New Zealand representative in Canberra at the outbreak of World War 
II.50 However, the lack of defence co-ordination was mostly political. Australasian military 
forces were actually in useful contact by 1939 through shared intelligence and renewed joint 
officer training.51  
 
During World War II, Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship was characterized 
in one sense by their dissimilar strategic defence policies. At the beginning of the war, 
Canberra suggested an ANZAC force, but Wellington turned this offer down as it felt that 
‘New Zealand may not wish to be associated automatically with a possible aggressive 
Australian attitude regarding strategy’.52 Australian and New Zealand forces did not have the 
same close links they had experienced during World War I because of their delayed entry into 
action and lack of composite units.53 Australia and New Zealand were given separate 
command areas in the Pacific which reinforced their separateness and meant they were ill-
informed about the other’s regional role.54 The main trans-Tasman disagreement came about 
in 1942 when Australia recalled most of its troops to the Pacific but New Zealand decided to 
keep its forces in the Middle East. In April 1943, New Zealand authorities did try to bring 
some troops back to the Pacific but submitted to pragmatic concerns and heavy pressure from 
London and Washington to stay in Europe.55 The Australians’ response was scathing; they 
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labelled New Zealanders the ‘curly haired boys of the empire’ and insisted that New Zealand 
should be independent enough to make its own decisions. Australia’s Prime Minister wrote to 
his New Zealand counterpart that for every soldier New Zealand kept away from the Pacific, 
an Australian or American would have to fill his place.56 While New Zealand did actually 
contribute to the Pacific War it was, and still is, believed in Australia that New Zealand 
shirked its responsibilities to regional defence.  
 
 Australia’s and New Zealand’s shared responsibility for the Pacific was reinforced towards 
the end of World War II when they together signed the Canberra Pact. This agreement 
reconciled and coordinated their defence policies in the Pacific. When the United States had 
given Australia and New Zealand separate areas of command in the Pacific area, both nations 
had protested strongly to Washington.57 The Canberra Pact, signed in 1944, attempted to 
establish common strategic interests and a regional zone of defence in New Zealand, 
Australia and through the islands north and northeast of Australia to Western Samoa and the 
Cook Islands. The Pact laid the foundation for trans-Tasman consultation in defence matters; 
joint training exercises, staff interchange and shared planning.58 Moreover, it set the 
framework for Australia and New Zealand to use their ‘special knowledge’ to contribute to 
the ‘peace, welfare and good Government of the whole Pacific region’.59 The Canberra 
Agreement arose partly out of frustrations with the United States and Britain and did not 
translate into a close trans-Tasman political relationship. However, it did establish a structure 
for close consultation and practical collaboration in the Pacific region between Australia and 
New Zealand, which has been maintained to this day.60 
 
The ANZUS treaty, signed in 1951 by Australia, New Zealand and The United States, 
seemingly signalled close Australasian ties. ANZUS gave Australia and New Zealand a 
promise of American support in the possibility of invasion and access to high level American 
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military intelligence and infrastructure.61 However, even from the first negotiations with the 
United States, Australia and New Zealand actually had divergent intentions. Australia wanted 
to lay the foundation for wider regional security in Asia and was happy to exclude the 
Commonwealth and NATO. By contrast, New Zealand was anxious to retain its support of 
Britain and was uninterested in a regional security pact. Moreover, different attitudes towards 
the United States existed in Australia and New Zealand well before the break-up of the treaty. 
In 1968, New Zealand rejected an American request to host an Omega Navigation facility. At 
the same time Australia had already accepted the Omega system and had three existing 
facilities.62 
 
The disruption of ANZUS in 1985 reflected Australia’s and New Zealand’s different defence 
priorities but also somewhat paradoxically drew the two nations closer together in strategic 
alliance. The Fourth Labour Government of New Zealand, acting on their election promise to 
make the nation nuclear-free, refused a request from the United States for their destroyer the 
USS Buchanan to visit.63 While New Zealanders had not foreseen exclusion from ANZUS, 
this was the ultimate result. Australian officials maintained that they must stick by America 
because of wider security interests and were irritated at New Zealand for potentially 
devaluing their agreement with the US from a multilateral to bilateral one.64 Nonetheless, 
after the crisis around ANZUS, Australia decided it was still in its best interests to draw New 
Zealand close and encourage it to remain a supporter of regional security. The New Zealand 
government of the time warmly welcomed this approach. So from the 1980s onward both 
governments emphasised that, excluding nuclear issues, Australia and New Zealand had very 
similar strategic interests, outlooks and objectives. They worked to make their forces 
compatible and support each other.65 In 1991, Australia and New Zealand adopted the policy 
of Closer Defence Relations (CDR). CDR was not a treaty, but an ‘evolutionary process of 
examining the practical possibilities of cooperation in aspects of training, doctrine and 
equipment procurement’.66 
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At the end of the twentieth century however, New Zealand unsettled the CDR agreement by 
reneging on some of its promises and jettisoning the combat arm of its air force. From 1997 
onwards, Australia became increasingly irritated at the New Zealand government’s perceived 
lack of commitment to defence. New Zealand’s level of defence funding was described as ‘a 
troubling aspect of the relationship’.67 New Zealand’s decision in 1999 to default on their 
promise to build a third ANZAC frigate further angered Australia. The 2000 Australian 
Defence White Paper declared ‘We would regret any decision by New Zealand not to 
maintain at least some air and naval combat capabilities’.68 There was considerable 
annoyance in Canberra when the New Zealand Labour government decided in 2001 to drop 
the air combat wing of the RNZAF, as they had for many years provided close air defence 
training for Australian Navy.69 In later years however, the fracas died down and Australia 
expressed official grateful recognition of New Zealand’s support of Australian peacekeeping 
operations.70 
Indeed, it should be emphasised that although there have been periods of resentment and 
disillusionment about the trans-Tasman defence relationship at a political and policy level, at 
the operational level Australia and New Zealand have continued to serve together on overseas 
missions.  In Korea, in 1951, the New Zealand regiment supported Australian infantry in the 
27 Commonwealth Brigade.71 In Vietnam, New Zealanders fought together with Australian 
units. The growing involvement of Australia and New Zealand in peacekeeping operations 
since the 1980s has provided many opportunities for defence personnel from the two nations 
to serve together. From 1982 to 1984, Australia and New Zealand operated a joint Anzac 
helicopter unit in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Sinai. New Zealand Army 
engineers worked with a 300 strong Australian engineer unit in Namibia. In Cambodia in 
1992, 40 New Zealand communications specialists together with a large Australian unit 
formed the mission’s communications unit. 72 Particularly in recent years, the growing 
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instability of some Pacific Island nations has led to regional peacekeeping missions. From the 
mid-1990s till the present, Australian and New Zealand defence forces have jointly planned 
and carried out operations in Bougainville, Solomon Islands, East Timor and Tonga. 
 
The important theme which emerges from this overview of Australian and New Zealand 
defence interaction is that it is simultaneously close and divergent. Because of their 
geographic proximity, shared British heritage, cultural similarity and inter-migration 
Australia and New Zealand do have broadly complementary views on defence. However, the 
defence relationship is not always close in the sense of agreement on policy. For example, in 
World War II, Australia and New Zealand deployed their troops differently. Moreover, while 
underpinned by a basic understanding of mutual strategic support, the tone of Australia’s and 
New Zealand’s defence relationship is changeable, responding independently to foreign wars, 
the international security climate, regional affairs, internal politics and public opinion. 
Indeed, the two nations have often simultaneously cooperated in one aspects of defence but 
acted separately in another. Australian and New Zealand cooperation in regional 
peacekeeping was concurrent with the New Zealand government’s decision to disband the 
combat section of its Air Force. Generally, however, threats and conflicts do draw the 
Australian and New Zealand Defence Forces closer together. Joint deployments in Gallipoli, 
the Western Front, Korea, Vietnam, Sinai and Solomon Islands provided an opportunity for 
Australian and New Zealand personnel to engage in joint planning, share experiences and 
form friendships. Another aspect of the trans-Tasman defence relationship is its cooperation 
on security issues in the Pacific. Because of their mutual interest in regional security and 
excluding unfriendly foreign intervention, Australia and New Zealand defence forces worked 
together in the Pacific War and more recently in peacekeeping interventions in Bougainville, 
East Timor and Solomon Islands. Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence relationship is one 
of siblings, not friends: sometimes clingy and familial, at other times estranged and resentful, 
but generally united in the face of outside danger. 
The creation of Anzac 
 
ANZAC is the acronym for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps which was created in 
Egypt, December 1914, by grouping the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force (NZEF) together under the command of Lieutenant-General William 
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Birdwood.73 ANZAC consisted of the 1st Australian Division, and the New Zealand and 
Australian Division under Major General Godley. Godley’s division was eventually made up 
of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the New 
Zealand Artillery Brigade, the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, and the 4th Australian 
Infantry Brigade.74 It is generally believed that the term Anzac was first coined by a New 
Zealand postal clerk, Sergeant K. M. Little, who made a rubber stamp with the corps’ initials 
to ink and register incoming mail.75 In spite of the later significance attached to the term 
‘Anzac’, the force was a marriage of convenience created by Imperial directives. Indeed, 
Godley had initially resisted the idea of an Australasian force in September 1914. Throughout 
their joint service, New Zealand and Australian commanders made sure to retain their 
independence and direct links to their respective national governments.76 Later on during the 
War on the Western Front, Australian and New Zealand troops separated further. On the 
Western Front, apart from April to May 1916, I ANZAC was a de facto Australian Corps, 
while II ANZAC was made up of the New Zealand division and Monash’s 3rd Australian 
Division. The New Zealanders also fought as part of the British XV and IV Corps. By 1918, 
the two ANZAC Corps had ceased to exist. With the exception of the mounted brigade in 
Palestine, the AIF and NZEF served separately and had their own distinct identities. 77 
 
Relationships between Australian and New Zealand troops in their Anzac formation were 
close but suffused by rivalry and national differentiation. During training in Egypt, the New 
Zealanders became characterised as more reticent, accepting of British discipline and 
gentlemanly as opposed to the more confident, undisciplined and aggressive Australians.78 
Charles Bean described how in Cairo a coolness developed between the two forces when 
New Zealand commanders curbed ‘drinking and slovenliness’ and then encouraged their men 
‘to have nothing to do with the Australians, but to show by their neat dress and sobriety that 
there was wide difference between the two forces’.79 New Zealand military historian, 
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Christopher Pugsley found many critical descriptions of Australians in New Zealand soldiers’ 
letters, diaries and recollections from World War I.80 However, once they faced the hardships 
of Gallipoli, Australian and New Zealand soldiers relied on each other and forged a bond out 
of their shared adversity. Charles Bean highlighted one particular assault where Major Hart 
and the Wellington Battalion came to the assistance of the severely weakened 2nd Australian 
Battalion. The two groups fought as one force and from then on ‘such small jealousies as had 
existed between Australians and New Zealanders in Cairo vanished completely… three days 
of genuine trial had established a friendship which centuries will not destroy’.81  The 
ANZAC mounted division in Sinai and Palestine worked together particularly effectively, 
firstly under an Australian Commander and then under a New Zealand one. A strong sens
rivalry remained between the Australian and New Zealand troops in spite of their close 
relationship. This was seen in the fiercely fought Inter-Allied rugby competition for the 
King’s Cup in 1919, where Australia defeated Ne
e of 
w Zealand. 82 
                                                           
 
The word Anzac quickly came to mean more than an acronym for the Australian and New 
Zealand forces. There were many other labels for Australian and New Zealand soldiers. The 
term ‘digger’ became a popular word for both nationalities although in later years it was 
appropriated by Australia as a nationalistic term. ‘Digger’ was a colloquial sobriquet with 
connotations of mateship, loyalty, larrikinism and the desire for a ‘fair go’.83 However, it was 
‘Anzac’ which became the most solemn and meaningful name for all Australian and New 
Zealand soldiers in World War I. The shared deaths at Gallipoli turned a convenient acronym 
into a sacred word. A shared Australian and New Zealand Anzac archetype developed in 
opposition to perceptions of the British soldier. Anzacs were physically superior to Britons, 
loyal to their nation and mates, egalitarian, and endowed with initiative and resourcefulness. 
However, neither nationality wished to be completely merged into the identity of the other, 
especially by outsiders who used the term Anzac for convenience’s sake in a type of back-
handed colonialism.84 Anzac did not merely signify a trans-Tasman connection; it was a term 
of national pride and identity in both Australia and New Zealand.  
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 Since their inception in 1915, Australia’s and New Zealand’s Anzac ceremonies have been 
closely linked but marked by different nuances of meaning. The Returned Services 
Association (RSA) of New Zealand and the Returned Services League (RSL) of Australia 
frequently sent delegations to each other’s Anzac services. New Zealand followed Australia’s 
lead in establishing a dawn service ceremony, making Anzac Day a half holiday and more 
recently in creating a Tomb of an Unknown Warrior and planning a Memorial Park.85 
Australia and New Zealand have traditionally used similar commemoration practices in 
Anzac Day services due to their common cultural background and constant exchange of 
ideas.86 In both nations, many people regard Anzac Day as their real national day.87 Then 
again, there are historical differences in the memorialisation of Anzac in each country. Anzac 
historians Stephen Clarke and Ken Inglis agree that New Zealand’s observance of Anzac Day 
has had a much stronger Protestant religious content than Australia.88 In Australia, especially 
in early years, Anzac Day was more of an ex-servicemen’s day than in New Zealand.89 In 
New Zealand, the Maori population have embraced and been included in Anzac Day more 
than Australian Aboriginals.90 The biggest difference between Australia and New Zealand is 
the tone of the Anzac legend. In Australia, Anzac celebrations are celebratory, nationalistic 
and frequently militaristic.91 In New Zealand, Anzac Days have traditionally been more 
focused on grief, mourning, remembrance and the repudiation of war.92 The other main 
divergence is that Australians tend to use the term Anzac as a synonym for ‘Australian’ 
whereas New Zealanders are always conscious of their larger partner in the Anzac 
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relationship.93 The Anzac traditions in Australia and New Zealand have developed in parallel 
but nonetheless are slightly different.  
 
In the last twenty years Anzac Day has grown in popularity in both Australia and New 
Zealand. Dawn Services in Australia, New Zealand and Gallipoli have increased in size 
dramatically. Anzac Day has become more inclusive of Vietnam veterans, descendants of 
soldiers and different ethnic groups.94 For the fiftieth anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli 
in 1965 an official party of 300 veterans and commentators from Australia and New Zealand 
attended. Only four Australian backpackers were present.95 Even thirty years ago Anzac Day 
ceremonies at Gallipoli might only have a dozen or so people attending. But the end of the 
Vietnam War, the growth of popular books and movies on Gallipoli, desire for a distinctive 
national heritage, expansion of the tourist industry and popularity of family history renewed 
interest in Anzac Day celebrations. By 2000 for the 75th anniversary, over 15 000 Australians 
and New Zealanders crowded onto the narrow beach at Anzac Cove where the first landing 
took place. Bruce Scates, who did an extensive survey of Australasian visitors to Gallipoli, 
found that there were commonalities among these modern pilgrims. Whether backpackers or 
descendants of soldiers, they saw Gallipoli as a sacred landscape and Anzac commemorations 
as a cathartic spiritual experience.96 Likewise, back home in Australia and New Zealand, 
numbers at dawn services continued to grow. The idea of Anzac retains a hold on the 
Australian and New Zealand popular imagination to the present day. 
 
The main ideas drawn out from the history of Anzac are that it is a relationship forged in 
adversity which has aspects of both similarity and difference. The Anzac relationship is 
strongest between Australians and New Zealanders when they serve together overseas, 
sharing danger and hardship. After early disagreements while training in Cairo, the Anzacs 
learned to rely on each other when facing the terrors of Gallipoli. Rivalry and national 
differentiation remain a key part of the Anzac relationship. Australian and New Zealand 
soldiers have always distinguished themselves from, and compared themselves to, their trans-
Tasman counterparts. Australia’s and New Zealand’s commemorations of Anzac Day have 
also developed in parallel but with significant variations. The idea of Anzac remains strong in 
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Australia and New Zealand, although it has a more nationalistic tinge in Australia, and has 
grown in national importance to both nations in recent years. 
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2.  Historiography 
 
 This chapter evaluates the Australian and New Zealand historiography related to the three 
main areas mentioned in chapter one: Australia’s and New Zealand’s association with the 
Pacific, defence relationship, and Anzac bond. Highlighting the intellectual trends in these 
areas is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, this chapter traces the genealogy of ideas 
which are still influential today, such as the notion that New Zealand has a superior cultural 
ability in the Pacific to Australia. Historiography illuminates how ideas change, evolve or die 
out. A firm grasp of historiography is also important as Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
defence and Pacific policy is often affected by academic arguments. Furthermore, a trans-
Tasman overview will also be able to identify the relative weighting of writing from each 
nation.  While this may seem obvious, historiography has not been often considered in trans-
Tasman sense. This approach reveals that both connections and dissimilarities exist between 
Australian and New Zealand historiography. 
 
A distinction needs to be made between strategic studies and historical writing when looking 
at defence and Pacific historiography. Strategic analysis on defence was initially written by 
politicians or military men. Since the 1960s, with the emergence of defence centres and 
think-tanks, the scope of this type of academia has greatly expanded. Strategic analysis is 
now usually done by political scientists or defence specialists. Its purpose is to investigate the 
current state of a nation or region’s defence situation, predict future patterns and then to make 
constructive recommendations for the future. It is often written in technical language and 
addresses those able to implement changes in defence policy. Strategic analysis generally 
only considers defence history as a brief context within which to place the contemporary 
issues being examined. It is most valuable as primary source which reveals the current 
preoccupations of defence thinkers. Historical writing, for the purposes of this chapter, is 
defined as academic work written by professional historians, which describes, investigates 
and evaluates past events. Historical writing usually has a less obvious agenda in influencing 
policy than politically motivated defence analysis. Although, of course, historians’ 
interpretations of events do vary depending on the time they are working in and their personal 
biases.  
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Australian and New Zealand views of the Pacific 
 
Up until the 1960s, Pacific history was written almost exclusively by Westerners and 
dominated by imperial concerns. Linnekin argues that in this type of Pacific history, all 
agency was given to the colonisers and the Islanders were merely acted upon. Australasian 
historians, especially those dealing with international affairs, considered the Pacific only as it 
related to Australia’s, New Zealand’s or the British Empire’s interests.1  Indeed, Pacific 
history was not seen as a separate discipline in Australia until the 1950s. In the aftermath of 
the Pacific War, Australia recognised that there was a widespread ignorance about the Pacific 
region.  As new Pacific nations began to emerge, Australia and New Zealand gave more 
prominence to academic study on their region. James Wightman Davidson, generally seen as 
the father of Pacific history, was appointed to the foundation chair of Pacific History at the 
Australian National University(ANU) in 1949. Davidson, a New Zealander with a strong 
sense of Australia’s and New Zealand’s responsibilities as colonial powers, promoted 
participant history and fieldwork.2 Interestingly, although the Department of Pacific History 
in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University remained the 
dominant institution in the area for the next thirty years, it was staffed mainly by New 
Zealanders or Britons.3 This imbalance reflected the greater attention given to Pacific studies 
in New Zealand and the lingering presence of British colonialism in the region. 
 
From the 1970s onwards, Pacific history fragmented and diversified. There was a trend 
among some members of the wider historical community at this time to believe that only 
‘insiders’ could understand and write about their own peoples’ history.4 Accordingly, some 
Pacific historians believed that non-Islanders could not write Pacific history. There was a 
move to decolonize not only written history, but academic institutions. The development of 
universities in Fiji and Papua New Guinea widened the boundaries of Pacific study and 
produced historians of Pacific origin such as Brij V. Lal and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka.5 Peter 
Hempenstall, a Pacific historian, argues that in the last 50 years, Pacific history has changed 
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from a ‘small and cosy field of Western academics plying their trade in ‘Island oriented 
history’ out of a finite number of scholarly institutions to a vast and complex field of multi-
disciplinary analysis practised by historians, anthropologists, linguists, pre-historians, literary 
and cultural studies critics’.6 
 
 The effect of recent historiographical changes is reflected in the literature. Perhaps fearing 
criticisms of re-colonialism, historians moved away from investigating the relationship 
between the Pacific and Australia and New Zealand. It is no coincidence that the most 
detailed study on New Zealand’s relationship with her Pacific territories, New Zealand’s 
Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, was published as long ago as 1969.7 
Recent Pacific historians have tried to divest themselves of a Eurocentric point of view 
although ironically the majority of Pacific historians are still mainly from Australia or New 
Zealand.8 The most recent accounts of Pacific-Australasian relationships are to be found in 
general historical surveys of the region or political science literature by Pacific experts such 
as Stewart Firth, Greg Fry or Richard Herr.9 Pacific-Australasian relationships are considered 
when applicable in individual histories of islands, missionaries and conflicts but are not the 
focus of much individual study. Max Quanchi in his 2003 submission to the Senate Foreign 
Affairs Committee on Australia’s relationship with the South Pacific outlined how Australia 
was no longer the leader in Pacific research. There was at that point only one university 
offering a package of Pacific papers.10 
 
There is room for historians to re-examine the Pacific’s relationship with Australia and New 
Zealand, especially in relation to recent events. Dietmar Rothermund argued in 2006 that 
there is a worldwide need for more comprehensive social and cultural histories of 
decolonisation: the narratives of a smooth transfer of power and triumphant nationalism are 
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now inadequate to explain the connections between metropolitan powers and colonies.11  
This seems to be true for the Pacific also. It is becoming increasingly apparent the 
independence settlements of the 1960s and 1970s affect the way the Pacific Island nations 
function (or do not) today. Pacific coups have forced a few historians to think about the past 
in the context of current political developments and then engage in moral judgement and 
debate about the present.12 For example, historian, Brij V. Lal, has been involved in 
commentating on the Fijian coups of the past few decades.13 And yet Lal, a historian 
interested in current Pacific affairs, is in the minority. ‘Participant’ history, as champione
Davidson has become unusual.  It is revealing that while the Journal of Pacific History issu
of September 2007 concentrated on the Solomon Islands and RAMSI, of the six contribut
only one was
d by 
e 
ors 
 a historian.14  
                                                           
 
The lack of historical interest in the relationship between Australia, New Zealand and the 
Pacific is more than compensated for in the area of political science and strategic analysis. 
Since the late 1980s, the fear of a potentially dangerous region has resulted in a flood of work 
on the Pacific’s strategic importance, stability and governance. Douglas Ranmuthugala rather 
cynically suggests that with the end of the Cold War, security organizations now had to find 
new regional threats to study in order to justify their existence.15 These organizations which 
use Pacific history to explain the present and justify policy recommendations are often 
closely linked to the Australian government. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 
established and funded by the Australian government, has put out several influential papers 
on Australia’s relationship with Solomon Islands.16 The Research School of Pacific Studies at 
the ANU receives funding from AusAid and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) to do specific research on the Pacific. The government departments send their people 
to the subsequent conferences and make use of the papers produced; even though there is no 
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obligation to support government policies a ‘strong bridging relationship’ exists.17 In recent 
years, Political Science departments in Australia and New Zealand have had a series of books 
and conference papers published which re-examine the Pacific region.18 In Australia in 
particular there has been a great deal of discussion about the Pacific islands as ‘failing’ 
states.19 
 
However, some strategic analysts and political scientists have begun to criticise their 
colleagues’ and governments’ narrow focus on the fraught politics and security of the Pacific 
in recent years. The first warning came from a 1996 article by Greg Fry in which he pointed 
out that a new and powerful ‘doomsday’ stereotype of the South Pacific had become 
prominent in Australia. Bureaucrats, politicians, foreign affairs journalists and academics 
incorrectly depicted the entire region as economically weak and corrupt, with unstable 
governance and unsustainable population growth.20 In the last few years there has been 
increasing criticism of the idea of Pacific islands as ‘failing’ states from both Australian and 
New Zealand Pacific experts. David Hegarty stated that the idea of the Pacific ‘arc of 
instability’ is too simplistic and over-dramatic.21 Graham Fletcher pointed out that there is no 
evidence of terrorist networks in the South Pacific and that Australia’s national security has 
never been at risk from so-called ‘failed’ states.22 Jonathan Fraenkel and M. Anne Brown 
have both recently argued that in pre-RAMSI Solomon Islands key elements of national life 
such as the judiciary, media, central bank, and food suppliers continued to function.23 Brown 
also claimed that commentators should not judge Pacific Island states harshly as they are still 
in the process of being created and retain traditional sources of cohesion.24  
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A further key idea found in the historiography is that New Zealand has a special ability in the 
Pacific because of its supposedly exemplary race-relations record with Maori. This view can 
be traced back to 19th century New Zealanders who felt they had a right to rule a Pacific 
empire because of their Polynesian expertise.25 The rhetoric of New Zealand’s aptitude in 
Pacific issues has become common and continues to the present. For example, when 
introducing a 1978 Foreign Policy Conference, the University of Otago Vice Chancellor, R. 
O. H. Irvine stated: ‘New Zealand has shown herself to be more in tune with the needs and 
aspirations of smaller nations in the Pacific. She is a Pacific Island state in a way Australia 
can never hope to be. The indigenous Polynesian population and a freer immigration policy 
have ensured that New Zealand will continue to play a leading role in this area. She is better 
equipped to understand and to think small.’26 Indeed, in recent years it has become 
increasingly common to claim that New Zealand is a Pacific nation itself. The 1990 New 
Zealand policy review, Towards a Pacific Island Community, declared that New Zealand was 
coming to terms with its place as a Pacific Island nation and was perceived by the Pacific 
Island Countries as in, and of, the region.27 Some authors of recent articles on regional 
defence and policy relationships assume that New Zealand is part of the Pacific, especially 
when compared to Australia.28 This view is often reinforced by the argument that New 
Zealand’s large Polynesian population gives New Zealand strong links with Pacific Island 
nations.29 A  Wellington columnist, Tapu Misa, argued in 2003 that the New Zealand 
government promotes New Zealand’s Pacific-ness as the one area in which New Zealand has 
an edge over Canberra.30 The idea of New Zealand as part of the Pacific has become a vital 
aspect of the New Zealand discourse about national identity. 
 
                                                            
25 Ross, 'Introduction', 1-2. 
26 R. O. H. Irvine, 'Foreword', in R. Hayburn (ed.), Australia and New Zealand Relations: 19-22 May 1978 
(Dunedin: Dept. of University Extension University of Otago, 1978), vii. 
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Review Group and J. Henderson, Towards a Pacific Island Community: Report (Wellington, 1990), 1, 3-4, 21. 
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Security Policy: Old Agenda Divergence, New Agenda Convergence?' in Australian Security after 9/11, 171., 
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Niggling Nationalism?' in B. Lynch (ed.), New Zealand and the World: The Major Foreign Policy Issues, 2005-
2010 (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Victoria University of Wellington, 2006), 33.  
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Peaceful Pacific. 
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in Redefining the Pacific, 48. 
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However, some regional experts argue that in reality New Zealand does not live up to its 
reputation as a Pacific nation.  Mary Boyd writing in the late 1970s was dismayed that under 
Robert Muldoon New Zealand had dramatically reduced the flow of Pacific migrants and was 
following Australia’s Pacific policies. She saw Australia and New Zealand as having 
basically similar bilateral relations with the Pacific in spite of their different race-relation 
records.31 A 1990 government task force charged with reviewing New Zealand’s relationship 
with the South Pacific cautioned against believing that just because New Zealand shares the 
same environment, it understands the region ‘through some magical process of osmosis’.  
The report highlighted that only a small number of New Zealanders have spent time in 
Pacific nations.  Furthermore, the Pacific was still perceived as a second-rate diplomatic 
posting and did not receive adequate resources. A number of Pacific submissions to the task 
force expressed concern that New Zealand’s Pacific policy was too heavily influenced by 
Australia.32 Malcolm McKinnon argued in 1993 that the rhetoric of New Zealand as a Pacific 
nation was ‘the language of informal empire’. He was sceptical that Pakeha had actually 
changed their identity in any way or that New Zealand foreign policy had a distinctively 
Pacific orientation. McKinnon stated, ‘white New Zealanders and Pacific Islanders have 
different identities, rooted in different historical circumstances and experiences’.33 Jim Rolfe 
in 2001 agreed that although New Zealand belonged in the South Pacific through its 
geographic position and social contact with Pacific peoples, the Pacific is not the region from 
which most New Zealanders derive their ethnic identity.34 In 2006, Ian Frazer and Jenny 
Bryant-Tokalau pointed out that although New Zealand does have a better reputation than 
Australia amongst Pacific nations, New Zealand has agreed with Australia in all large Pacific 
initiatives since 1990.35  
 
This historical overview on Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific 
reveals several important trends. Although New Zealand does have a strong interest in the 
Pacific and helped launch the Department of Pacific History department at the ANU, in 
recent years Australians have written more on the region than New Zealanders. Another trend 
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is the way Australian and New Zealand Pacific historiography has changed according to 
international trends. Australians and New Zealanders wrote Pacific history from a Western-
centred, ‘insider’, nationalist or post-colonial viewpoint when these approaches were current 
in the world-wide historical community. Another theme is that the desire to avoid accusations 
of re-colonial sentiments has discouraged historians from writing about the state of 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific. The majority of recent study on 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific is by political scientists and 
focuses on security issues. Another tendency in the historiography is New Zealand’s long-
standing depiction of itself as more integrated into the Pacific region than Australia. New 
Zealand highlights its special ability in Pacific affairs even when historical evidence suggests 
that New Zealand’s record with its surrounding region is patchy at best. This trend is 
important as it influences New Zealand decision-makers’ view of their nation. New Zealand’s 
Pacific policy is often affected by expectations of cultural sensitivity.  
Australian and New Zealand defence thinking 
 
In both Australia and New Zealand, there was a marked lack of historical writing on defence 
during the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the 1987 source book, Australians, a Guide to 
sources claims that Australian historians and observers published almost no books devoted to 
defence issues between 1908-1964. According to Australians, this gap illustrates ‘the 
indifference, excusing involvement in the two world wars, towards the defence of the nation 
at all levels of the community, including politicians, academics and press’ during this 
period.36  Coral Bell, an expert in international relations, agreed that strategic enquiry at the 
top political level was ‘virtually dead’ in Australia for 18 years after the ANZUS treaty was 
signed.37 In New Zealand a similar lack of discourse around defence exists. Malcolm 
McKinnon, a historian of New Zealand foreign policy claimed in 1993 that there was a dearth 
of New Zealand post-World War II political history.38 
 
Australian and New Zealand historians during the mid-twentieth century focused on studying 
their nation’s contribution to World Wars I and II rather than defence policy. In both nations, 
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Studies in Peace and War in Honour of Professor T.B. Millar (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies Australian National University, 1995), 54. 
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government-sponsored historians published comprehensive war histories in the 1940s and 
1950s. In the early 1940s, Australia’s official war correspondent, Charles Bean, authored and 
edited a monumental twelve volume official history of the Australian forces in World War 
I.39 Australia began an official history of its involvement in the Second World War in 1943 
with the appointment of Gavin Long as General Editor. The resulting 22 volumes, written by 
14 authors, were published by the Australian War Memorial between 1952 and 1977.40  In 
New Zealand, the military hierarchy’s narrow conception of military history and insistence 
on military authors injured the official history project on World War I. Four volumes of 
popular history were quickly churned out from 1919 onwards but lacked the rigour and depth 
of the Australian World War I project.41 New Zealand’s involvement in World War II was 
much more extensively covered. A War History Branch was established in April 1945 and 
the official history project was completed in the 1960s, altogether publishing 48 volumes and 
24 short booklets.42 Ian McGibbon claimed that the production of the New Zealand official 
World War II series involved just about anyone in the nation capable of writing military 
history.43 This sustained research into Australia’s and New Zealand’s efforts in foreign wars 
seems to have occupied historians so completely it prevented them from studying their 
nations’ histories with regard to regional concerns and local defence policy.  
 
From the late 1950s onwards however, interest in national defence and strategic policy rather 
than foreign wars, began to grow among historians in Australia and New Zealand.  Historians 
focused on previously neglected periods before and between the two world wars. A few 
historians investigated Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence policies in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Defence histories were written which argued New Zealand’s 
and Australia’s foreign policy had been more independent from outside influence than 
previously thought. This trend was identified in later years by Malcolm McKinnon who 
claimed that historians stressed New Zealand’s ‘old’ maturity out of nationalist sentiment.44 
An example of connecting past defence decisions with a new nationalist viewpoint is 
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demonstrated in David McIntyre’s 1988 book, New Zealand Prepares for War: Defence 
Policy 1919-39. McIntyre suggested the moral stance taken against nuclear power by New 
Zealand’s fourth Labour government in 1985 was the culmination of an earlier Labour 
government’s attempts in 1936-38 to foster universal collective security in the League of 
Nations.45 Prompted by contemporary interest in the region, historians on both sides of the 
Tasman also rediscovered their nations’ involvement in the Pacific during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century in matters of defence.46 The more nationalistic histories of the 
1970s and 80s identified Australia’s and New Zealand’s independent foreign policies as 
arising out of their role in the Asia Pacific area. It should be noted however, that the general 
trend in the field of history during the 1970s and 1980s was towards social history. Those 
who made defence history their field of expertise were a small minority.47 
 
In the Australian historiography, from the late 1950s onwards, a few historians began to 
argue that Australia had possessed a distinctive view of her position in the world. Charles 
Grimshaw in a 1958 article ‘Australian Nationalism and the Imperial Connection 1900-1914’ 
argued that Australian defence attitudes in the pre-war period demonstrated the growth of an 
Australian nationalism separate from Britain.48 In 1969, Neville Meaney published a 
somewhat inflammatory article in Australian Outlook which argued that the historical 
narrative of Australia having no foreign policy apart from Britain’s up until World War II 
was a myth. Meaney accused T. B. Millar of fostering this myth and offered an alternative 
interpretation of Australia’s defence policy as Pacific-centred.49 His book, The Search for 
Security in the Pacific, published in 1976, expanded this argument. Meaney asserted that 
from 1901-1923, even though it was still part of the British Empire, Australia developed an 
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individual strategic outlook. Australia undertook diplomatic initiatives and in the Asia-Pacific 
region ‘came to possess the substance of a foreign policy.’50  
 
Likewise, in New Zealand, during the 1970s and 1980s, a few history publications argued 
that New Zealand’s defence policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
more independent than previously realised. In 1971, John Henderson wrote a history of New 
Zealand defence policy from 1840-1939 which claimed that New Zealand remained loyal to 
Britain out of realism and consistently tried to influence imperial affairs in its own favour.51 
In 1981, Ian McGibbon, a Senior Historian for the Ministry of Defence, published Blue 
Water Rationale, a history of New Zealand’s naval policy up to the fall of Singapore. In this 
book McGibbon argued that while New Zealand did not have an independent view of foreign 
affairs before World War II, it consistently made sure of its own security long before 1935. 
New Zealand leaders consciously decided to secure their defence via dependence, not 
independence.52 In The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand 1840-1915, McGibbon 
reinforced this interpretation by claiming that New Zealand’s defence policy in the pre-World 
War I period was firmly centred on the Pacific region.53  Felicity Caird in her 1987 M.A. 
thesis, ‘The Strategic Significance of the Pacific Islands in New Zealand’s Defence Policy, 
1935-39’, argued that in the four years before WWII, New Zealand increasingly focused on 
Pacific defence.54 David McIntyre modified Caird’s argument in his 1988 book, New 
Zealand Prepares for War, by asserting that New Zealand’s influence shifted to the Pacific 
on behalf of, not in opposition to, the Empire.55 
                                                           
 
The development of political science and strategic studies writing on Australian and New 
Zealand defence originated in the 1950s. The exception to the lack of defence writing after 
World War II was in foreign affairs publications. In particular, the series, Australia in World 
Affairs, edited by Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper contained a reasonable amount of 
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information on Australia’s defence concerns. The first volume, which covers the period 1950-
1955, does not separate defence policy out from foreign policy. Defence matters are 
mentioned in relation to the regional ‘search for security’ and the threat of communism.  In 
the second volume on 1956-1960, defence is given subheading titles in chapters such as 
‘Australia and the US’ and ‘Australian Foreign policy in action’. By the third volume, which 
looks at the period from 1981-1965, there is a separate chapter on Australian defence policy 
written by T. B. Millar, an Australian defence expert. In the Journal of Australian Politics 
and History and The Australian Quarterly, there is little mention of defence issues during the 
1950s and 1960s.56 
 
By the mid-1960s, interest in regional defence policy helped instigate the growth of strategic 
analysis as an academic discipline in Australia and New Zealand. In Australia, growing 
controversy over the Vietnam War sparked a new interest in current defence matters. T. B. 
Millar’s seminal book, Australia’s Defence, published in 1965, started with the claim that 
Vietnam ‘has stimulated considerable public interest in defence in Australia, and a vigorous if 
not always well informed debate’.57  Millar’s book argued that defence was a subject of 
public concern which needed to be better understood. Though Australia’s Defence had one 
chapter on Australia’s defence history, Millar’s main concern was to analyse the current 
strategic and military situation of Australia. More significant than his prolific writing was 
Millar’s work in helping to establish the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) in 
1966 at the Australian National University. 
 
For two decades the SDSC, partly funded by the Australian Department of Defence was the 
only academic centre in Australia devoted to research on strategic and defence issues.58 The 
Institute quickly made up for the previous dearth of writing on Australian defence by turning 
out a never-ending stream of books and working papers on Australian defence. Academics 
associated with the SDCS soon became influential in Australian defence politics.59 Indeed the 
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Centre’s third head, Paul Dibb, was the driving force behind Australia’s adoption of the 
policy of military self reliance in 1987.60 By contrast, New Zealand took longer to develop an 
atmosphere of interest in defence policy. Its equivalent to the SDSC, the Centre for Strategic 
Studies (CSS), was only established in 1993.61  Both the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF 
contribute to the funding of the CSS. The Centre has a handful of permanent staff who are 
supplemented by visiting scholars from overseas or associates who are primarily employed 
by other universities.62 It is correspondingly less prolific and influential.   
 
In the post-Cold War environment of the early 1990s, defence policy-writers and experts in 
Australia and New Zealand became increasingly concerned with the Pacific region. They 
were apprehensive about the probable withdrawal of the United States from Micronesia, 
possible internal conflict in small, decolonised Pacific Island nations, the growth of new 
regional powers and maritime security. The United States’ donations of aid and military 
presence had helped keep the Pacific stable during the Cold War. In the early 1990s, small 
Pacific nations understandably doubted the United States’ continuing commitment to the area 
now that it was less strategically important.63 Strategic analysts also saw the potential of 
internal conflict in the region. As Stephen Henningham, an expert on the Pacific, pointed out 
in 1993, after the Cold War Pacific Island countries became less insulated from the outside 
world and more similar to comparable Third World countries.64 Onlookers saw Pacific 
nations negatively, as host to separatist ethnic and religious forces, with military groups 
increasingly involved in politics and vulnerable to authoritarian government.65 Those 
involved in Strategic Studies were conscious of the growing power of China, Japan and India. 
The military expansion of these nations attracted the concern of Australian authors in 
particular.66 There was also a new awareness of maritime security, natural resource issues 
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and boundary conflicts.67 Indeed, there was a general agreement among strategists that in 
1990s the South Pacific region was likely to become more complex and volatile. 
the 
                                                           
 
Strategic experts also became gradually more interested in Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
defence relationship from about the late 1960s onwards. In 1968, in response to Britain’s 
proposed withdrawal from the Suez base and an unstable South East Asia, the SDSC and 
Political Science department at Victoria University, Wellington, held a joint conference on 
Australia-New Zealand Defence co-operation. At the conference, the possibility of a joint 
planning system for the two nations’ defence was suggested.68 Delegates primarily 
investigated the economic facets of the defence relationship. The two Otago Foreign Policy 
schools on the Australia-New Zealand relationship, in 1978 and 1982, barely mentioned 
defence issues; instead Closer Economic Relations (CER) attracted most of the speakers’ 
attention.  However, after New Zealand’s withdrawal from the US guarantee under the 
ANZUS treaty in 1985, New Zealand and Australia mutually decided to strengthen their 
defence relationship.  Once again the preoccupations of the present prompted a re-
examination of the past. By 1990, the trans-Tasman defence relationship, both in its past and 
present guises, was increasingly studied, debated and contested. For example, Keith 
Sinclair’s book, Tasman Relations, published in 1987, contains two chapters on the defence 
and foreign affairs links betweens Australia and New Zealand.69  
 
Defence historiography in the 1990s has also reflected the changing tone of the trans-Tasman 
defence relationship. In 1992, a year after the Closer Defence Relations (CDR) agreement 
was signed between Australia and New Zealand, an Australian conference was held on 
CDR.70 Sir Frank Holmes, a senior New Zealand economist, was still emphasising the close 
mutual understanding of the two nations’ defence forces in 1996.71 By the start of the twenty-
first century, however, perceived differences in defence policy drove a wedge between the 
two nations’ defence viewpoints. The differences in Australia’s and New Zealand’s defence 
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Prospects (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1993), 52, Woodman, Australian Security Planning, 11. 
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outlook have been characterised by David McCraw as being between traditionalists and 
revisionists. Traditionalists, who predominate in Australia, believe a defence force should 
keep as full a range of capabilities as possible.  Revisionists, who control New Zealand 
defence policy, want a defence force structured for current needs.72 By 2001, both Australian 
and New Zealand defence experts, reflecting the differences in Australian and New Zealand 
defence policy, began to use the rhetoric of ‘drifting apart’.73  Hugh White’s seminal address 
at the 2002 Otago Foreign Policy School claimed that Australia and New Zealand were going 
separate ways on strategic policy. White emphasized the historic and contemporary 
differences between Australian and New Zealand defence policy and argued that the two 
nations needed to stop trying to work together on a shared strategic model.74  
 
However, in the last few years New Zealand strategists in particular have come to realise that 
in the specific context of the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand do have a shared security 
agenda. In 2001 Derek Quigley identified the current divergence between Australian and 
New Zealand defence policies. Instead of bemoaning the breakdown of CDR, Quigley 
suggested that the best option for the future was an Australia-New Zealand relationship that 
would maximise combined defence capabilities in the interests of regional security.75 
Quigley’s recommendations have proved prescient. Since 2000, the threat of international 
terrorism and internal unrest in some Pacific islands has caused Australia and New Zealand to 
increase their cooperative regional security efforts. Consequently, in the last few years, 
Australian and New Zealand strategists and government officials have endorsed trans-
Tasman defence cooperation in the Pacific region.  In 2005, the New Zealand Deputy 
Secretary of Defence, Chris Seed argued that the New Zealand and Australian governments 
work very closely in regional security issues and continue to have a ‘high degree of co-
operation, consultation and co-ordination.’76 Colin James, who stresses Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s differences in defence and international affairs, conceded in 2006 that there is a 
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growing appreciation of New Zealand’s peacekeeping contributions in the Pacific and the 
scope for further cooperation in Canberra.77 New Zealand-born political scientist, Robert 
Ayson and New Zealand-based strategic studies expert Stephen Hoadley have both written 
recent articles which emphasise the cooperation of Australian and New Zealand defence 
policy in the Pacific region.78  
 
Australian and New Zealand defence historiography has several key features: it is Australian 
dominated, has developed a Pacific-centred nationalism in the last 40 years, and affects 
defence policy decisions. Although earlier in the twentieth century, there was a dearth of both 
Australian and New Zealand defence writing, it is mostly Australians who have authored the 
plentiful strategic studies publications of recent years. This is because Australia has always 
been home to more academic defence centres and professional strategists than New Zealand. 
Moreover, military issues feature more prominently in Australian newspapers and popular 
politics than in New Zealand. These research centres and strategic analysts have tended to 
focus on current defence concerns. While authors did include some historical analysis this 
was often brief and used to highlight long term trends or contemporary issues.79 Australasian 
defence history has generally focused around the traditional military subject of war.  But 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s growing nationalism from the late 1960s onwards encouraged 
some historical study of past defence relationships and strategies in the Pacific. Likewise, 
around the same time, a renewed interest in the immediate region’s security led Australian 
political scientists and defence experts to pay attention to strategic issues in the Pacific. 
Indeed, defence historiography relating to the Pacific often provokes nationalism or national 
concern among Australian and New Zealand historians and strategic analysts. Recent 
Australian and New Zealand defence historiography has also affected national policy 
decisions, particularly in Australia, where defence think tanks are linked with the 
government. Hugh White’s claim that Australia and New Zealand were drifting apart helped 
prevent further divergence by alerting contemporaries to the trend and urging acceptance of 
differing policies. Likewise, reports on the state of the Pacific in recent years have influenced 
the Australian government’s decisions to intervene.  
                                                            
77 James, 'Foreign and Family', 34. 
78 Ayson, 'Australasian Security Policy', R. Ayson, 'When Cooperation Trumps Convergence: Emerging Trends 
in Australia-New Zealand Defence Relations', Security Challenges, 2/3 (October 2006)., Hoadley, Pacific Island 
Security Management. 
79 The exceptions to this rule are political scientists John Henderson in New Zealand and Stewart Firth in 
Australia who both had originally trained and worked as historians. 
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The development of the Anzac legend 
 
In the years immediately after the 1915 landing at Gallipoli historians and journalists created 
the legend of Anzac as a sacred, nation-defining, uniquely Australasian ideal. Ellis Ashmead-
Bartlett, the official British war correspondent, wrote a laudatory first account of the landing 
which set the tone for future commemoration of Anzacs. Charles Bean claimed that 
Ashmead-Bartlett’s despatch probably influenced the Anzac tradition more than any other 
accounts written subsequently.80 Philip Schuler’s book on the Anzac troops at Gallipoli, 
Australia in Arms (1916) reinforced the legend. Schuler claimed that ‘ANZAC’ was the 
‘worth of a Nation and Dominion proved by five letters’. Gallipoli was a ‘baptism of fire’ 
that gave Australia the ‘indelible stamp of Nationhood’ and would ‘ever form the front page’ 
in its history.81 A Child’s History of Anzac, also published in 1916, mythologized the Anzacs 
as heroic, innovative, gallant heroes who had shown the world the worth of the Australians 
and New Zealanders.82 In Australian popular culture (which would have been available in 
New Zealand also) there were a series of books and movies made about Anzac. Early 
articulation of the Anzac legend was displayed in C. J. Dennis’s tales of Ginger Mick in The 
Songs of a Sentimental Bloke (1915) and The Moods of Ginger Mick (1916), both of which 
quickly sold 40 000 copies on publication. Another example is The Anzac Book, a 
commemorative collection of work by Anzac men, edited by Bean. By 1916 it sold more than 
100 000 copies. It developed a picture of Anzacs as bush dwellers; tough men who endured 
hardship stoically and stood by their mates till the end.83 In 1928, Film-maker A. C. Tinsdale 
produced the movie Gallipoli. Other successful war films included, Ginger Mick (1920) by 
Raymond Longford, Diggers (1931) by F. W. Thring, Diggers in Blighty (1933) by Pat 
Hanna and Forty Thousand Horsemen (1940) by Charles Chauvel.84 The Anzac legend was 
well-enshrined in Australian and New Zealand society within a few years of 1915 and this 
trend continued throughout the early to mid twentieth century. 
 
The most important individual in the early historiography of Anzac is Charles Bean, the 
official war correspondent and author of the Australian official histories of World War I. 
                                                            
80 Bean wrote this in an article in the Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1931, 17 on occasion of Ashmead- 
Bartlett’s death.  J. Macleod, Reconsidering Gallipoli (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 114. 
81 P. F. E. Schuler, Australia in Arms: A Narrative of the Australasian Imperial Force and Their Achievement at 
Anzac (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916), 99, 15, 291-2. 
82 E. C. Buley, A Child's History of Anzac (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916). 
83 Macleod, Reconsidering Gallipoli, 6. 
84 R. Nile, 'Peace, Unreliable Memory and the Necessities of Anzac Mythology', in Anzac: Meaning, Memory 
and Myth, 90. 
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Bean envisaged his official war histories as a monument to the Australian soldiers, a literary 
equivalent to his plans for the Australian War Memorial. In 1938 he said ‘The first question 
for my fellow historians and myself clearly was: How did the Australian people – and the 
Australian character, if there is one – come through the universally recognised test of this, 
their first great war?’85  The first volume of Bean’s The Story of Anzac came out in 1921 and 
the second in 1924. Together they were a massive narrative of the Gallipoli campaign as well 
as a celebration of the Australian character told from the viewpoint of the trenches. For the 
next 23 years Bean worked on his detailed histories of World War I and in 1946 published a 
more accessible one volume abridgement, Anzac to Amiens, for the ordinary Australian.  
 
New Zealand’s Anzac tradition and historiography has always been less prominent and 
nationalistic than Australia’s. New Zealand’s official history of World War I consisted of 
only three volumes, which were ‘short, breezy and not heavily documented’.86 Indeed, New 
Zealand had no comparable figure to Bean who could articulate their national Anzac story. 
The closest equivalent was Malcolm Ross, New Zealand’s World War I correspondent, who 
did not arrive at Gallipoli until June 1915.87 Moreover, New Zealand, up until recently, has 
lacked any war museum equivalent to the Australian War Memorial which plays a key role in 
purposefully disseminating the mythology of Anzac. The Australian War Memorial puts on 
exhibitions, funds research, holds conferences and helps publish books that address the role 
of Australia in war. Moreover, it acts as a sacred place, the temple of the civil religion of 
Anzac.88 In New Zealand there is nothing like so powerful a statement of national 
remembrance. After World War I there was talk of a New Zealand national war museum but 
it never eventuated. Even the Auckland War Memorial Museum devotes only a small section 
to war.89 New Zealand has always remembered Gallipoli but with less emphasis on 
mythologizing Anzac as a national achievement. 
 
There was not much published, either for an academic or popular audience on the Anzac 
legend during the mid twentieth century. Ken Inglis speculated that J. A Hobson’s influential 
book Imperialism impressed post-war scholars with the idea that military history was  ‘a 
                                                            
85 K. S. Inglis, 'The Anzac Tradition', in Anzac Remembered, 19. 
86 Ibid., 83, 85, 87, 89. 
87 R. Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross: A Forgotten Casualty of the Great War', MA Thesis (Dunedin: University of 
Otago, 2007). 
88 Inglis and Brazier, Sacred Places, 333, 459. 
89 K. S. Inglis and J. Phillips, 'War Memorials in Australia and New Zealand', in J. Rickard and P. Spearritt 
(eds.), Packaging the Past? Public Histories (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 189. 
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ghastly pageant in which the young men of all nations were sacrificed to the squalid designs 
of capitalists lusting for markets… a subject for angry tears rather than investigation’. 
Consequently Australian historians ignored Australia’s official military histories during the 
1950s and 1960s.90 During the 1960s, Inglis found nothing in his university career had helped 
him understand Anzac. World War I did not make it onto the university history syllabus 
because, as in British universities, history stopped before the twentieth century.91 Likewise, 
Bill Gammage, a well-known historian of Australian’s involvement in World War I was 
disappointed in the early 1960s by the academic neglect of military history. His choice of a 
World War I topic for his honours thesis was so unusual he had to be given a supervisor from 
Duntroon.92 The same was true for New Zealand universities which also followed British 
universities’ example. On certain Anzac anniversaries celebratory accounts would be 
published; however, such works were brief, relied on existing material and did not challenge 
or analyse the subject. 93 
 
Since the 1960s there has been a growth in Australian historiography which examines not just 
the Gallipoli campaign but also the creation of the Anzac legend. Because of the central 
position of the Anzac legend in Australian identity it has been of greater interest to Australian 
historians than New Zealand historians. The pioneer in the field was Australian historian, 
Ken Inglis. Inglis was the first to study Charles Bean and his significant role in shaping the 
Anzac legend. He wrote notable articles over the years which investigated the nature of the 
Anzacs, the sacredness of Anzac Day, the development of the legend and its 
memorialisation.94 During the 1970s, two popular and influential Australian histories of 
Gallipoli were published; Bill Gammage’s The Broken Years and Patsy Adam-Smith’s The 
Anzacs. Their work contributed to a growing public awareness of the Anzac legend in 
Australia.95 Gammage’s view of Gallipoli particularly attained a wide influence through his 
work as historical advisor on Peter Weir’s 1981 film Gallipoli.96 Another influential 
historical study was that done in the early 1990s by the Australian oral historian, Alistair 
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Thomson. Thomson interviewed working class Anzacs and analysed how their memories 
intersected with and contradicted public legends about Anzac. His work demonstrated the 
ways the Anzac legend has flattened out the nuances of individual experience.97 Since the 
1970s, the Australian War Memorial has become a centre of research as well as a memorial. 
It has a popular archival centre with searchable databases which are accessible to the public. 
Indeed, increasingly the role of the Australian War Memorial is also being studied by 
Australian academics.98  
 
Other historians, mainly from Australia, simultaneously widened, revised and re-examined 
the Anzac legend. Some activist authors examined the legend of Anzac from the perspective 
of feminism and gender studies in the late 1980s.99 There have also been books written which 
revise traditional Australian Anzac narratives in the last ten or so years. Richard Nile re-
examined the academic assumption that war had little impact on the Australian literary 
scene.100 In 1992, Peter Cochrane’s book, Simpson and Donkey investigated the development 
of the Anzac legend of Simpson which was taught in Australian schools for much of the 
twentieth century.101 In 1993, E.M. Andrews published The Anzac Illusion which pointed out 
the parochialism, delusions and exaggerations of the legend.102 Dale Blair critically 
investigated the chauvinistic depiction of the Australian digger by focusing on civilian links 
of family and class, and examined the emotional dilemmas facing Australian soldiers in 
World War I.103 Issues of ethnicity and transnational influence are some of the more recent 
Anzac issues to be examined. Australian historian, Jenny Macleod, compared the Australian 
and British traditions of Gallipoli in her recent book Reconsidering Gallipoli. Two recent 
books examine the background of Australian Anzacs who came from Russian and German 
backgrounds.104 Bruce Scates in his recent book, Return to Gallipoli examines the history of 
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Australasian pilgrimages to war sites and the recent phenomenon of tourists visiting Anzac 
Cove as a sacred journey.105  
 
In New Zealand, there has only been a little done on the topic of Anzac in comparison to 
Australia.  Stephen Clarke and Scott Worthy have done some investigation into the 
development of Anzac Day celebrations.106 New Zealand cultural historian Jock Phillips 
collaborated with Inglis on an article comparing Australian and New Zealand war 
memorials.107 Popular books on Gallipoli continue to be written by both Australian and New 
Zealand authors. For example, Chris Pugsley published The Anzac Experience, in 2004.108 
Unfortunately, New Zealand is only occasionally mentioned in the new work on Anzac and 
as yet has not followed suit with comparable studies. This means that New Zealand is 
underrepresented in recent historiography on the development of Anzac.109 Perhaps because 
of the smallness of the New Zealand historical community, there are no comparable figures to 
Ken Inglis who are recognised experts on the New Zealand Anzac tradition.110 
 
There are several important themes in Australian and New Zealand Anzac historiography. 
The Anzac tradition has been far more thoroughly investigated in Australia. The significant 
critical attention paid by Australian historians to the development of the Anzac legend is 
unmatched in New Zealand. Australia’s dominance in the historiography is partly due to its 
larger academic community. But it is also a consequence of the important role that the themes 
of defence and Anzac play in the development of Australia’s sense of national identity. 
Australian writing on Anzac mimics historical events in that it often ignores the ‘NZ’ in 
Anzac. Australian historians usually only explore the Australian Anzac tradition and trans-
Tasman studies are rare. The body of New Zealand writing on Anzac is much smaller but it 
usually includes Australians in its depiction of the Anzac experience. The expansion of 
Anzac publications, in Australia in particular, has arisen from a nationalist impulse. It mirrors 
the growing numbers of Australians and New Zealanders eager to honour the Anzac tradition 
as part of their identity. 
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Recognising how international trends shape historiography brings an awareness of the 
limitations of any one publication but also reveals how some ideas and historical 
interpretations endure over time. For example, the historiography of Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s role in the Pacific differs according to its context but retains general themes. 
Nineteenth century politicians advocating a Pacific empire, late-twentieth century nationalist 
historians arguing that Australia’s and New Zealand’s early autonomous foreign policy 
originated in the Pacific, and  twenty first century political scientists describing RAMSI, all 
use different vocabularies and focus on different spheres of interest. Nonetheless, in all their 
work it is assumed that the Pacific is of vital importance to Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
security and that intervention is justified when conflict emerges. Similar themes, which are 
expressed in different forms but retain an integral continuity are New Zealand’s superior 
ability in the Pacific and the importance of Anzac.  
 
Another key pattern is that while the body of Australian historiography is larger than New 
Zealand’s in all three areas, it is generally national rather than transnational in scope. New 
Zealand, being the smaller nation, is more aware of Australian influence than vice versa. 
Furthermore, historiography, especially that by strategists, both reflects and influences 
popular opinion and governmental policy decisions. 
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3. The TMG in Bougainville 
 
This chapter’s main focus is the trans-Tasman negotiation and planning of the Bougainville 
peace process and shared Australian and New Zealand experiences in the early months of the 
Truce Monitoring Group. There is a large existing body of work on the history of 
Bougainville and the causes and course of the civil war that began in 1989.1 Likewise, 
authors have analysed the role of the Burnham meetings in New Zealand extensively.2 Thus, 
background details to the conflict will be dealt with concisely, and with an emphasis on 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s involvement. Rather than give a detailed narrative of the 
entire process, three themes will be addressed in the context of the Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s efforts to bring peace to Bougainville: firstly, tensions and disagreement; secondly, 
collaboration, and thirdly, the idea of cultural sensitivity in the Pacific. This thematic 
approach, although broadly chronological, does not give a complete narrative of the events in 
each team site or the experiences of individual monitors. Instead it seeks to stress the Anzac 
theme of Australia’s and New Zealand’s simultaneous conflicts and cooperation in the policy 
making, planning and early stages of the TMG. Trans-Tasman differences are given special 
attention as they have often been glossed over in previous writing. Furthermore, the chapter 
highlights the trend of the emphasis on New Zealand’s special ability in the Pacific in order 
to lay the ground for a critical examination of this idea in chapter five.   
 
 
 
                                                            
1 For a selection see, R. J. May and M. Spriggs, The Bougainville Crisis (Bathurst, N.S.W.: Crawford House 
Press, 1990)., A. Regan, 'Current Developments in the Pacific: Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict', 
Journal of Pacific History, 33/3 (1998)., S. Dorney, The Sandline Affair: Politics and Mercenaries and the 
Bougainville Crisis (Sydney: ABC Books for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1998)., G. T. Harris, N. 
Ahai, and R. Spence, Building Peace in Bougainville (Armidale; N. S. W: Centre for Peace Studies University 
of New England; National Research Institute, 1999)., Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade, Australia, ‘Bougainville, the Peace Process and Beyond’, 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/bougainville/BVrepindx.htm>., D. Denoon, Getting Under the 
Skin: The Bougainville Copper Agreement and the Creation of the Panguna Mine (Carlton: Melbourne 
University Press, 2000)., A. Downer and G. Urwin, The Bougainville Crisis: An Australian Perspective 
(Canberra: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001)., A. Carl and L. Garasu, Weaving Consensus: The Papua 
New Guinea-Bougainville Peace Process (London: Conciliation Resources in collaboration with BICWF, 2002). 
2  For example, see S. McMillan, Briefing on Bougainville (Lincoln: International Trade Policy Research 
Centre: Dept. of Economics and Marketing Lincoln University, 1997)., T. P. Rosanowski, 'Resolving the 
Bougainville Conflict: Readiness and Third Party Intervention in Civil War',  MA Thesis (Christchurch: 
University of Canterbury, 2001)., J. Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville', International 
Peacekeeping, 8/4 (Winter 2001)., L. Gault, Desiree, 'The New Zealand Intervention in the Bougainville 
Conflict: A Legal-Rational and Cultural-Intuitive Approach to Conflict Resolution in Melanesia', MA Thesis 
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Background to the Bougainville Conflict 
 
Bougainville, (see Map 3.1), named for the French explorer Louis de Bougainville who 
sighted it in 1768, is a large island, about 200km long and between 60-100 km wide, 
positioned to the east of Papua New Guinea. The smaller island of Buka at the northern tip is 
also included as part of Bougainville. When colonial boundaries were drawn up in the late 
nineteenth century, Bougainville was included as part of German New Guinea even though it 
was geographically, culturally and ethnically closer to the Solomon Islands chain. Indeed 
there have historically been close trading and missionary links between Bougainville and 
Solomon Islands.  After World War I, when Australia took over German New Guinea, 
Bougainville was included as part of the handover. In 1975, in spite of calls for secession, 
Bougainville became a province of newly independent Papua New Guinea. Bougainville’s 
population of about 200,000 is ethnically and linguistically diverse. There are about 21 
distinct languages on the island. Although Bougainvillean men dominate politics and public 
life, the matrilineal nature of land custodianship means women have a relatively high status 
in Bougainvillean society. The capital is Arawa, on the eastern coast.3  
 
The causes for the Bougainville conflict which began in late 1988 were varied and deeply 
rooted.  Although Bougainvillean dissatisfaction about the Panguna gold and copper mine 
was undoubtedly a major source of disagreement there were other long-standing issues which 
contributed to the outbreak of violence. Economic, ethnic and social tensions in Bougainville 
created an environment conducive to civil unrest. Bougainville was generally an egalitarian 
society without economic disparity between individuals until the 1950s; however, the influx 
of foreign servicemen during World War II made Bougainvilleans aware of their inferior 
material wealth compared to industrialised societies. The shift from subsistence gardening to 
cash crops in the 1950s disrupted traditional cycles of land transferral and placed pressure on 
land availability. Population growth further increased pressure on the traditional agricultural 
system.4 There were also pre-existing tensions between different Bougainvillean groups. In 
the relatively prosperous villages of Buka, integration with Papua New Guinea was favoured 
                                                            
3 McMillan, Briefing on Bougainville, 1., M. S. Murray, 'What It Means to Be in the Gloom of Misery: 
Reflections from a Group of Bougainvilleans Living in the Solomon Islands Speak of Their Experiences as 
Refugees', MA Thesis (Palmerston North: Massey University, 1999), 45-6., M. A. Brown, Security and 
Development in the Pacific Islands, 90-2., Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Bougainville: The 
Peace Process and Beyond.'  
4 J. Connell, 'The Panguna Mine Impact', in P. Polomka (ed.), Bougainville: Perspectives on a Crisis (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Research School of Pacific Studies Australian National University, 1990), 
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whereas other areas of Bougainville advocated independence. Although primary schooling 
was almost universal in Bougainville by the 1980s, secondary schooling and jobs were 
limited. By the 1980s there was a large pool of semi educated young men with little 
opportunity or social status.5 
 
Another underlying cause of the Bougainville conflict was the sense of common identity 
which had developed gradually among Bougainvilleans during the twentieth century. From 
the 1950s in particular, identity politics focused on grievances arising from colonial neglect. 
In 1962 Bougainvillean leaders applied to a visiting UN Mission to have administration 
transferred to the United States. As resentment about the mine grew, Bougainvilleans 
increasingly blamed the ‘redskin’ Papua New Guinean immigrants for their problems. They 
believed they deserved special treatment as the original inhabitants of the land. In the years 
before Papua New Guinea became independent in 1975, there were concerted calls among 
Western-educated Bougainvillean groups for independence.6  
 
The creation of the Panguna mine exacerbated existing tensions and created new ones. 
Alexander Downer described it as the catalyst and symbol around which old and new 
grievances accumulated.7 Surveying and test drilling began in the early 1960s and the gold 
and copper mine opened in April 1972.8 The Bougainville Copper Agreement arranged for 
compensation payments between the Papua New Guinean government and the Panguna 
Landowners Association (PLA). This agreement became a source of grievance among 
younger Bougainvilleans who accused the PLA of mismanaging the funds.  Furthermore, 
some tribal groups received more compensation than others. The mine’s payments created 
significant economic inequalities between and within clan groups. The Australian 
administration did not understand matrilineal clan lineages and recorded land titles 
incorrectly. Payments failed to increase with population growth and rifts developed as 
younger landowners demanded their share.9 From the beginning of mine operations there was 
also dissatisfaction at the environmental damage caused by mining. The local river and 
                                                            
5 Brown, Security and Development in the Pacific Islands, 97. 
6 The long held sense of Bougainvillean distinctiveness climaxed fifteen days before Papua New Guinea gained 
independence. Bougainvillean leaders declared their own island independent and were only reconciled to Papua 
New Guinea after a year of negotiation. Downer and Urwin, The Bougainville Crisis, 2. 
7 Ibid., 4. 
8 For a full account of the process of the creation of the mine and the Agreement negotiated between Australia, 
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville see Denoon, Getting Under the Skin. 
9 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond.', Brown, Security 
and Development in the Pacific Islands, 93-4, 96. 
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wildlife were poisoned and the mining company removed vast amounts of land only to turn it 
into thousands of tonnes of tailings. Inequalities between Papua New Guinean mine workers 
and locals furthered feelings of resentment. Dissatisfied young Nasioi landowners formed the 
New Panguna Landowners Association under the leadership of former mine employee 
Francis Ona and began to sabotage mine infrastructure.10 Persistent sabotage led to the 
closing of the Panguna mine and the deployment of Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
(PNGDF) and police contingents in 1989. 
 
 After the mine closed, the Papua New Guinean Government declared a state of emergency 
and suspended Bougainvillean provincial government.  In early 1989, Ona and his followers 
became known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and developed their own 
ideology which promised to expel outsiders and re-establish traditional Bougainvillean 
society.11 The use of excessive force by the police and military against suspected BRA 
supporters alienated much of the Bougainvillean population. In 1990, PNG put a blockade in 
place which precipitated social hardship and economic collapse. Francis Ona declared 
Bougainville the Independent Republic of Me’ekamui and established the Bougainville 
Interim Government (BIG).  Local opposition to the BRA coalesced to become the 
Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF).In September 1990 the BRF invited the PNGDF to 
return to Bougainville. From 1990-1996 various attempts to resolve the conflict alternated 
with continued violence and military operations.  The Endeavour Accords of August 1990, 
Honiara Declaration of January 1991, Bougainville Leaders Forum of April 1993, Arawa 
Peace Conference of October 1994 and Cairns Conference at the end of 1995 all failed to 
facilitate lasting peace.   
 
In June 1996, Papua New Guinea’s new military offensive on Bougainville ended dismally in 
the Kangu Beach Massacre. Twelve PNGDF and police personnel were killed and five taken 
hostage.12 This catastrophe angered the Papua New Guinean Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan 
and he entered into secret negotiations with Sandline International to contract a mercenary 
force to defeat the BRA. When this plan was publically denounced by PNGDF Brigadier 
General Singirok in March 1997 and criticised by Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific 
                                                            
10 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond.', R. J. May, 'The 
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Island nations, the Sandline contract was suspended and the stage set again for further peace 
negotiations.13 
 
Australia and New Zealand had been involved in previous attempts to end the Bougainvillean 
conflict. In 1990, New Zealand hosted peace talks on a Royal New Zealand Navy ship, 
HMNZS Endeavour, off the east coast of Bougainville. The Endeavour Accord was signed 
but never implemented.14 Australia’s relationship with Bougainville was compromised 
because of its ownership of the Panguna mine and military aid to the PNGDF during the 
Bougainvillean conflict.15 Nonetheless, in 1994, Australia led a peacekeeping operation to 
secure the site of the PNG-organised Arawa Peace Conference. The South Pacific 
Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) consisted of about 400 soldiers from Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu, 
with logistic backing provided by Australia and to a smaller extent New Zealand. The SPPKF 
attempted to secure the site of the peace conference and several neutral zones where delegates 
would gather under protection for the duration of the talks. Unfortunately Ona and his close 
supporters failed to attend when their personal security could not be guaranteed.16 Bob Breen, 
a prominent Australian military historian who has studied Operation Lagoon, argued that 
although Australia was guilty of rushed deployment, vague planning and cultural misreading 
of the Pacific Island troops and Bougainvillean conflict, failure at Arawa was due to rogue 
elements of the PNGDF ambushing secessionist leaders on their way to the conference.17  
 
Nonetheless the SPPKF showed the potential of a regional peacekeeping force and hinted at a 
new consensus emerging among Pacific nations that the Bougainvillean civil war was a 
neighbourhood problem.18 In 1995, Australia hosted peace talks in Cairns, but when the 
returning Bougainvillean delegates were shot at by PNGDF forces, violence re-erupted and 
                                                            
13 A. Regan, 'Preparation for War and Progress Towards Peace: Bougainville Dimensions of the Sandline Affair 
', in S. Dinnen, R. J. May, and A. Regan (eds.), Challenging the State: The Sandline Affair in Papua New 
Guinea (Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, 1997), 71. 
14 J. Martin, The Path to Peace: The New Zealand Defence Force in Bougainville 1990-2003 (Wellington: New 
Zealand Defence Force, 2003), 2. 
15  The Australian government provided training, equipment and finance to the PNG Defence Force during 
operations on Bougainville. Australia supplied Papua New Guinea with Pacific Class patrol boats, speedboats, 
Iroquois helicopters and Nomad aircraft which have all been used to maintain and enforce the blockade on 
Bougainville. In addition, some Australian advisors directed and advised Papua New Guinea on day-to-day 
operations during the war. V. John, 'The Australian Role in Bougainville', in Building Peace in Bougainville, 24. 
16 B. Breen, Giving Peace a Chance: Operation Lagoon, Bougainville 1994: A Case of Military Action and 
Diplomacy (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence; No. 142; Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 
Australian National University, 2001), 79-89. 
17 Ibid., B. Breen, [personal correspondence], 8-1-08. 
18 Downer and Urwin, The Bougainville Crisis, 12. 
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the peace process was once again derailed. 19 At the beginning of 1997 all of New Zealand 
and Australia’s attempts to resolve the Bougainville crisis had failed.  
 
In early 1997, New Zealand, led by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don McKinnon, renewed 
its efforts to resolve the Bougainville conflict. After the National Government returned to 
power in 1996, McKinnon, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided he wanted to do 
something about the problem of Bougainville.20 New Zealand representatives contacted the 
BRA leaders through Martin Miriori of the BIG who was living in The Hague as an exile. 
Small planning meetings, held in Honiara and Auckland between New Zealand and 
Bougainvillean representatives, decided that New Zealand would host a peace meeting. 
Papua New Guinea was not enthusiastic but the Sandline crisis put them in a weak position to 
intervene.21 After some risky transportation of Bougainvillean delegates to New Zealand by 
the RNZAF, a conference was held at Burnham from 3 to18 July. Warring Bougainvillean 
parties agreed to release five Papua New Guinean hostages and signed the Burnham 
Declaration which committed them to a peace process.22 The second round of talks at 
Burnham began on 1 October 1997 and included government officials from Papua New 
Guinea and Solomon Islands.23 Burnham II resulted in the Burnham Truce. A month after 
Burnham II, talks were held in Cairns to arrange the composition and conditions of the Truce 
Monitoring Group.  
 
The consensus reached at Burnham II called for a neutral regional group to monitor the truce. 
A formal agreement, signed at Port Moresby on 5 December 1997 by Papua New Guinea, 
New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu, provided the legal framework for the actions of 
the truce monitors. The TMG was then deployed in Bougainville on 6 December 1997.24 
Despite Bougainvillean reservations, New Zealand insisted on incorporating a 90-strong 
                                                            
19 May, 'The Bougainville Conflict and Its Resolution', 462. 
20 Most sources agree that Don McKinnon was the driving force behind the Bougainville peace process. Roger 
Mortlock argued that John Hayes saw the opportunity first. However, this does not detract from the fact that it 
was McKinnon who had the authority and means to move forward the plans for mediation with John Hayes as 
his right-hand man. R. Mortlock [interview], Wellington, 7-9-07. For first hand account from Don McKinnon 
see Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville', 46. Bede Corry said McKinnon’s view was ‘there’s 
this bleeding sore on our doorstep and it behooves us to do something about it.’ B. Corry, [phone interview], 
Wellington, 2-10-07. 
21 B. Corry, [phone interview], J. Rolfe [personal communication], Wellington, 5-9-07.  
22 Bougainville Leaders, 'The Burnham Declaration: By Bougainville Leaders on the Re-Establishment of a 
Process for Lasting Peace and Justice on Bougainville ', 
<http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_19970718.html>, accessed 4-5-07. 
23 McMillan, Briefing on Bougainville, 5-7. 
24 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond'. 
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Australian logistical support group along with 20 Australian civilian monitors in the TMG. 
New Zealand provided about half the force and there were also small groups of Fijian 
military and civilian Ni-Vanuatu, making up a total of about 250 personnel.25 NZDF 
Brigadier Roger Mortlock who was responsible for planning and deploying the force did not 
follow any doctrinal peacekeeping recipe but instead worked out what was needed from first 
principles. 26The TMG was divided into four teams, each of about 20 members, who were 
situated in Arawa, Buka, Buin and Tonu. The teams monitored and reported on the 
implementation of the Burnham Declaration: 
 
The monitoring teams patrolled, observed and participated in village social 
life in their areas. A patrol typically consisted of village stops, presentations 
to the villagers about the peace process and the TMG, discussions about the 
truce process and how it was holding out in the village area, and answering 
questions. The TMG’s aim was to instil trust in the integrity of the peace 
process and this was best achieved by the monitoring patrols demonstrating 
benign presence over as wide an area as possible.27  
 
In January 1998, a Bougainville Leaders’ meeting at Lincoln, Christchurch produced the 
Lincoln Agreement, which provided for an extension of the truce and TMG until April 1998. 
In April the TMG was replaced by the Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) which 
operated on similar lines to the TMG. The Bougainville Peace Agreement passed its final 
vote in 2002 and is based on three pillars: autonomy, the referendum on independence and 
weapons disposal.28 The PMG finally pulled out of Bougainville in 2003. 
Australian and New Zealand tensions 
 
First hand accounts and secondary articles often focus on the remarkable success of the TMG 
and PMG. Tension between Australians and New Zealanders is only mentioned in passing. 
However, conflict and disharmony between trans-Tasman representatives, in particular the 
military forces, is the untold story of the Bougainville peace process. Apart from the SPPKF, 
Australia and New Zealand had little recent experience at working together on relatively 
large scale peacekeeping operations in the Pacific region.29 Furthermore, this was a New 
                                                            
25 P. Londey, Other People's Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping (Crows Nest; NSW: Allen and 
Unwin, 2004), 220. 
26 Mortlock, [interview]. 
27 Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville', 49-50. 
28 May, 'The Bougainville Conflict and Its Resolution', 462-3. 
29 Australia and New Zealand had worked together on a number of occasions for disaster relief and on trans-
Tasman exercises, B. Breen, [personal correspondence]. 
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Zealand-led mission. This made the TMG an exception to general military practice where a 
coalition is led by the larger and wealthier nation. Some Australian Department of Defence 
officials and ADF personnel lacked confidence in the New Zealand leadership of Brigadier 
Roger Mortlock. The ADF also felt that the mission would be better served by Australian 
commanders who were more experienced in employing Australian assets for force protection. 
While the ADF and NZDF collaborated fairly well at a tactical level, there were strong 
differences of opinion between the two forces at the strategic level of command.30 Seen from 
this perspective it is remarkable that TMG enjoyed the amount of trans-Tasman collaboration 
it did. 
 
Even before the Bougainville peace process started moving in mid 1997 there were pre-
existing differences of approach between the Australian and New Zealand defence forces. 
The Australian Defence Department, a large organization, thrived on contested advice which 
sometimes slowed down planning processes and led to tensions between civilian and 
uniformed personnel.  The ADF was much larger than the NZDF, and as such, relied on 
extensive networks of committees to ensure thorough planning. The ADF also had better 
training programmes and equipment than the NZDF. By comparison, the NZDF was 
undersized and under-resourced, but with small cohesive strategic management groups which 
encouraged fast decision-making and lateral thinking.31 Moreover, the Australia-New 
Zealand defence relationship was tense in 1997. The Australian Department of Defence was 
critical of New Zealand’s small defence budget and in a 1997 Australian White Paper on 
Defence described New Zealand’s level of funding as ‘a troubling aspect of the 
relationship’.32  
 
Australia, because of its geographical proximity and former colonial responsibilities, had 
historically been more concerned than New Zealand about Papua New Guinea and 
Bougainville. Australia had major security concerns about the fragmentation of Papua New 
Guinea and the establishment of small, non-viable states close to Australia.33 Neil Robertson, 
the New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner in Port Moresby, recounted his Australian 
colleagues' strong unease when John Hayes, a MFAT official working for McKinnon and a 
                                                            
30 Ibid., 8-1-08. 
31 R. Mortlock, 'A Good Thing to Do', in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 73-4., R. Mortlock, 
[interview], B. Breen, [interview], Canberra, 12-10-07., J. O’Reilly [phone interview], Wellington, 10-8-07., 
Breen, [personal correspondence]. 
32 Australia, Australia's Strategic Policy, p. 20. 
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known supporter of Bougainvillean separatism, canvassed opinions on a New Zealand-led 
peace intervention in Bougainville in early 1997.34 
 
Because of these Australian concerns, New Zealand’s early attempts to involve the ADF were 
rejected. Some senior ADF officers were aware of New Zealand’s attempts to contact BRA 
members from early on but did not think that these initiatives would amount to much.35 An 
Australian military analyst, Ewan MacMillan, recalled that while he and his colleagues 
started to see the possibility of Australia deploying to Bougainville after March 1997, many 
in the ADF dismissed their predictions as ‘plain out there’.36 NZDF Chief of Operations, 
Brigadier Roger Mortlock, flew over to Australia after Burnham I to attempt cooperative 
contingency planning. The Australian Chief of Defence Force, General John Baker, and his 
senior defence officials were unenthusiastic. They made it clear that the ADF wanted nothing 
to do with a New Zealand-led operation. Bob Breen, an attendee of a meeting at the 
operational level in Sydney recollected that Australian officers with peacekeeping experience 
were more empathetic than their peers without the same experience. Australian Department 
of Defence civilians were unsupportive and held the policy position that New Zealand should 
be spending more on defence.37  
 
Even after Burnham II when it became increasingly clear that Australia would be involved in 
a Bougainville intervention some senior ADF officials continued to create obstacles. A 
workshop was held in Canberra, on 4 November 1997, to investigate a possible ADF 
contribution to Bougainville. At this meeting, Major General Jim Connolly, Commander of 
the Headquarters Australian Theatre, advised unhelpfully, against his staff’s 
recommendation, that the Bougainville job would require a brigade (2500 soldiers). Bob 
Breen characterised this unnecessarily large recommendation as evidence of Australian 
unwillingness to participate in a New Zealand-led operation.38 When Mortlock returned to 
Australia soon after Burnham II, Australian officers were still divided in their response, 
particularly with regard to the idea of going in unarmed.39 Major General John Sanderson and 
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Major General Peter Abigail, having headed previous Australian peacekeeping missions, 
were supportive of the Bougainville operation but others opposed it.40 Even after it became 
clear that a peacekeeping mission would be sent to Bougainville in the next few months, 
some Australians such as Admiral Peter Briggs and Defence civilian Alan Behm continued to 
argue for a smaller Eminent Persons Group model.41 When the TMG model was finalised, 
Australian military analysts were caught off guard by the speed of the preparations and were 
flooded with questions by concerned colleagues.42 
 
New Zealand should not necessarily be characterised as the injured party in Australia-New 
Zealand disagreements over Bougainville.  Some NZDF high-level staff did not support the 
Bougainville operation. Major General John Denniston-Wood, the New Zealand Chief of 
General Staff, initially opposed involvement in Bougainville.43 Neil Robertson, the Deputy 
New Zealand High Commissioner in Port Moresby, also pointed out that some New 
Zealanders took unnecessary pleasure in being ‘top dog’ for once.44  Indeed, Don McKinnon 
recognised this tendency in a speech to the New Zealand Parliament when he stressed that 
New Zealand should not see its leadership of the TMG as a coup over Australia and must 
recognise that ‘Australia will carry the more formidable load of reconstruction of 
Bougainville’.45 Breen argues that Australians did not necessarily oppose New Zealand 
leadership of the TMG because they were anti-New Zealand, but because they wanted 
accountability for their own assets and people.46 Some of the Australian senior officers 
assessed that the NZDF’s planning and style of operation was backward and unprofessional. 
There was a genuine concern that New Zealand had run down its defence capacity and was 
incapable of managing the Bougainville operation.47 Moreover, the New Zealanders moved 
so quickly in the early stages of negotiation that Australians felt at a disadvantage. Australian 
Colonel Jeff Wilkinson believes that New Zealand deliberately kept up the planning 
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momentum for the operation leaving Australia with no choice but to participate on New 
Zealand’s terms.48 
 
Differences in the way the ADF and NZDF operated became clear during the early stages of 
the TMG. New Zealand’s and Australia’s entry to Bougainville had not been well 
coordinated. For both nations, pre-deployment training was rudimentary.49 Whereas the 
NZDF started to arrive on a ‘force flow’ basis from the first day, the ADF reconnaissance 
party had planned to stay for only six days in order to assess the situation.50 These opposing 
methods were reflected in a situation that developed after the reconnaissance party, led by 
New Zealander Colonel Clive Lilley, arrived in Buka. Finding the TMG’s credibility on the 
line because of its late arrival, Lilley pushed for an immediate crossing to Bougainville on the 
local boats, which had been organised by New Zealand Defence Attaché in Port Moresby, 
Athol Forrest. This was opposed by the head of the Australian contingent, Colonel Steve 
Joske, who wanted more time to reconnoitre and plan the trip to Arawa. Lilley asserted his 
authority with Joske (whom he had not met previously) and the trip to Arawa went ahead 
early the next morning. Joske was left to go by road. Concerned about the local response if 
the first TMG group to arrive at Arawa were not New Zealand-led, Lilley hired a commercial 
Hevilift helicopter and flew into Arawa.51  Ged Shirley describes the ‘race for Arawa’ as 
‘friendly posturing’. In reality the situation was more fraught and did not set a good tone for 
Lilley and Joske’s relationship in the following weeks.52  
 
Generally, the ADF was more concerned about safety, procedure and equipment than the 
NZDF. The two military forces had different approaches to risk management. The ADF 
expected to have reliable 24-hour radio communication and vehicles driven by qualified 
drivers. The NZDF, probably because of its lack of resources, was content to deploy without 
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such necessities. The New Zealand military radios and jeeps were untrustworthy and 
potentially unsafe; a situation which worried Australian communications and transport 
officers.53 This difference in approach was demonstrated when the Australian-led PMG took 
over in 1998 and immediately put in place a force which was larger and better equipped than 
the TMG.54 
 
Indeed, a major operational problem for the New Zealand and Australian forces in 
Bougainville was the NZDF’s inadequate provision of equipment, resources and personnel. 
New Zealand did not have the capacity to provide communications for the TMG; a situation 
Lilley found very frustrating as it meant all his reports were sent through Canberra.55 The 
Land Rovers New Zealand sent with the TMG, (see in Figure 3.1) were notoriously dreadful: 
rusted, dangerous and unroadworthy. According to Wilkinson, the vehicles were assessed by 
the Royal Australian Mechanical Engineers (RAME) as unsafe.56 Andrew Rice, an Australian 
civilian monitor from the TMG recalled that when he left Bougainville all four New Zealand 
Land Rovers had to be pushed onto the landing craft.57 Jan Gammage, another Australian 
civilian monitor, remembered the New Zealand Major’s irritation with his troops’ lack of 
skill at manoeuvring their antiquated light tactical raft (see Figure 3.2) into position on 
arriving at Buka.58 Furthermore, New Zealand withdrew some of its troops and supply 
responsibilities during the second rotation of the TMG. Wilkinson, the Senior National 
Officer (SNO) of the Australian contingent at this time, characterised this as a deliberate 
policy of ‘progressive non-replacement - withdrawal by stealth’. According to Wilkinson and 
Breen, Colonel Jerry Mateperae came in with secret instructions to cut the New Zealand 
presence down to only 30 personnel. Thus, without officially consulting the ADF, the NZDF 
appeared to be defaulting on its logistical obligations. The NZDF also pulled out and planned 
to not replace Special Forces personnel who were vital to guaranteeing the teams’ security.59 
This policy was due to the New Zealand governments’ withdrawal of financial support for the 
operation. When Jenny Shipley ousted Jim Bolger as Prime Minister in December 1997, she 
made several budget-saving decisions, one of which was to withdraw New Zealand troops 
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from Bougainville. Don McKinnon did not want to have to pull out from Bougainville but 
was ‘crunched by the Treasury’.60  All members of the TMG experienced unnecessary 
hardship and danger because of the New Zealand government’s decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The New Zealand Land Rovers at Buka, March 1998, courtesy of 
Andrew Rice.  
 
Figure 3. 2: The antiquated New Zealand Light Tactical Raft, Buka, March 
1998, courtesy of Andrew Rice. 
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In spite of these tensions between the two nations, many New Zealanders and Australians 
chose to focus on the positives rather than the negatives of the TMG.  It is perhaps to be 
expected that Australia’s Foreign Minister, Downer, only mentioned the close collaboration 
between Australia and New Zealand in the Bougainville peace process in his official 
publication on Bougainville.61 However, even in individual interviews, New Zealand 
participants in particular, glossed over trans-Tasman discord.62  Perhaps this occurred 
because of the popular perception of Bougainville as a successful operation. The TMG  has 
become a story of Australia and New Zealand cooperation in the Pacific and interviewees 
may have interpreted their experiences through this public narrative of achievement. 
Moreover, for both Australians and New Zealanders national and personal pride as well as 
professional discretion may have prevented criticism of policies. 
Trans-Tasman cooperation in spite of difficulties 
 
Disagreements did not occur at every level of Australia-New Zealand interactions during the 
planning of the Bougainville operation. After some initial strain the Australian and New 
Zealand Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer and Don McKinnon cooperated 
closely.63 Australia’s involvement ultimately occurred because it was the political will of 
Alexander Downer and Australian Prime Minister, John Howard.64 By the time of Burnham 
II, Australia provided all the air transport for Bougainvillean delegates and Australian and 
New Zealand diplomats were working well together.65 Athol Forrest described his Australian 
defence colleagues in Port Moresby as ‘absolutely 100 percent’, ‘cooperative’, ‘professional’ 
and ‘extraordinarily astute’.66  
 
Furthermore, some ADF staff did work with the NZDF from relatively early on. At an 
operational level of planning there was a fair amount of competitive cooperation. Major 
General Frank Hickling, Land Commander of the ADF, employed Lieutenant-Colonel Bob 
Breen, an operations analyst to begin preparations for deployment to Bougainville while 
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other Australian defence officials and ADF officers in Canberra were still arguing against 
involvement in Bougainville. After Burnham II, Hickling sent liaison planners from his staff 
to sit in on the NZDF’s operational planning at Takapuna and tactical planning at Linton. The 
Australians reported back to Breen, worked to influence NZDF planning positively and 
specified what equipment and services the ADF should provide.67  During the process of 
working out the composition of the TMG, NZDF Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cassidy and 
Hickling’s planning staff were gratified to arrive at a shared assessment that a 250-strong 
TMG was required.68 Bob Breen characterises the separate preparations of supplies and 
personnel in Sydney and Linton as being informed by a healthy Anzac rivalry that resulted in 
a high standard of work.69 It is important to note that trans-Tasman negotiations over the 
Bougainville peacekeeping mission varied between different spheres. While there was 
tension at the higher end strategic level, at the diplomatic, tactical and operational levels there 
was more awareness of the need for cooperation during planning although methods 
differed.70 
 
During on-the-ground operations, Australians and New Zealanders almost invariably worked 
well together. Roger Mortlock praised two Australians, Colonel David Hurley and DFAT 
official Greg Moriarty, who accompanied him on an exploratory visit to Bougainville. He 
credits their experience and good sense with creating confidence that an unarmed joint 
Australian-New Zealand mission was achievable.71 In the first rotation of the TMG, although 
relationships were somewhat strained between Joske and New Zealanders, Richard Cassidy 
and Clive Lilley, other Australian-New Zealand relationships were good. Lilly found Joske to 
be the exception to the rule among his Australian colleagues. James Batley, the head civilian 
among the Australians, was highly appreciated by Mortlock. Correspondingly, Batley 
described his relationship with the New Zealanders as ‘extremely productive’.72 In the second 
rotation of the TMG, cooperation between New Zealand Commanding Officer, Colonel Jerry 
Mateparae, Australian Chief of Staff, Colonel Jeff Wilkinson and the Australian civilian 
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Chief Negotiator, Rhys Puddicombe was excellent. Mateparae and Wilkinson separately 
recalled that their professional relationship was honest and supportive. In spite of sensitivities 
between Canberra and Wellington at the time of the changeover to the PMG, their good 
working relationship on Bougainville eased the transition from New Zealand to Australian 
leadership.73 Jan Gammage and Andrew Rice both remembered their interactions with New 
Zealand military on their team sites as informal and friendly.74 Ben McDevitt, who worked 
with the TMG and PMG in 1998 as a member of the Australian Federal Police found it more 
relaxed and comfortable working under the NZDF than the ADF.75 During the Bougainville 
peacekeeping operation, it seems that Australian and New Zealand personnel got on well 
together and formed enduring friendships. 
 
In particular, hardship and the demands of necessity increased cooperation between 
Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping staff in Bougainville. For example, when Athol 
Forrest and Rhys Puddicombe visited Bougainville a week before the TMG arrived they 
utilized some ‘good Anzac spontaneity’ to get around restrictive Australian policy.  
Puddicombe wanted to fly over the Panguna mine but was forbidden from doing so by 
Australian regulations. Therefore, Forrest quickly negotiated with his High Commissioner in 
Port Moresby to change the helicopter flight to a New Zealand charter.76 Another example of 
cooperation was the Australian provision of a new four-wheel drive vehicle for Richard 
Cassidy, the TMG’s first Chief Negotiator. Although the Australians wanted to ensure the 
NZDF fulfilled its logistical commitments they made an exception here because of the 
importance of a reliable vehicle for this vital role.77 And when New Zealand defaulted on its 
logistical and personnel commitments during the second rotation of the TMG, young New 
Zealanders and Australians on the ground were drawn closer together in shared adversity.78 
On the team sites, there was an internal blending of cultures. The challenges of communal 
living, sharing domestic jobs and radio duties, and operating unarmed in remote locations 
drew team members closer together.79 Roger Mortlock recognised this Australian-New 
Zealand closeness in the face of a combined task when he said, ‘we rediscovered what my 
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Grandfather said ‘Take a bunch of Australians, a bunch of New Zealanders, give them a hard 
task and they put their shoulders to the wheel as one entity – Anzacs – and they generate a 
power beyond their numbers.’80 This renewal of the Anzac spirit in Bougainville will be 
addressed in more detail in chapter five. 
New Zealand’s Pacific advantage 
 
The third theme which permeates accounts of Bougainville is that of New Zealand’s special 
ability in the Pacific, particularly in comparison to Australia. Central to this theme are the 
peace meetings at Burnham, the modus operandi of the TMG and the culturally appropriate 
behaviour of New Zealand personnel. Almost all New Zealanders and most Australians 
mentioned New Zealand’s cultural sensitivity in these three areas. The prominence of New 
Zealand’s cultural ability in the writing and memories about the Bougainville peacekeeping 
operation needs to be investigated. 
 
There is common agreement that Burnham I was extraordinarily successful in reconciling 
warring Bougainvillean factions largely because of New Zealand’s culturally sensitive 
approach to the meetings. Even before Burnham, Bougainvillean delegates were impressed 
by New Zealand’s commitment to the renewed peace process. In particular, John Hayes’ 
downplaying of the BRA shooting at his helicopter demonstrated that New Zealand could be 
trusted.81 New Zealand in planning for Burnham I conformed to the ‘Pacific Way’ of doing 
business in that it aimed to be non-prescriptive, flexible, and process rather than results 
driven.82  New Zealand diplomats stressed they wanted to facilitate, not dictate an agreement 
(although in practice New Zealand officials did occasionally attempt to direct proceedings 
through their personal relationships with the delegates). Furthermore, at Burnham I the NZDF 
strictly controlled media access and turned down offers of help from Western mediation 
experts.83 The NZDF’s routine use of Maori cultural ceremonies in greeting the delegates 
was also very meaningful to Bougainvilleans. The NZDF’s comprehensively bi-cultural 
                                                            
80 Mortlock, [interview]. 
81 Kabui, 'Reconcilation a Priori', 38-9. 
82 ‘Wellington to Canberra, cable U373639, 18 August 1997. File note, telephone discussion 
McKinnon/Downer, 7 August 1997’ in Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville', 47. The ‘Pacific 
Way’ requires unanimous compromise, inevitably involves long discussions, frank disagreements and is biased 
towards non-intervention. Rolfe, 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville', 39. 
83 For example, the Australian lawyers, Leo White and Mark Plunkett (who had previously held a conflict 
resolution workshop for Bougainvillean leaders) were urged not to attend because it was felt not all delegates 
would welcome their presence. Gault, 'The New Zealand Intervention in the Bougainville Conflict', 5-8, 17, 57. 
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nature, achieved through the amalgamation of European and Maori military culture in the
Ngati Tumatauenga doctrine, was projected onto how delegates saw New Zealand as a 
whole. The use of the Haka, powhiri and hongi in the welcome for Bougainvillean delegates 
forced them to connect, challenged them about their own lack of cultural harmony, reminded 
them of their own customary ways of solving problems, and gave them a sense of 
responsibility to respond to New Zealand’s commitment.
 
ham 
rs – just to know they 
ared’.86  
 
 series 
t a 
 
king by 
that he was given an enormous amount of latitude in putting his somewhat unorthodox plans 
                                                           
84 In the second meeting at Burn
and Lincoln, Maori culture was once again used to encourage breakthroughs. Efforts were 
also made to foster a feeling of comfort for delegates.  Burnham delegates were provided 
with betel nut and local Bougainvillean food, as well as winter clothes, extra blankets and 
heating to ward off the cold Canterbury nights.85 Don McKinnon’s and John Hayes’ presence 
and contributions were also greatly appreciated. Ruth Spriggs, a Bougainvillean delegate at 
the Lincoln talks, described their concern with gratitude: ‘It was like oil in our hearts and 
minds – just to walk and chat to us – not bash us with foreign affai
c
 
The New Zealand-led TMG, headed up by NZDF Brigadier Roger Mortlock, built on the
successes of Burnham and focused on ‘soft power’ and culturally sensitive programs. 87 
Mortlock, a veteran of the failed UN peacekeeping mission in Angola, held strong views on 
how the peacekeeping mission in Bougainville should proceed.88 Mortlock instigated a
of programmes that would create an environment in which peace could be built by the 
Bougainvilleans. The most important decision made was for the TMG to be unarmed. A
vital meeting in the village of Laguai during a planning visit to Bougainville, Mortlock 
presented the factors for and against an unarmed mission and left members of the BIG and
BRA to make their own decision overnight. In the morning a ‘nucleus of a design for the 
Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was there.’89 Other programmes included peacema
region, local peace meetings, sports tournaments and the presence of Pacific Island 
contingents, women and Melanesian priests at the team sites. Mortlock admitted gratefully 
 
84 Ibid., 61-2, 132-4. 
85 Ibid., 60. 
86 R. Spriggs, [interview], Canberra, 10-10-07.  
87 Soft power in this context means ‘an indirect influence on international relations, based on cultural, economic 
or ideological means; influence of international relations without coercion or military means’,  ‘soft power’, 
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/soft%20power>, accessed 8-2-08. 
88 The most important of these views was that any peacekeeping mission should not happen unless it could 
guarantee success. Withdrawal without peace was not an option. Mortlock, [interview]. 
89 Kabui, 'Reconciliation a Priori', 41., Mortlock, 'A Good Thing to Do', 75. 
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into practice by the Australians and Fijians; to Mortlock it was ‘a very Pacific way of doing 
business’.90 
 
On the ground, New Zealand soldiers, particularly those of Maori and Polynesian heritage, 
were perceived as being more approachable and culturally aware than Australians. 
Bougainvilleans appreciated the knowledge of Maori culture and language displayed by both 
Pakeha and Maori members of the NZDF.91 New Zealand soldiers were aware of their 
reputation and used the haka at every opportunity to defuse tensions or introduce themselves 
to locals (see Figure 3. 3). Athol Forrest recollected how when the TMG reconnaissance team 
faced an unexpected BRA roadblock during their journey to Arawa, ‘the four Kiwi guys, not 
a Maori among them, were inspired to launch into a haka’.92 Jan Gammage, as a civilian 
monitor noticed that all the New Zealand, Fijian and Ni-Vanuatu men in her truce monitoring 
team ‘did the haka everywhere’ to the great enjoyment of the locals.93  Colonel Jerry 
Mateparae, the second commander of the TMG, consciously drew attention to links between 
Maori and Bougainvillean culture in his letter to Francis Ona.94 Both Australian and New 
Zealand participants in the TMG commented that New Zealand personnel were generally 
more relaxed and at ease with the Bougainvillean people than Australian soldiers.  For 
example, Rhys Puddicombe observed that the TMG went out of its way to associate itself 
with Bougainvilleans and make them feel welcome around headquarters more so than the 
Australian-led PMG. 95 In Bougainville, the NZDF used their familiarity with Maori culture 
very successfully and their ‘Pacific advantage’ has become a key component of the accepted 
narrative of the TMG. 
                                                            
90 Mortlock, [interview]. 
91 S. Kauona, 'Freedom from Fear', in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 93-4., F. Semoso, 'We 
Needed Peace Too', in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 97. 
92 Forrest, [interview].  
93 J. Gammage, [interview]. 
94 ‘I am a Colonel in the New Zealand Army. I am a Maori officer from the Ngati Tuwharetoa tribe in the centre 
of the North Island of New Zealand. I am finding many similarities between the Bougainvillean kastom and my 
Maori heritage, especially in the way you discuss and then make major decisions.’ M. A. I. R. Plimmer, 
'Extracts from Operation Bel Isi Commander's Diary', in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group, 179. 
95 Puddicombe, 'Role of the Chief Negotiator', 67-8. 
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 Figure 3. 3: NZDF Haka at Ruruvu School, central Bougainville, March 
1998, courtesy of Andrew Rice.  
 
Australia’s greatly improved relationship with Bougainville over the course of the TMG 
should not be overlooked. Australians were initially handicapped in their relationships with 
Bougainvilleans because of Australia’s connection to the Panguna mine and provision of 
military equipment to the PNGDF. According to Joseph Kabui, head of the BIG, ‘Australians 
posed a risk to Bougainvilleans, leaving butterflies in our stomachs’.96 Indeed, Australian 
civilian monitors knew about their reputation and were careful to not respond to criticism 
directed at them by anti-Australian Bougainvilleans.97 Australia’s achievement in sending 
civilian and female monitors was significant. Mortlock said that he was not sure New 
Zealand could have done the same even after ransacking the public service.98 Some 
Australian civilians such as James Batley and Jan Gammage had lived in Melanesia 
previously and were well acclimatised to the local culture. The successful integration of 
Australian civilians into the TMG team sites helped reconcile Bougainvilleans to Australia, 
                                                            
96 Kabui, 'Reconcilation a Priori', 41. 
97 ‘There were some significant occasions when I copped it from the Bougainvillean people – thankfully not 
often. So we had a real legacy that made it difficult. The Australian Government had made the decision to use 
civilians as they were less confrontational but still Australian and so responsible’, Rice, [interview]. 
Corroboration from Forrest, [interview], Puddicombe, 'Role of the Chief Negotiator', 63. 
98 As a result, Australian now has a civil sector with more Melanesian experience than New Zealand. Mortlock, 
[interview]. 
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as was intended.99 As time went on, Australia improved its civilian monitors’ pre-deployment 
training, making more of an effort to ready them for Bougainvillean culture and society. The 
changeover from the TMG to the PMG was smooth and the Australians chose good men to 
lead the PMG. Brigadier Bruce Osborn, the first PMG commander quickly adapted to a 
slower, more flexible Melanesian approach in spite of occasional protests from Canberra. 100 
Australian personnel in many cases showed themselves to be capable of a sympathetic 
understanding of Bougainville’s culture. 
 
The largely unquestioning acceptance of New Zealand’s superior ability in the Pacific in both 
historiography, and the peacekeeping participant interviewees needs to be interrogated. The 
point is not necessarily to dispute the truth of New Zealand’s success in engaging the 
Bougainvilleans with Maori culture but rather to investigate the reasons for the concerted 
emphasis of this trend in primary and secondary sources. As shown, Australia did in fact send 
civilians to Bougainville who were culturally sensitive and knowledgeable about the Pacific 
region (the ADF was still inexperienced in the cultural and political dimensions of these sorts 
of operations at this time).101 Yet, in most literature on the Bougainville peace mission 
Australians are compared unfavourably with New Zealanders in their interactions with 
Melanesians and Polynesians.102 The position of New Zealand’s Pacific advantage within the 
context of the idea of Anzac will be further explored in chapter five. 
 
The TMG in Bougainville was the first significant post-World War II operation in which 
ADF and NZDF cooperated closely and for a sustained period in the Pacific.103 In many ways 
it was a risky and unusual peacekeeping mission: unarmed, New Zealand-led, and with 
civilian and military personnel from several countries serving together in small isolated 
teams. At a political level, after initial hesitancy on Australia’s part, trans-Tasman 
cooperation moved forward steadily at an operational level.  Because of the political 
imperative to work together, the ADF and NZDF were forced to cooperate in the planning 
and deployment of the TMG. This process was a somewhat bumpy one, hampered by 
differing views in the two forces on how a mission should be conducted. The TMG 
                                                            
99 Kabui, 'Reconcilation a Priori', 44. 
100 B. Osborn, 'Role of the Military Commander', in Without a Gun: Australians' Experiences Monitoring Peace 
in Bougainville, 52-5. 
101 Breen, [personal correspondence]. 
102 For example, see accounts in Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group. 
103 Operation Lagoon in 1994 was the first combined peacekeeping mission but was not as significant as the 
TMG, being smaller, of much shorter duration, and less of a trans-Tasman affair. 
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illuminated the NZDF’s shortcomings in the area of equipment, logistics and funding; most 
NZDF personnel had to withdraw after six months. On the positive side, New Zealand’s 
reputation as having a special ability in the Pacific was reinforced by the TMG. At a personal 
level, most Australians and New Zealanders got on well together during the planning and 
early stages of the TMG. After arrival, the hardships faced in Bougainville drew them closer 
together. Indeed, these new relationships formed the basis of a trans-Tasman community 
which had experience and knowledge of working in the Pacific and with each other. The 
significance of the TMG, and later the PMG, was not only its success in helping bring peace 
to Bougainville; it was also its role as a benchmark and precedent for future regional 
interventions and trans-Tasman partnerships. 
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4. Trans-Tasman Peacekeeping after Bougainville 
 
Only a few years after the peacekeeping mission in Bougainville, Australia and New Zealand 
intervened in conflicts in East Timor and Solomon Islands. INTERFET in East Timor and 
RAMSI in Solomon Islands were more complex missions than the TMG, with members 
numbering in the thousands rather than hundreds. There are good secondary accounts based 
on extensive research for both these operations which cover the details of planning and 
operations in the various military theatres.1  Although this chapter outlines the background of 
these conflicts and the Australian-New Zealand response, the main emphasis is on the 
changes and continuing patterns in trans-Tasman peacekeeping after Bougainville. As the 
main focus of the thesis is Bougainville there are less primary material and interviews for 
INTERFET and RAMSI than for the TMG. East Timor’s and Solomon Islands’ significance 
for this thesis is to demonstrate how subsequent Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping 
was affected by the experiences in Bougainville. The aim is not to make outright comparisons 
or judgements about the success or style of the missions.  As David Hegarty points out, 
conflicts and their resolutions are context specific and it is not always possible to apply 
lessons from one conflict to another.2 However, one can identify specific operational 
processes and ideas used in INTERFET and RAMSI which clearly have their genesis in 
previous missions. As such, this chapter highlights the lessons learnt from Bougainville 
onwards as applicable to each mission. As with chapter three on the TMG, the Australian and 
New Zealand relationship in INTERFET and RAMSI is investigated with particular attention 
to tensions, cooperation, and claims of cultural sensitivity. This is done in order to analyse 
how the Australian-New Zealand relationship in the context of regional peacekeeping 
missions evolved after Bougainville. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 The best are B. Breen, Mission Accomplished, East Timor: The Australian Defence Force Participation in the 
International Forces East Timor (Interfet) (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2000) and J. Crawford and 
G. Harper, Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor 1999-2001 (Auckland: Reed, 
2001)., R. W. Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (Ramsi) (RAND Corporation, 2007). 
2 D. Hegarty, 'Peace Interventions in the South Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands', paper 
given at Island State Security 2003: "Oceania at the crossroads", Honolulu, 15-17 July 2003. 
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Background to the East Timor conflict and INTERFET 
  
The island of Timor, (as seen in Map 4. 1) is situated in Southeast Asia, about 650 km 
northwest of Australia. The Portuguese established themselves on Timor around 1520, with 
the Dutch following suit in the early 1600s. Conflicts between the Portuguese in the east of 
the island and the Dutch in the west disrupted the island until the Portuguese formally made 
territorial concessions in the western half of the island to the Dutch in 1859 and 1893. Timor 
was occupied by Japanese military during World War II. After Indonesia’s independence in 
1949, West Timor became part of the Indonesian province of Nusatenggara. East Timor 
became a province of Portugal in 1953. After a 1974 coup in Lisbon toppled Portugal’s 
authoritarian regime, Portugal decolonized its overseas possessions, including East Timor.3 
In 1975, two new political parties in East Timor, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) an
the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), formed an unstable 
ruling coalition. In July 1975, however, the UDT launched a coup against FRETILIN and 
East Timor was plunged into civil war.  Concurrent with these first steps towards 
independence the Indonesian military set up a secret intelligence operation to generate unrest 
in East Timor. The Indonesians invaded soon after the civil war began and continued to 
attack until December. They were supported by Indonesian migrants and thousands of East 
Timorese who were reliant on Indonesia for employment and education.
d 
                                                           
4  FALINTIL, 
FRETILIN’s paramilitary, put up unexpectedly effective opposition against pro-Indonesian 
forces. This enraged the Indonesian troops causing them to kill civilians indiscriminately. The 
armed struggle eventually cost the lives of 200 000 East Timorese, (about 30 percent of the 
population) and 10 000 Indonesian soldiers. On 17 July 1976, East Timor formally became 
the 27th province of Indonesia. It was governed under military occupation and run as a police 
state.5 
 
Overturning the annexation of East Timor seemed a lost cause during the 1970s and 1980s, 
but it developed a higher profile in the 1990s because of international concern about the 
violation of UN principles and genocide. In January 1999, Indonesian President Suharto 
bowed to public pressure and stepped down. His successor, B. J. Habibie unexpectedly 
announced that if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy within Indonesia he would 
 
3 K. G. Ooi, 'Timor: A Divided Island', Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopaedia from Angkor Wat to East 
Timor (3; Santa Barbara: Abc-Clio, 2004), 1130. 
4 Breen, Mission Accomplished, East Timor, 1. 
5 J. Crawford and G. Harper, Operation East Timor, 11-20. 
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grant them independence. Accordingly, Portugal and the UN agreed to hold a referendum 
later that year.6 As expected, the UN-run referendum faced severe opposition. As early as 
April, reports of killings in East Timorese villages by anti-independence supporters became 
public. The UN established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in June 
and voter registration proceeded throughout the following months in spite of agitation against 
the referendum. The first day of polling was on 30 August 1999. In the face of intimidation a 
spectacular 95 per cent of registered voters visited the polling booths. The result, announced 
on 3 September, was overwhelming in favour of independence. The ensuing backlash of 
violence caused the Indonesian government to accept the need for a multinational 
peacekeeping force.7  
 
The 1999 crisis forced Australia to abandon its previously non-interventionist attitude to East 
Timor and intervene. In November 1975, FRETILIN had approached the Security Council of 
the UN and the Australian Foreign Minister for help in resisting Indonesia, but was turned 
down. Indeed, Australia, always sensitive to the threat of Indonesia, was the only nation in 
the world to recognise Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. New Zealand, under the 
leadership of Bill Rowling was willing to respond positively to a UN request for a 
peacekeeping contribution for East Timor. The Ministry of Defence went as far as preparing 
a basic outline of a possible New Zealand force contribution. But, when no peacekeeping 
intervention was forthcoming New Zealand shelved its peacekeeping plans.8 Events in 1999, 
however, forced Australia to reassess its dismissal of East Timor’s independence movement. 
Australia, under the Prime Minister John Howard, committed to creating the International 
Force for East Timor (INTERFET).  For the first time Australia took on the role of forming 
and leading an international coalition peacekeeping force. The peak Australian contribution 
of 5500 personnel to East Timor was the biggest single deployment by Australian forces 
since the end of World War II.9 New Zealand quickly came on board with the Australian 
planners and committed to providing considerable logistic and troop support in East Timor.  
At one stage New Zealand had 1100 personnel serving in INTERFET; it was New Zealand’s 
largest overseas military deployment since the Korean War.10 
                                                            
6 Ibid. 
7 New Zealand Audit Office., New Zealand Defence Force: Deployment to East Timor: Report of the Controller 
and Auditor-General = Tumuaki O Te Mana Arotake (Wellington: The Audit Office, 2001), 10. 
8 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 15. 
9 J. C. Blaxland, Information-Era Manoeuvre: The Australian-Led Mission to East Timor (Canberra: Land 
Warfare Studies Centre, 2002), 3. 
10 New Zealand Audit Office., New Zealand Defence Force: Deployment to East Timor, 10. 
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INTERFET was a peace-making mission with the authority to use armed force. At its peak 
there were 23 contributing UN member states and over 11 000 personnel. Australia provided 
the major contribution of over half the staff.11 INTERFET was led by General Peter 
Cosgrove of the ADF. Cosgrove’s operational campaign for East Timor plan had four phases: 
firstly, to negotiate with Indonesian Major General Kiki Syahnakri to ensure safe 
preconditions; secondly, the rapid lodgement of as many combat forces as possible; thirdly,
to establish a secure environment in Dili and then throughout East Timor; and lastly, to 
ensure a smooth transition from INTERFET to a UN peace enforcement operation.
 
e next 
 
ses 
uary 2000.13 
                                                           
12 The first 
troops deployed on 20 September 1999. The advance group of 2000 ADF personnel, 
supported by small international contingents of troops, ships and aircraft, spent the first ten 
days securing Dili. After early success the build-up of coalition forces began. During th
few months INTERFET consolidated its presence in East Timor and by mid-December had
achieved a state of constant calm. The handover to the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) began in the New Year and continued in pha
until General Cosgrove handed over security responsibilities on 23 Febr
Lessons learnt from Bougainville 
 
The success of Bougainville gave Australia and New Zealand confidence and experience in 
regional peacekeeping and helped contribute to an atmosphere of support for INTERFET.  
The TMG’s experience gave New Zealand in particular a good reputation as an honest and 
impartial conciliator. In both Australia and New Zealand there was nation-wide public 
support for the members of INTERFET, which was in part due to the pride felt in previous 
peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia and Bougainville. This popular support 
encouraged the Australian and New Zealand governments to provide enough funding to 
commit to sustaining a considerable number of troops for a long period of time.14 
Furthermore, the TMG and PMG had given members of the Australian and New Zealand 
government departments and defence forces considerable experience in leading and operating 
a multinational peacekeeping mission.  For example, knowledge gained in Bougainville by 
 
11 Australian National Audit Office, A. Müller, and A. Hickman, Management of Australian Defence Force 
Deployments to East Timor: Department of Defence (Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 2002), 9. 
12 Breen, Mission Accomplished, East Timor, 23. 
13 Ibid., viii, ix. 
14 P. Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', in New Zealand Institute of  International Affairs (ed.), Defence Policy 
after East Timor: Discussion Papers (Wellington: The Institute, 2000), 1-2., M. Burton, 'Opening Address', in 
Defence Policy after East Timor, 7. 
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logisticians was invaluable in deciding what items of equipment and supplies would be 
needed in East Timor.15 
 
The New Zealand Defence Force in particular improved on planning and equipment 
shortcomings identified in Bougainville. They successfully used a new joint planning 
approach between the Army, Navy and Air Force with the Army’s Land Command centre 
acting as headquarters for East Timor.  The NZDF command gave responsibility for 
managing operational planning tasks to a Joint Operational Planning Group, which had 
members from all three services and liaised between strategic and operational planners. This 
approach was adopted after the NZDF’s observation of the ADF’s joint Headquarters in 
action during the planning for Bougainville.16 The NZDF also benefited from improved 
equipment. Bougainville had made defence planners aware of the critical deficiencies in New 
Zealand’s military equipment. So on 10 May 1999, the New Zealand cabinet approved the 
use of existing defence funds to replace the Army’s elderly and notoriously unreliable Land 
Rovers.17  Well before the government decided to send forces to East Timor, the NZDF’s 
Operational and Preparedness and Reporting System (OPRES) identified equipment 
deficiencies and could therefore carry out informed planning. Cabinet was able to be notified 
early on about the need for equipment upgrades.18 Cabinet allocated funds to prepare the Air 
Force’s helicopters, overhaul the Army’s armoured vehicles and reduce the degree of notice 
needed by a New Zealand battalion from 60 to 28 days. Although there were still logistic and 
personnel shortfalls, New Zealand managed to deploy quickly due to farsighted planning.19  
From its experience leading the TMG, New Zealand was also more confident of its ability to 
provide and command a large force. The NZDF contributed a battalion to INTERFET, 
allowing them to retain tactical control of their personnel.20  
 
The trans-Tasman relationship in East Timor 
 
There were a few potential pitfalls for Australian and New Zealand relations during the 
course of INTERFET, but these were the exception to the rule and usually avoided. The ADF 
                                                            
15 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 47., J. Rolfe, 'Operation East Timor: How Did We Do?' New 
Zealand Defence Quarterly, 29/Winter (2000), 2. 
16 Rolfe, 'Operation East Timor: How Did We Do?', 2., New Zealand Audit Office, New Zealand Defence 
Force: Deployment to East Timor, 49., Lilley, [interview].  
17 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 25. 
18 New Zealand Audit Office., New Zealand Defence Force: Deployment to East Timor, 50. 
19 Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', 4. 
20 J. Rolfe, 'The Way Ahead', New Zealand Defence Quarterly, 27/Summer (1999), 8. 
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and NZDF had not exercised together at Brigade level for over two years before deployment 
to East Timor which could have made working together in East Timor difficult. Fortunately, 
both forces had maintained a common doctrinal basis for operations and command and 
control. During INTERFET, all the New Zealand force elements coordinated fully with 
Australia’s methods and procedures.21 Australia’s doubts about New Zealand’s ability to 
deploy a battalion group without assistance proved to be unfounded. Careful planning, 
innovation and the use of hired equipment largely overcame New Zealand’s logistic 
shortfalls.22 Because this was a clearly Australian-led mission outside New Zealand’s area of 
Polynesian expertise, New Zealand did not push for any differing operational styles. On the 
ground there was a possibility of a conflict between Australian and New Zealand national 
interest when it came to directing the New Zealand Battalion. Fortunately, however, 
operations took place without difficulty.23  
 
Indeed, Australia as the leading nation had more difficulty cooperating with its other alliance 
partners than with New Zealand. The scope of INTERFET meant there were sizable forces 
from many other nations who Australia did not regularly exercise with.24 Australia was 
surprised at the relative lack of control it had over some areas of the operation. A number of 
countries told Australia what they were sending rather than asking what would be useful.25 
The Australians had problems marshalling the diverse coalition groups as all had unique 
equipment needing special logistics. Self-sufficient force elements were indispensable, and 
thus New Zealand’s Tanker Endeavour and field surgical team were particularly 
appreciated.26 Australia also found that some of the coalition members, such as the 
Philippines, did not own a sufficient range of higher level combat equipment. Besides 
Australia, only New Zealand fronted up with the full range of its capabilities.27 In this context 
it is easy to see why New Zealand’s interoperability and dedication to INTERFET was so 
                                                            
21 Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', 6. 
22 Ibid. 
23 The New Zealand Battalion was under the operational control of an Australian Brigadier but also reported to 
the New Zealand Senior National Officer in Dili who then reported to the Joint Commander at Trentham. 
Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 111. 
24  Countries contributing to INTERFET: Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United 
States of America.  ‘Countries Involved’, <http://pandora.nla.gov.au/parchive/2000/S2000-Nov-
7/easttimor.defence.gov.au/index.html>, accessed 22-1-2008. 
25 Rolfe, 'Operation East Timor: How Did We Do?' 2. 
26 Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', 6. 
27 D. Dickens, 'Capability Planning: Towards a Third Way', in Defence Policy after East Timor, 6. 
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appreciated by Australia.  Australian difficulties with New Zealand were insignificant in 
comparison to those faced with other less familiar alliance members. 
 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s close working relationship in East Timor began during their 
shared involvement in planning INTERFET. The NZDF foresaw their potential involvement 
in East Timor from February 1999. From March 1999, MFAT and the ADF held discussions 
about developments in East Timor and possibility of the need for a peace support operation.  
The NZDF established A Joint Operations Planning Group at its headquarters for strategic 
planning. A key member of the group was Wing Commander Glen Toscan, an Australian 
exchange officer who had planning experience from his involvement in Somalia and the 
evacuation of Australians from East Timor in 1975.  The NZDF gave the New Zealand 
Minister of Defence a report about ongoing ADF planning in April.28 Colonel Martyn Dunne, 
who headed up the NZDF liaison with Australia, recalled that NZDF and ADF staff were 
planning and sharing options three to six months before deployment.29 By August, planners 
on both sides of the Tasman participated in regular, secure video-conferences to coordinate 
their work. 
 
In mid-August New Zealand dispatched liaison officers to Australia. For instance, a NZDF 
officer was sent to the Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) in Sydney, which dealt 
with such issues as planning for the movement of supplies and maintenance arrangements.  
The NZDF selected Colonel Martyn Dunne, a recent graduate of the Australian College of 
Defence and Strategic Studies, to lead the New Zealand Forward Planning Group which 
visited Australia in September because of his good knowledge of the ADF and operational 
experience. Colonel Dunne and his team were sent to the Deployable Joint Force 
Headquarters (DJFHQ) in Brisbane, and had a vital role in finalising the agreement signed 
between two forces for mutual logistics support in East Timor.30 The joint planning was 
intense and close; Dunne remembered, ‘we were planning with them every minute, we were 
breathing together’.31 
 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s close interoperability continued during the early stages of 
INTERFET. The New Zealand SAS combined with their Australian counterparts and 
                                                            
28 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 22-3. 
29 M. Dunne, [phone interview], Wellington, 2-11-07. 
30 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 43-4. 
31 Dunne, [phone interview].  
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members of the United Kingdom’s Special Boat Service to form the INTERFET Response 
Force, the first troops sent into East Timor.32 The 3 Squadron RNZAF helicopters operated 
under the operational control of Australian 3 Brigade, located at Suai, which was also the 
New Zealand Battalion’s senior Headquarters.  This arrangement worked well. Indeed the 
Australians greatly appreciated the New Zealand Iroquois helicopters since they were much 
cheaper to run than their Black Hawks. 33  Another example of good interoperability is the 
NZDF Victor Company, which was in Dili under the tactical control of 3rd Battalion, Royal 
Australian Regiment (3 RAR) commanded by Australian Brigadier Mark Evans. It was 
arranged that Victor Company’s leader, Major Howard could go directly to the New Zealand 
Senior National Officer if he felt tasks were too risky or not serving NZ’s national interests. 
The Victor Company were given its own area of operations and left to decide how to achieve 
its mission. The New Zealanders liked this and had a comfortable relationship with their 
Australian commanders.34 Indeed, both Australian and New Zealand military leaders felt that 
one of the most important military lessons learnt from East Timor was the growth of trans-
Tasman interoperability.35 
 
Another feature of Australian-New Zealand cooperation in East Timor was the excellent 
relations between the Senior National Officers. ADF Brigadier Peter Cosgrove, the 
commander of INTERFET, got on very well with the New Zealand SNO Martyn Dunne and 
described him as ‘one of my closest and most trusted colleagues’. 36 Similarly, Martyn Dunne 
recalled, ‘I had a very good relationship with Cosgrove – not only did we become friends 
afterwards, we respected each other professionally and I worked well for him’.37 When 
Cosgrove decided to establish a separate brigade-sized Headquarters for operations in Dili, he 
felt that Dunne was the best person to command.  Cosgrove negotiated with the New Zealand 
Chief of General Staff, Major General Maurie Dodson in late September to promote Dunne to 
Brigadier in order that he could be appointed an INTERFET formation commander.38 The 
good relationship between Cosgrove and Dunne was also beneficial to the New Zealand 
                                                            
32 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 57. 
33 Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', 6., Lilley, [interview]. 
34 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 72. 
35 ‘As General Cosgrove remarked in Dili in November 1999, the ADF and NZDF must engage in more 
combined exercises, exchange postings and build on the ‘common understanding’ that exists between the two 
nations. Military cooperation, he said, must occur’ rather more routinely between our countries’. While the 
Anzac bonds are strong, they need to be continually invigorated by constant contact.’ Ibid., 169. 
36 P. Cosgrove, My Story (Sydney: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006), 214. 
37Dunne, [phone interview]. 
38 Breen, Mission Accomplished, East Timor, 97. 
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Army.  In spite of there being no brigade headquarters for the New Zealand Battalion, Dunne 
could easily raise matters of national importance with Cosgrove in conversation.39 
 
Although it is difficult to generalise for the personal relationships between thousands of 
Australian and New Zealand soldiers, interviewees did indicate that East Timor marked a 
new high in trans-Tasman relations in the armed forces. Peter Cosgrove felt that in East 
Timor Australians were able to rely on Kiwis to the same extent as their fellow Australians.40 
Martyn Dunne pointed out that past joint exercises with Australia meant that it was easy to 
gain the trust of the ADF commanders.41 New Zealander Greg Moyle who worked as part of 
the UN mission in East Timor found his Australian colleagues to be very supportive, 
sometimes even more so than Kiwi colleagues.42  DFAT official James Batley argued that 
East Timor was very important in enhancing personal relationships between Australians and 
New Zealanders.43 Clive Lilley said that the NZDF purposely put very capable officers into 
East Timor to make a good impression on the Australians: INTERFET ‘opened the eyes of 
the Australians to the capabilities and can-do attitudes of New Zealanders’.44 Australian 
Trent Scott agreed that the excellent work done in East Timor by the Kiwis influenced all 
areas of the Australian army and reinforced the ADF’s perception of their capability.45 
Indeed, the theme of New Zealanders impressing Australians should be noted. Both Clive 
Lilley and Trent Scott saw East Timor as an opportunity for New Zealand to prove its w
as a defence partner to Australia. After the fiasco of inadequate logistics and person
withdrawal in Bougainville, East Timor was a chance for New Zealand to make things right 
with the Australians.  
orth 
nel 
                                                           
 
In East Timor, both Australian and New Zealand defence forces made a concerted effort to 
perform their duties in culturally appropriate ways. Australian planners from the Information 
Operations cell tested their leaflets on local people before distributing them to ensure they 
were suitable. The Information Operations cell also produced a weekly local newspaper and a 
radio show. An appeal in Australia resulted in a donation of over 300 radios for the people of 
East Timor so that communities could listen to the INTERFET programme. There was little 
 
39 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 79. 
40 Cosgrove, My Story, 214. 
41 Dunne, [phone interview]. 
42 G. Moyle, [phone interview], Auckland, 24-11-07.  
43 J. Batley, [phone interview], Suva, 30-9-07. 
44 Lilley, [interview]. 
45 Trent Scott, [interview], Canberra, 8-10-07.  
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use of loudspeakers as INTERFET was aware that this form of public announcement had 
been used during the Indonesian occupation. All troops exercised remarkable restraint and 
there were very few casualties.46 The New Zealand Battalions also worked hard to combat 
rumours and facilitate community dialogue. New Zealand troops did a number of small-scale 
community projects such as building classrooms, medical clinics, notice boards and water 
systems, running a district football competition, and printing a newspaper with locally trained 
staff. The New Zealanders encouraged voluntary involvement by East Timorese whenever 
possible. By all accounts the community appreciated these efforts and in return passed on 
high quality information to the New Zealanders about the Indonesian militia. 47 One 
development initiated by the New Zealand Battalion 2, and further refined by following New 
Zealand Battalions, was detachments of four NZDF staff led by a corporal living in local 
villages alongside the people for the duration of their deployment. This program won the trust 
of locals, and granted the NZDF accurate intelligence of conditions. The Australian Sector 
West Commander, Brigadier Ken Gillespie, was impressed with the initiative and urged the 
Australian Battalion in the north to adopt similar measures.48 
 
But regardless of all the ADF’s efforts, the traditional perception of New Zealanders as being 
more understanding and culturally attuned to local conditions prevailed in East Timor.  Part 
of this was due to INTERFET’s dominant Australian culture. Lieutenant Colonel Mark 
Wheeler, a New Zealander, commented that while ‘ninety per cent of the time I think that 
you’ve done marvellously well,…ten per cent of the time I’ve got really frustrated with the 
Australian-centric view… the Australian flavour overrides anything else where it needn’t 
have.’49  Australian peacekeeping historian, Peter Londey, agreed that ‘Interfet headquarters 
was heavily dominated by Australians, with the result that other national contingents could 
feel left out.’ Londey also found that other military personnel and locals perceived Australian 
soldiers as overly aggressive-looking because of their obvious weapons and dark glasses.50 
The NZDF initiative of living in villages was particularly given as proof of a difference 
                                                            
46 Blaxland, Information-Era Manoeuvre, 6, 41-3. 
47 A. M. Hayward, East Timor: A Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention (Upper Hutt: Military Studies 
Institute, 2003), 13-15, 18. 
48 Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 141, 43-4. 
49 A. Ryan, 'Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks': Australian Defence Force Participation in the 
International Force East Timor (Canberra: Australian Land Warfare Studies Centre, November 2000), 101-2. 
50 Londey, Other People's Wars, 255. 
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between Australians and New Zealanders. ADF member Trent Scott particularly praised the 
tactical method of placing Maori in villages to build up confidence among locals.51 
 
Less than three years after INTERFET, Australia found itself leading a peacekeeping and 
nation building mission to Solomon Islands.  The Australian Howard government had refused 
previous requests to mediate, but in 2002, motivated by fears of terrorism and increased 
confidence in their peacekeeping ability, Australia agreed to the Solomon Islands’ 
government’s request for aid. New Zealand, once again made a significant contribution. 
Unlike East Timor though, this was an entirely regional effort. Australia, and to a lesser 
extent New Zealand, took on the major burden of funding and equipping the intervening 
force. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
51 Scott, [interview].  
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Background to Solomon Islands conflict and RAMSI 
 
Solomon Islands, a chain of over 900 islands (see Map 4. 2.) lies to the northeast of Australia, 
and is flanked by Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. Solomon Islands was a British 
dependency until 1978 when it gained independence. Its colonial experience was uneven and 
its economy based on national resource exploitation (cocoa, copra, palm oil, and logging) and 
subsistence farming. It has a largely youthful population of half a million who have great 
linguistic diversity (about 87 distinct languages).52 The two main islands are Malaita and 
Guadalcanal. Malaita has historically been overpopulated, with limited land available for 
cultivation and underdeveloped infrastructure. Thus, Malaitans have traditionally worked as 
labourers in other parts of the Solomon Islands.53 After independence was granted in 1978, 
Malaitans increasingly migrated in large numbers to Guadalcanal and intermarried with 
Guadalcanal families, disrupting their traditional land inheritance patterns. Greg Watson 
argues that other contributing causes to the Solomon Islands conflict were the unsuitability of 
a Westminster-style government system, economic inequalities, the lack of nationalism and 
the overflow of refugees and arms from the Bougainville conflict.54   
 
Unrest and social pressure reached a peak in 1998. A catalyst for conflict occurred when the 
Premier of Guadalcanal province, Ezekial Alebua, demanded that the national government 
pay compensation to the relatives of 25 Guadalcanal people murdered by Malaitans in the last 
20 years and return lands occupied by Malaitans.  Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu 
complied but at the expense of grants intended for Guadalcanal.  In this tense environment, 
Guadalcanal people interpreted Alebua’s demands as a mandate to harass Malaitans.55  In late 
1998, Guadalcanal men formed the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and initiated a violent 
movement against settlers from other islands, in particular Malaitans, around Honiara. From 
1998 to 2000, around 20 000 settlers fled Honiara. Over 250 people were killed and 
numerous human rights abuses occurred. Malaitans responded by forming the Malaitan Eagle 
Force (MEF). In June 2000 the MEF seized Honiara, broke into the national armoury, forced 
the resignation of the Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu and plunged Solomon Islands 
                                                            
52 M. G. Morgan and A. McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour?' Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
60/3 (September 2006), 415. 
53 C. Moore, 'The Misappropriation of Malaitan Labour: Historical Origins of the Recent Solomon Islands 
Crisis', The Journal of Pacific History, 42/2 (September 2007), 211-20. 
54 G. Watson, 'Solomon Islands: Conflict Overview', in Securing a Peaceful Pacific, 402. 
55 Ibid., 403. 
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into a downwards economic and social spiral.56 In their troubles, Solomon Islands requested 
outside help from Australia. 
 
In 2000, Australia and New Zealand sponsored conciliatory talks between the MEF and IFM 
and provided the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) to monitor the subsequent 
peace accord. A ceasefire agreement signed in August on the HMAS Tobruk collapsed after 
less than 24 hours when a MEF member was killed. Nonetheless, negotiations continued and 
the Townsville Peace Agreement was signed in October.57 The agreement outlined a package 
of steps to rehabilitate the Solomons: demilitarization of warring factions, reconciliation, 
greater political autonomy for Malaita and Guadalcanal, and help for displaced Solomon 
Islanders.58 The IPMT, made up of Australians and New Zealanders, with a few Pacific 
Islanders, attempted to enforce this mandate.  The six team sites established patrolled 
Guadalcanal and Malaita. IPMT personnel also worked with indigenous Peace Monitoring 
Council (PMC) teams, engaging with community groups, facilitating meetings, contacting 
militants and assisting reconciliation. The process worked reasonably well for six months or 
so and was partially successful in disposing of weapons, halting open warfare and mobilising 
elements of civil society. However, many senior political figures, militant leaders and police 
refused to turn in their guns or support the mission.59 As David Hegarty, the second 
Australian head of the IPMT, pointed out, not enough time had been given to the peace 
process and the IMPT lacked powers of enforcement. As a result there was little local buy-in 
or dedication to peace by the rebels.60 By 2002, attempts at resolution had failed, the IPMT 
had been withdrawn and the Solomons conflict was at an impasse. 
 
The Solomon Islands Government asked for Australian intervention twice before John 
Howard acceded to a third request in 2003. During the height of civil unrest in 2000 and 2001 
Solomon Island Prime Ministers Bartholomew Ulufa’alu and Manasseh Sogavare both 
appealed to Australia and New Zealand for assistance in vain. Even as late as January 2003, 
Alexander Downer said that ‘sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands 
                                                            
56 Morgan and McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour?', 415., R. Ponzio, 'The Solomon Islands: The UN and 
Intervention by Coalitions of the Willing', International Peacekeeping, 12/2 (Summer 2005), 174., T. T. 
Kabutaulaka, 'Australian Foreign Policy and the Ramsi Intervention in the Solomon Islands', The Contemporary 
Pacific, 17/2 (2005), 284. 
57 Morgan and McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour?', 286. 
58 Ponzio, 'The Solomon Islands', 174. 
59 Hegarty, 'Peace Interventions in the South Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands', paper 
given at Island State Security, 2003, 'Oceania at the Crossroads', Honolulu, 15-17 July 2003, 5. 
60 Hegarty, [interview]. 
93 
 
would be folly in the extreme’.61 There is a considerable amount of writing on the subject of 
why and how Australia changed its position on intervention in the Solomon Islands, so the 
reasons for Australian intervention in the Solomon Islands will only be outlined briefly.62 
The international context of the ‘War on Terror’ and America’s desire that Australia patrol
own backyard encouraged intervention. There was a widespread belief in Canberra that 
Solomon Islands was on the verge of collapse and could easily become fertile territory for 
terrorism. The rhetoric of failed states increasingly used among policy analysts and 
academics undoubtedly contributed to this fear of Solomon Islands imploding.
 its 
                                                           
63In particular, 
Elsina Wainwright’s paper for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a government-funded 
think tank, on the Solomon Islands in June 2003 was very influential. The report identified 
Solomon Islands as a ‘failing state’ with the potential to turn into a ‘post-modern badlands’ 
and advised Australian intervention.64 New Zealand’s participation arose from similar 
regional concerns and a desire to support Australia. 
 
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived in Honiara in late 
July 2003. RAMSI was an interagency operation headed up by an Australian civilian from 
DFAT, Nick Warner. Tactically, the mission was directed by the Participating Police Force 
(PPF) which at its height had 335 members. The PPF was made up of officers from ten 
Pacific nations but the large majority were seconded from the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) and Australian State forces. The PPF was headed by AFP officer Ben McDevitt.  The 
PPF was given logistic support by a military contingent from Australia and New Zealand of 
about 1800 personnel, which was commanded by ADF Lieutenant  Colonel John Frewen.65 
RAMSI’s plan was made up of three phases: commencement, consolidation and 
sustainability. Commencement focused on re-establishing law and order via disarmament, 
capturing militant leaders and strengthening the police force. This segment of the mission 
was particularly successful. Order was quickly restored, corrupt individuals were prosecuted, 
and by late 2003, 3700 weapons had been destroyed. Consolidation began in January 2004 
 
61 The Australian, 8 Jan 2003, Kabutaulaka, 'Australian Foreign Policy and the Ramsi Intervention in the 
Solomon Islands', 286-7. 
62 For the best outlines see, S. Dinnen, 'Lending a Fist? Australia's New Interventionism in the Southwest 
Pacific', State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Seminar (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, 2004)., C. Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis: The Historical Causes for a Failed State in Solomon 
Islands, 1998-2004 (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2004)., Kabutaulaka, 'Australian Foreign Policy and the 
Ramsi Intervention in the Solomon Islands'. 
63 Ponzio, 'The Solomon Islands, 177-8. 
64 Dinnen, 'Lending a Fist', 8-9., Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour, 6, 13, 39. 
65 Morgan and McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour?', 419., Ponzio, 'The Solomon Islands', 179., R. W. 
Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, xiv. 
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and focused on eliminating corruption, training officials and reforming institutions, in 
particular the Royal Solomon Island Police (RSIP). The third phase of RAMSI, promoting 
sustainability, self reliance and the solidification of reforms, started in January 2005 and is 
ongoing.66 
Lessons learnt from previous peacekeeping missions 
 
Coming soon after Australian-New Zealand peacekeeping interventions in Bougainville, East 
Timor and the earlier IPMT in Solomon Islands, those involved in planning RAMSI 
implemented some of the knowledge and lessons learnt in previous missions. Firstly the value 
of merely being on the ground, calming fears, conveying reliable information and building 
confidence, was reaffirmed in Solomon Islands. Furthermore, RAMSI’s planners realised that 
the ineffectiveness of Operation Lagoon and the IPMT was partly due to their limited and 
unclear mandates, so RAMSI was given a much more impressive military presence and 
clearer rules of engagement.67 In East Timor, Australia had been criticised for its overly 
complicated and top heavy military leadership. For RAMSI, the Australian CDF, Peter 
Cosgrove, set limits on the number of senior officers and made command structure clearer.68 
In East Timor, there was also no clear overarching framework and some of the individual 
sectors’ activities were piecemeal and poorly coordinated. So when it came to RAMSI, 
planners took care to create an integrated mission with clear civilian coordination.69 An 
additional tactical lesson picked up from INTERFET was the use of a naval presence to 
demonstrate competence. Australian observers had noted the significant impact of the USS 
Belleau Wood on the Indonesian Army when it was stationed off the coast of East Timor. So, 
the Australians deliberately made sure the HMAS Manoora appeared off the Guadalcanal 
coast on the morning of July 24, 2003 to coincide with the arrival of the first Australian Air 
Force Hercules. RAMSI also operated on the idea used in the TMG that nations should not be 
separated off into their own areas of responsibility. Instead, different nationalities, in 
particular the Pacific Islanders, were integrated together in teams in order to ensure unity of 
coalition goals.70 Another technique learnt from the TMG experience was to destroy 
collected weapons in front of the people instead of confiscating them.71 The success of the 
                                                            
66 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, xii. 
67 Hegarty, 'Peace Interventions in the South Pacific, 7., Batley, [phone interview]. 
68 O’Reilly, [phone interview]. 
69 Hayward, East Timor, 18-19. 
70 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 9, 23, 98. 
71 ‘We had learned from Bougainville never to have weapons turned in and take them away. The people think 
you are taking them and giving them to their enemies. So we cut them up in front of them. We let people come 
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unarmed TMG also helped New Zealand police persuade the AFP to agree to go to Solomon
Islands unarm
 
ed.72  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
On a more informal level, individual experience gained in the TMG, PMG, INTERFET and 
IPMT helped RAMSI personnel. There were a few occasions where soldiers and police were 
entitled to use force under the rules of engagement but held back because of their familiarity 
with Melanesian culture and combat situations.73 Indeed, most respondents who were 
involved in RAMSI stressed the usefulness of knowledge of local conditions. ADF 
Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott agreed that the previous success of New Zealanders’ extended 
village stays in East Timor set a precedent for Australia to facilitate similar operations in 
Solomon Islands.74 Ben McDevitt recalled that his experiences in the Bougainville operation 
had highlighted the prevalence of rumour-spreading in Melanesian culture. Accordingly, in 
his role as head of the PPF in RAMSI, McDevitt held press conferences every day for the 
first two months as well as doing frequent radio interviews to combat rumours.75 Although 
the IPMT had not been particularly successful in enforcing law and order, RAMSI 
participants benefited from the experience gained by military, police and diplomatic 
representatives who had worked for the IPMT. For example, the IPMT security team were 
able to provide a huge amount of information on local conditions in Solomon Islands. 
Likewise, arrangements made with local police to keep records of corruption after the 
Townsville Peace Agreement proved invaluable to the PPF in making prosecutions.76 
The trans-Tasman relationship in Solomon Islands 
  
The main trans-Tasman friction around RAMSI occurred in the very early stages when New 
Zealand was unsure about Australia’s proposed intervention. Rebecca Lineham in her masters 
thesis on RAMSI found that when the possibility of an assistance mission to Solomon Islands 
was first raised with New Zealand Ministers in May 2003 it was deemed to be ‘against the 
grain’ of New Zealand’s traditional approach in the region. Indeed, New Zealand was 
initially concerned about the Australian-led mission’s aggressive military footprint and lack 
of pre-deployment conciliation. New Zealand documents, mindful of protecting their good 
out of the crowd and cut them up.’ (From interview with Nick Warner) Ibid., 25. Also, confirmed by B. 
McDevitt, [phone interview], Canberra, 25-10-07. 
72 V. McBride, [interview], Wellington, 6-9-07., T. Annandale, [phone interview], Wellington, 2-10-07. 
73Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 27.  
74 Scott, [interview]. 
75 McDevitt, [phone interview].  
76 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 19, 33, 104. 
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relationship with the Pacific, consciously did not use the terms ‘failed state’ and ‘terrorism’ 
often found in Australian strategic analysis.77 New Zealand MFAT official, Vince McBride, 
recalled that during the pre-operation planning there was some ‘creative tension’ between 
him and his Australian counterparts. McBride often had to soften the Australian approach to 
Solomon Islanders in order to make the process seem more consultative.78 Australian 
Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott recalls that on the military side there were occasional 
differing expectations during planning but that these frictions were easily overcome.79 During 
RAMSI there were also a few times when Australia and New Zealand faced issues that 
frustrated cooperation. There was the potential for a conflict of national interest with New 
Zealand troops due to unclear operation control directives; however this issue was resolved 
after the problem was recognised. Another problem resulted from Australia’s concern to 
preserve its intelligence-exchange relationship with the United States. New Zealand officers 
were denied access to the Australian Defence Secret Network (DSN) which they found very 
frustrating.80 For example, imagery of Solomon Islands landing zones was not released to 
New Zealand personnel, despite it being unclassified, because it was posted on the DSN. The 
matter was resolved when a limited number of New Zealanders were given access to the DSN 
after high-level negotiations between the two nations.81 Generally, Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s operational disagreements were minor, occurred during the early stages of the 
mission, and were quickly rectified. 
 
Indeed, for RAMSI, a major challenge was not the relationship between Australia and New 
Zealand, but that among different organizations, in particular the military and police. Because 
RAMSI was an interagency operation, personnel from the Australian and New Zealand 
defence forces, aid organizations, police forces and government had to work together. In spite 
of a largely successful effort from top officials to present a united front, unfamiliarity with 
each other led different organizations to ignore or misunderstand each other inadvertently.  
While the ADF and NZDF were by now well acquainted with working together in 
                                                            
77 NZ Ministry of Defence, SI: NZ Support [Memo], p. 4-5 in R. Lineham, 'The Regional Assistance Mission to 
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79 Scott attributes these differences to the NZDF’s expectation the military would as usual play the leading role 
in the mission. However, this mindset was due to the NZDF’s lack of briefing due to hurried planning and a 
limited time frame. Scott, [interview]. 
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peacekeeping operations, RAMSI was the first major overseas operation for the Australian 
and New Zealand police. As a result Australian and New Zealand police faced a steep 
learning curve, both on how to work with the military and in the austere conditions of the 
Pacific.82 For example, AFP officer Ben McDevitt found that in a planning exercise held a 
few weeks before deployment the military had not included any civilian police 
representatives.83 Ben McDevitt was luckier than most in that he had previous experience in 
Bougainville and working with the ADF.84  New Zealand police officer Tony Annandale 
found that police and military had very dissimilar operative styles: the military worked on a 
more hierarchical, maximum force doctrine whereas the police were used to a minimum force 
doctrine with more autonomy given to junior staff.85  
 
Because it was their first experience of a substantial contribution to a peacekeeping mission 
the Australian and New Zealand police also encountered some difficulties in working 
together. The Australian police officers from the AFP were mainly experienced in monitoring 
federal offences such as terrorism and internet security. Moreover, because of the large 
numbers required, many of the first AFP officers sent to Solomon Islands were young and 
inexperienced. By contrast New Zealand sent older officers with considerable experience of 
working on the street and in communities.86 Australia’s and New Zealand’s differing policing 
backgrounds led to some initial miscommunication. Tony McLeod recalled ‘I continually 
raised the issue that RAMSI needed a community policing policy. The Australian Federal 
Police said of course and I was under the impression that we were talking about the same 
thing but we weren’t. The AFP don’t actually carry out ordinary policing duties except in 
Canberra’.87  Togimanu Annandale argued that because New Zealand and Pacific Island 
police were used to attending domestics, assaults and traffic incidents they were able to bring 
a community policing model to RAMSI more confidently than the AFP.88 New Zealand 
police officers, because of the integration of Maori and Pacific Islanders in the police force 
were also more aware of involving Pacific Island police than their Australian counterparts. 
Annandale, a New Zealander of Samoan heritage, realised from early on that the Pacific 
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Island contingents were not being utilised to best effect. He discussed this with the rest of the 
policing executive and subsequently took on a liaison role with Pacific Island officers.89 
Australian officers did learn from their Kiwi counterparts. In later deployments Australia sent 
police from the state forces who were more experienced in community policing.  
 
As a rule, however, Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationship during the planning and 
operation of RAMSI was close, mutual and effective.  The extremely short lead time made 
cooperation essential, especially as the force was put together on an ad hoc basis.90  During 
the six to seven weeks of planning, New Zealand government officials, police officers and 
defence force personnel flew to Canberra and then on to Honiara with their Australian 
counterparts. A RAMSI Principles Group brought together Australian and New Zealand 
heads of the various involved agencies to form a joint planning team.91 While New Zealand 
personnel often started out a little behind the Australian planning process they worked hard to 
catch up and soon became heavily involved. For example, Annandale, a New Zealand police 
officer involved in pre-operation planning, visited Canberra and found the Australians’ 
thinking on the operation to be highly developed. He rang back to New Zealand with this 
information and the New Zealand Police Commissioner was on the plane in the next couple 
of days to discuss the operation with his AFP counterpart.92 New Zealand was also heavily 
involved in military operational planning from the beginning through the Australian strategic 
command division’s reports to the NZDF Joint Headquarters at Trenthem. Once on the 
ground Australians informed the New Zealand national command element of all upcoming 
operations and included them in tactical planning. According to Trent Scott, because of their 
familiarity with each other and shared experience in East Timor ‘both partner forces 
combined well together and worked extremely closely and collaboratively.’93 
 
The good working relationship of Australian and New Zealand personnel was in large part 
due to their shared experiences in Bougainville and East Timor. When Russell Glenn 
interviewed participants of RAMSI he overwhelmingly found that the relationships formed in 
Bougainville and East Timor had a positive effect on the mission: ‘a generation of Australian, 
Pacific Islander and New Zealand police, diplomats and military personnel gained experience 
                                                            
89 Annandale, [phone interview]. 
90 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 22. 
91 McBride, [interview], McDevitt, [phone interview]. 
92 Annandale, [phone interview].  
93 Scott, [interview]. 
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and built relationships that would serve them well when they once again found themselves 
working together. Many of the same individuals would be in senior leadership positions by 
the time RAMSI occurred, providing a well-established basis for close interagency 
cooperation’.94 Most of the RAMSI participants interviewed corroborated this argument. 
Australian James Batley, the second Special Coordinator of RAMSI mentioned the 
importance of personal links and cooperation between different agencies established in 
Bougainville. Vince McBride from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt that a 
‘bank of personal relationships’ had been formed in East Timor which stood trans-Tasman 
cooperation in good stead. And John O’Reilly from the NZDF believed that New Zealand’s 
cooperation with Australia in the IPMT gave them joint experience in contributing together in 
the Solomon Islands.95  
 
Furthermore, from the interviews conducted it is clear that Australians and New Zealanders 
in leadership positions enjoyed working together. Ben McDevitt found his Kiwi colleagues to 
be ‘extraordinarily professional’ and having worked under New Zealand leadership in 
Bougainville, preferred their relaxed tempo over the Australians’ more militaristic approach. 
James Batley’s relationship with his kiwi deputy in RAMSI ‘couldn’t have been better or 
closer’.  Likewise, Paul Ash, a New Zealand deputy Special Coordinator ‘loved’ working 
with his Australian colleagues and pointed out that the Australians were often ruder to each 
other than to New Zealanders.96 In spite of their occasional differences, Australians and New 
Zealanders working together in RAMSI generally had harmonious personal relationships.  
 
The Australian led-mission did attempt to be culturally sensitive and implement lessons learnt 
in previous operations. Right from the first planning stages, Australia recognised the 
importance of involving South Pacific nations in RAMSI to show regional unity and assisted 
in training the smaller nations for duty. RAMSI’s initial publicity named the mission Helpem 
Fren, which means to help the government and people to help themselves. Subsequent 
publicity used similar Pijin English phrases.97As mentioned previously, there were concerted 
attempts to quell rumour-mongering.  The AusAID-funded talkback radio programme, 
‘Talking Truth’ travelled over Solomon Islands and gave locals the chance to question senior 
RAMSI officials and Solomon Islands politicians on air. The Special Coordinators worked 
                                                            
94 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 6. 
95 Batley, [phone interview], McBride, [interview], O’Reilly, [phone interview]. 
96 McDevitt, [phone interview], Batley, [ phone interview], Ash, [interview]. 
97 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 95., Moore, 'Helpem Fren: The Solomon Islands, 2003-2007', 147. 
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without bodyguards, flags of office or other official paraphernalia and most of the police 
operated unarmed.98 Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen of the ADF put in place rules to 
minimise the impact of the armed forces on Solomon Islands society. Soldiers were not 
allowed to shop in the Solomons, carry guns in their free time or drink liquor. To combat 
rumours RAMSI held a public capability demonstration only ten days after arriving. Soldiers 
painted kids’ faces with camouflage paint, displayed equipment and demonstrated mine 
detectors and dogs locating weapon caches.99 In many ways RAMSI planners made great 
efforts to operate the mission in a style cognisant of and non-disruptive to Solomon Islands 
society. 
 
In spite of these efforts, RAMSI members, in particular the Australian personnel, have faced 
criticism for a lack of cultural tact. Although the general population is still highly supportive 
of RAMSI, commentators have censured the behaviour of some RAMSI staff. Some 
members of the PPF, not bound by the military’s strict code of conduct, have been found 
smoking marijuana, drinking home brewed alcohol and involving themselves with local 
women. Clive Moore, an expert on Solomon Islands history and society, has criticised the 
RAMSI staff as a new transitory elite who make little effort to learn Pijin and interact with 
locals only at work. Moore suggests that extensive cultural orientation be made compulsory 
and language learning inducements introduced. After the April 2006 riots, RAMSI began to 
pay more attention to basic linguistic and cultural skills, but according to Moore, this 
emphasis should have been there from the beginning.100 Australians, Michael Morgan and 
Abbey McLeod in a recent article on RAMSI agree that unless the current practice of PPF 
personnel living apart from the community is changed, anti-RAMSI sentiment will continue 
to grow. 101 Australian PPF officers were also accused of using excessive force and treating 
their Pacific Island workmates dismissively.102  John Roughan, an expatriate American who 
has long been involved in Solomon Islands civil society organizations criticised Australia’s 
inability to acknowledge its mistakes and involve Solomon Islanders in its work.103 And 
Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare increasingly challenged RAMSI’s 
                                                            
98 M. Fullilove, 'Ramsi and State Building in Solomon Islands', Defender, (Autumn 2006), 34. 
99 Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube, 101, 108-9. 
100 Interestingly, Moore suggests that a modern equivalent to the Australian School of Pacific Administration 
(1947-1972) be established Moore, 'Helpem Fren: The Solomon Islands, 2003-2007', 147-8. 
101 Morgan and McLeod, 'Have We Failed Our Neighbour?' 421, 19. 
102 Lineham, 'The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Democratic Accountability', 77, 99. 
103 J. Roughan, [interview], Christchurch, 16-9-07. 
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authority and questioned Australia’s involvement in local government before his loss of 
power in late 2007. 
 
Indeed, as with Bougainville, once again New Zealand’s personnel were compared 
favourably with their Australian counterparts when it came to matters of cultural 
understanding. New Zealander Paul Ash thought that the Australian members of RAMSI 
generally had a greater level of Pacific experience than the New Zealanders. But although 
many Australians did get involved in local communities, starting Aussie Rules football teams 
and doing construction work, New Zealanders continued to be perceived as more 
approachable and culturally sensitive, both by Solomon Islanders and Australians and New 
Zealanders. Ash recalled that Solomon Islanders often requested New Zealand troops.104 
Vince McBride described an occasion when New Zealanders, Australians and Fijians flew 
into a school in North Malaita. The Kiwis and Fijians chatted with the locals whereas the 
Australians huddled together. McBride took this as indicative of Australians’ uneasiness with 
cultures different from their own.105 Australian Trent Scott agreed that because of the heavy 
Maori and Pacific presence in New Zealand patrols, locals did tend to warm to them faster 
than the predominantly Caucasian Australians.106 New Zealand police officers Togimanu 
Annandale and Tony McLeod found their Australian colleagues more abrupt, less in touch 
with Pacific Island culture and disinclined to include Solomon Island locals or Pacific Island 
partners in their decision making processes.107 It is hard to make generalizations from only a 
few interviews and articles; however, it would seem that the trend of perceiving New 
Zealanders as more culturally sensitive due to their familiarity with Maori culture continued 
on in RAMSI. 
 
Although INTERFET and RAMSI were in some ways very different operations from each 
other and the TMG, there are some clear trends across all three peacekeeping missions. 
Firstly, Australia and New Zealand learnt lessons from previous peacekeeping missions and 
applied these missions to INTERFET and RAMSI. For New Zealand, a major lesson was the 
need for reliable equipment and increased defence funding. More generally, the Australian 
and New Zealand defence forces applied specific knowledge gained in previous missions to 
                                                            
104 Ash, [interview]. 
105 McBride, [interview]. 
106 Scott, [interview]. 
107  Tony Annandale realised early on in the mission that the Pacific Island police contingents were not being 
heard at an executive level. He discussed this with the rest of the executive level and took on a liaison role with 
the PIC contingents. Annandale, [phone interview], T. McLeod,  [phone interview]. 
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improve their planning processes, troop deployment, mission structure and interaction with 
Melanesian culture. Furthermore, having a number of regional peacekeeping missions so 
close together in time gave individual personnel invaluable experience. A pool of Australians 
and New Zealanders gained an understanding of working in the Pacific and made connections 
with their trans-Tasman counterparts. 
 
 Each new mission did provide fresh challenges. In East Timor, Australia had to grapple with 
leading a large multinational force. In Solomon Islands, the inclusion of police unused to 
peacekeeping or Pacific operations raised new coordination issues. In spite of these obstacles, 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s pre-deployment planning became more cooperative and 
effective over the course of the IPMT, INTERFET and RAMSI. After the logistical 
difficulties faced in Bougainville, New Zealand made a concerted effort in the preparations 
for East Timor to make a significant contribution to the Australian-led mission. New Zealand 
equipment and personnel were reliable, did exemplary work and were highly appreciated by 
the Australians in INTERFET. Likewise, in the preparations for RAMSI, trans-Tasman 
collaboration was frequent and close. In both East Timor and Solomon Islands, Australian 
and New Zealand leaders enjoyed excellent relationships, which in turn improved interactions 
between the two national forces. Lastly, the trend of commentators and participants 
perceiving New Zealanders as more culturally sensitive peacekeepers than Australians 
continued in both INTERFET and RAMSI. In spite of successful Australian efforts to use 
operational methods that suited Melanesian society, it was New Zealand who continued to 
receive the kudos for perceptive interaction with locals. 
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5. Anzac Peacekeeping 
 
This chapter will argue that during regional peacekeeping missions in Bougainville, East 
Timor and Solomon Islands participating Australians and New Zealanders experienced an 
revived Anzac relationship. The old Anzac connection forged during World War I was 
renewed and revitalised in recent joint deployments. There are two facets to the Anzac 
tradition to examine. Firstly, there is the official Anzac tradition signified by joint training 
exercises, Australian and New Zealand defence treaties and agreements, shared decisions 
about military operations and trans-Tasman defence policy. This aspect of Anzac is 
conducted by government officials, politicians and defence personnel. The second facet of 
Anzac is its use as an adjective to describe the significance and meaning that surrounds the 
relationship between Australia and New Zealand. Its most enduring legacies are the annual 
Anzac Day celebrations and remembrance ceremonies performed in both nations. ‘Anzac 
spirit’ has connotations of trust, loyalty, distinctiveness and rivalry. The term Anzac signifies 
the special relationship existing between the two nations.  
Official Anzac connections 
 
The first aspect of the Anzac tradition will be dealt with only briefly, as chapters three and 
four have already demonstrated the high degree of cooperation between Australian and New 
Zealand personnel in recent peacekeeping operations. The second aspect of Anzac is more 
nebulous and as such has not yet been explored in this study, which is why the majority of 
this chapter is devoted to investigating the ‘Anzac spirit’.  
 
Official Anzac links for recent regional peacekeeping missions have been frequent and close. 
Moreover, they have grown in frequency and ease of interoperability. For TMG, INTERFET 
and RAMSI, from early in the planning stages, Australian and New Zealand diplomats, 
government officials and defence personnel participated in joint meetings and conferences. 
For all three missions Australia and New Zealand both contributed equipment and staff. 
Although in Bougainville New Zealand’s logistic capabilities were inadequate this problem 
had been largely corrected by the time they deployed to East Timor and Solomon Islands. In 
all three missions New Zealand was able to do good work with its Iroquois helicopters. 
Australia in turn filled in logistic gaps for New Zealand, offering communications and 
intelligence. In East Timor, Australian and New Zealand defence forces received their 
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supplies through a joint logistics agreement. One of the most important Anzac links was 
through teams of Australians and New Zealanders operating together. In Bougainville, the 
Teams Sites were largely made up of NZDF personnel and Australian civilians. In East 
Timor, although the national forces had their own particular areas of operation, some smaller 
teams such as the intelligence gathering group and Dili Command Headquarters were staffed 
by Australians and New Zealanders working together.1 Likewise in RAMSI, Australian and 
New Zealand civilians, defence staff and police officers worked closely together on various 
assignments. The TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI were examples of Anzac collaboration even 
closer than that of Gallipoli.2 
 
This close trans-Tasman relationship during peacekeeping missions was possible because of 
the regular contact between Australian and New Zealand governments and defence forces. 
The practice of holding annual inter-governmental and defence-force meetings between 
Australians and New Zealanders meant that there was familiarity with each other’s systems 
and capabilities.  Australian defence official, Alan Behm credits the tradition of New Zealand 
Army officers training at Duntroon for the closeness between the ADF and NZDF. During 
shared training strong friendships between Australian and New Zealand Army Officers are 
often formed. Likewise, joint exercises encourage familiarity between the different services. 
Indeed, a lesson learnt from East Timor by both Australians and New Zealanders was the 
importance of continuing and expanding trans-Tasman combined exercises, exchange 
postings and contingency planning.3 Anzac cooperation was able to occur in Bougainville, 
East Timor and Solomon Islands because of the network of connections already existing 
between Australian and New Zealand government and defence establishments. 
The Anzac Spirit: celebration, rivalry and differentiation 
 
Australian and New Zealand cooperation and joint planning do not necessarily entail a 
revival of the Anzac spirit. Australia and New Zealand also cooperated with other nations, 
especially in East Timor. The superior coordination of logistics and force integration after 
                                                            
1 Lilley, [interview].  
2 For example, at Gallipoli, Australians and New Zealanders at first cooperated only at a brigade scale. Their 
smaller units were based on national provinces (i.e. Canterbury). In Bougainville in particular, the TMG groups 
were made up of about 20 Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Island individuals. Smaller mixed groups meant 
greater trans-Tasman interaction. For Gallipoli, planning was handed down from the British, as opposed to the 
constant cooperation between Australians and New Zealanders found in recent peacekeeping missions. 
3 For New Zealand view see Reid, 'The Lessons of East Timor', 7. For Australian view see General Cosgrove’s 
remark reported in Crawford and Harper, Operation East Timor, 169. 
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Bougainville could merely be the product of improved procedures rather than a result of a 
closer Anzac relationship. And the term Anzac did not necessarily seem to have much overt 
significance in day-to-day operations for personnel.  
 
In spite of these counter arguments, when talking with Australian and New Zealand members 
of the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI it became clear that even if it wasn’t always explicit, 
the spirit of Anzac was part of these peacekeeping missions. Of course, opinions about, and 
experiences of Anzac differ according to an individual’s temperament, background and 
character. An Anzac Day may be moving for one individual and less meaningful for another 
because of unique circumstances such as the loss of a colleague. Nonetheless in the 
interviews conducted for this thesis, clear patterns emerged. The first trend in interviewees’ 
experiences of Anzac was a subtle feeling of greater than normal closeness while on 
deployment. This Anzac spirit was often grounded in recognition of shared historical 
experience. While usually implicit, during Anzac celebrations the ‘Anzac spirit’ emerged to 
create emotionally charged experiences for those involved. Secondly, the main way the 
Anzac relationship manifested itself in day-to-day operations was through competitiveness, 
particularly in the discharge of duties and sporting events. Related to this competitiveness is 
the third trend: a strong desire on the part of New Zealanders to differentiate themselves from 
Australia by claiming a special ability in Pacific peacekeeping. While these second two 
trends may not seem ‘Anzac’ in nature it is important to remember that the original Anzac 
tradition also involved these two elements. As related in chapter one of the thesis, 
competitiveness and the smaller partner’s desire for uniqueness were both part of the original 
relationship between Australian and New Zealand forces. 
 
There was a mixed response among interview respondents as to whether they were aware of 
an ‘Anzac spirit’ while on deployment.  Some were unsure as to whether there was an 
explicit awareness of Anzac feeling. The word Anzac was not at the front of people’s minds 
according to New Zealander Vince McBride. Or as Trent Scott put it, ‘It’s not an explicit 
thing – we don’t go around saying ‘Come on Anzacs’’. Jan Gammage, although conscious of 
the Anzac feeling, couldn’t remember talking about it to the other TMG members. Neil 
Robertson knew Australians and New Zealanders had a close relationship especially when in 
a third country but wasn’t sure if this was an Anzac or general trans-Tasman link. Some 
interviewees wanted to make caveats to the idea of Anzac. Jeff Wilkinson cautioned that 
although Australia’s and New Zealand’s involvement in peacekeeping operations were 
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consistent with the Anzac spirit, it was politics and international affairs that drove their 
intervention. John O’Reilly said that the Anzac myth was more ingrained in Australian 
culture than in New Zealand’s. Then again, other participants such as James Batley, Roger 
Mortlock and Tony McLeod felt there was undoubtedly a strong awareness of the Anzac 
spirit.4 With such mixed responses a test was needed to determine whether there really was a 
widespread feeling of closeness between Australian and New Zealand members of the TMG, 
INTERFET and RAMSI.  
 
The test used was to ask respondents if they had celebrated Anzac Day while on deployment. 
The response overwhelmingly confirmed that the Anzac spirit, while usually an implicit 
undercurrent, materialized with strength on the traditional day dedicated to its celebration.  
Other important ceremonial moments such as the arrival and departure of troops or 
remembrance days also prompted feelings of Anzac solidarity. Almost every single 
interviewee had emotive memories of the Anzac ceremonies they celebrated while on 
deployment. The following excerpts from the interviews describe such Anzac moments:  
 
We now come to Anzac Day. I’d spent five Anzac Days away in the 
previous years. They discovered a WWII memorial – a Fijian memorial. 
They literally went down – it was made out of classic plinths – and lovingly 
and as a common thing, cleaned it up. People driving up and down on the 
road had seen this thing – discovered that it was a WWII memorial – found 
out locations of battles. The Regimental Sergeant Major was there 
[responsible for military ceremonies]. It turned out that this would be an 
Anzac Day when the majority of people due to leave and PMG due to come 
– they turned out on the day at dawn – 250 people on parade. Down at this 
memorial which had been lovingly cleared away – awaiting Anzac Day – a 
shared project. There was an enormous sense of solidarity in that they were 
there at a WWII battlefield, New Zealanders had been there with Fijians 
who had fought in Bougainville in a battalion in WWII - where there had 
been casualties – here gathered again in cause of peace, New Zealanders, 
Fijians, Australians and Ni-Vanuatu, and a beautiful dawn it was too and I 
think at that ceremony – it marked  a sort of moment of unity in what had 
been a troubled operation – a sentimental view but no doubt  that it was a 
glowing day – a big lunch, cricket match – an Anzac Day celebrated. You 
could have argued that they would have had separate celebrations but there 
was never any doubt – everyone wanted a joint one.  
Bob Breen, on Anzac Day in Bougainville, 1998 
 
                                                            
4 McBride, [interview], Scott, [interview], J. Gammage, [interview], Robertson, [interview], Wilkinson, 
[interview], O’Reilly, [phone interview], Batley, [phone interview], Mortlock, [interview] and T. McLeod, 
[phone interview]. 
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I’ve been to four Anzac Days overseas. One in Cyprus, one in Bougainville, 
and two in Solomon Islands. They were the best Anzac days ever of any - 
just incredible. The one in Bougainville – we went to a Japanese war 
memorial where we had Anzac Day – a really really moving experience. 
There was a big contingent of New Zealand military, some Australian 
military and other players from right across the spectrum – really moving 
tributes to the Anzacs. In Solomon Islands there were great big functions all 
day: dawn service, then a gunfire breakfast. They really embraced it as a 
significant day.  
Ben McDevitt 
 
When the Kiwis were leaving in late April 1998, they did a mass final haka 
- it was pretty funny because the Maoris up the front were going for it but 
other New Zealanders and Maoris at the back were all out of time. When 
the PMG arrived, the Aussies lined up in military formation after they 
arrived. The Kiwis all lined up and did a mass haka. The Group’s Major 
made a speech in Maori – about Anzac tradition – ‘we’re brothers and 
sisters’ – a pretty sad day.  
Andrew Rice  
 
In Bougainville I was living on a little island, Sohano Island. There was a 
memorial there – maybe just an Australian one – can’t remember. On 
Anzac Day I dressed up in my police uniform and attended a dawn service. 
As Peace Monitoring Group was still operating (Combined military from 
NZ/AUS/Fiji/Vanuatu) the Australians brought over some bandsmen from 
Australia.  It was wonderful experience commemorating Anzac day in this 
remote part of the world.   
Togimanu Annandale 
 
Must have been 28th September, Police Remembrance Day- we held a 
police remembrance day in Honiara – quite a big service. I distinctly 
remember - I was the senior New Zealand Police representative – marching 
out of church beside the AFP commissioner, I felt that Anzac relationship 
very strongly. And with the IPMT it was predominantly just Australians 
and New Zealanders when I was there and RAMSI was predominantly 
Anzac with small contingents from the Pacific.  Every time you saw 
Australia and New Zealand flag flying next to each other – saw it quite a bit 
in Honiara – very conscious of that. I went to an Anzac Dawn Service in the 
IPMT. It’s very much there even 90 years after. 
Tony McLeod 
 
The Australians strongly value Anzac Day and the New Zealand part is not 
forgotten about by them. Whenever I speak about Anzac I mention 
Australians too. The Anzac spirit shows through on that particular day. I 
don’t know if it’s as strong on the other 364 days. They [Australia] 
recognise it and talk up our success. 
Clive Lilley 
 
We seniors might argue among ourselves but on the ground a Kiwi and 
Australian just get on. I know we cleared an old Anzac memorial just to the 
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south of Arawa. There was a club on the beach and overgrown by jungle 
was a little memorial. We cleared it for Anzac Day but I was home by then. 
A lot of my young fellows’ grandfathers had served in Bougainville in 
WWII. The Japanese Grand Admiral Yamamoto was killed in Bougainville 
– it has history and people were aware of that – absolutely. 
Roger Mortlock 
 
I missed the first Anzac Day in Solomon Islands because I was sick. The 
second one was the most moving one I’d ever been to. It was held in the 
GBR camp, after the riots, there was still a curfew in Honiara. It was a 
private ceremony for military, defence officials and civilians. It was a large 
ceremony because 600+ military were there, 1000+ were present. The 
helicopters in the theatre, as the sun went down they flew over – quite 
something. It brought a tear to my eye. There were wounded police officers 
present who had been wounded in the riots a week before. There was an 
awareness of a close relationship. Anzac has changed over the years – been 
appropriated. We all come to these operations with shared memories. I’m 
very proud to have served with Australia and New Zealand. We went 
through a very difficult period – in 8 days we worked 120 hours over the 
riots as we struggled to contain a violent situation. The distinctions between 
New Zealanders and Australians blurred – working to a common goal. It 
was nothing like the actual Anzacs but it was a little taste. 
Paul Ash 
 
It is clear that for many interviewees the official Anzac events attended while on deployment 
were the most meaningful they had ever attended. They were the moment when the Anzac 
spirit of solidarity and unity became actualised. Andrew Rice recalled feelings of brotherhood 
at the departure of the New Zealand TMG troops in early 1998 (see Figure 5.1). Anzac rituals 
often encouraged emotion; sentiments of loss, sadness at the departure of fellow Anzacs or 
feelings of pride and achievement. These accounts reveal why Anzac celebrations during 
peacekeeping operations heightened feelings of Australian and New Zealand closeness. The 
experience of danger and being far from home drew Australians and New Zealanders closer 
together. The Anzac Day in the Solomon Islands after the May 2006 riots was particularly 
poignant because of the presence of wounded police. At such events the special Anzac 
relationship forged in adversity became real and the experience of the original Anzacs was 
made all the more poignant. 
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Figure 5. 1: NZDF Haka at their departure from Loloho, April 1998, courtesy 
of Andrew Rice. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Anzac Day celebrations at Sohano Island, 25 April 1998. Note the war 
memorial in the background and local attendee in a Scout’s uniform, second from 
left in the front row, courtesy of Andrew Rice. 
 
110 
 
Anzac Day was particularly moving because it was grounded in an awareness of the sacrifice 
of previous Australian and New Zealand soldiers in the Pacific. Trent Scott reflected that 
traditions are important to the military: uniforms, drills and ceremonies are all based on 
historical precedent.5 Thus, when serving in the Pacific, Anzac personnel were very aware of 
the men and women who had served and died during the Pacific War in the 1940s. Indeed, 
the recurrent and spontaneous occurrence of holding services at World War II memorials 
reflected a respect for past Anzacs (see Figure 5.2). Peacekeepers cleaned up and restored the 
old memorials out of reverence for the Anzac past and a desire to do things properly. Even in 
a foreign environment the old traditions of a dawn service, gunfire breakfast and army 
parades were adhered to when possible. Other less noble customs were also followed: heated 
sports matches played an important role in Anzac Day celebrations as part of the Anzac 
tradition of mateship and friendly rivalry.  
 
The Australian and New Zealand peacekeepers’ awareness of the historical past was 
reinforced by Pacific Islanders’ general knowledge of their participation in the region during 
World War II. While Pacific Islanders did not consider themselves part of the Anzac tradition 
many were aware of Australia’s and New Zealand’s historical contribution to their region in 
the Pacific War.6 Fijian, Ni-Vanuatu and Cook Island personnel were easily included in 
Anzac celebrations as their ancestors had fought with Australian and New Zealand troops in 
the Pacific War. Quite often locals attended the peacekeepers’ Anzac Day ceremonies. In 
Bougainville, when Andrew Rice’s Truce Monitoring Team decided to hold their 
commemorative service at an old memorial on Sohano Island they found that the villagers 
already held an Anzac Day ceremony there every year (see Figure 5. 2).7  
 
The second aspect of the Anzac spirit experienced by Australians and New Zealanders while 
on peacekeeping missions was competition, particularly in operational ability and sporting 
events. Members of the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI often felt that this was how the Anzac 
relationship was expressed in everyday life. Because of the closeness of the trans-Tasman 
relationship Australians and New Zealanders are able to take liberties with each other that 
would be inappropriate with other alliance partners. For example, Ben McDevitt recalled how 
‘healthy competition’ between the Aussies and Kiwis was a marker of their connection. 
                                                            
5 Scott, [interview]. 
6 There was consensus on this view among  interviewees who considered this issue: Ash, [interview], O’Reilly, 
[phone interview], Batley, [phone interview], Lilley, [interview]. 
7 Rice, [interview]. 
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Joking putdowns actually indicated a close relationship. Ben had been to a number of 
overseas forums for his counter terrorism work. At one in Indonesia, ‘at the end some people 
came up and asked, ‘Don’t the New Zealanders and Australians like each other?’ For 
McDevitt however this was actually a positive experience: ‘it was all friendly – great and 
healthy rivalry. The Anzac spirit is alive and well – there’s no doubt about that’.8  Roger 
Mortlock said ‘watching New Zealand and Australian soldiers together is a joy – it’s funny. 
They hassle each other but it doesn’t have a barb in it’.9 James Batley also remembered ‘a 
healthy spirit of competitiveness’ in the early days of the TMG between Australia and New 
Zealand.10 National rivalry was not seen negatively by interviewees. It was a natural outcome 
of a strong relationship between two close yet separate countries. 
 
There was some indication that this Anzac rivalry was used to improve Australians’ and New 
Zealanders’ performances. Peter Cosgrove in his autobiography My Story gives an example 
of this in action at an Anzac Day ceremony in Gallipoli. Cosgrove told Australians at their 
ceremony at Lone Pine that he thought the ‘Kiwis had out-sung us on the national 
anthems…and that we should really let it rip on Advance Australia Fair at the end of the 
service.’ The Australian crowd responded by singing ‘the birds out of the trees’.11 Jeff 
Wilkinson felt that Australians and New Zealanders worked very well together because they 
were driven by a shared heritage and ‘extremely friendly rivalry’. Trent Scott also found that 
trans-Tasman rivalry was used to good effect on peacekeeping missions: 
 
The whole Anzac thing – it’s there and it’s drawn upon implicitly to, I 
guess, almost to create internal competition between the two armies when 
on operations to excel in their job. It’s not an explicit thing – we don’t go 
around saying ‘Come on Anzacs’ or ‘Come on, you’re an Anzac’. There is 
a degree of competitiveness between the two forces. If Kiwis do something 
well operationally the Aussies will try to reciprocate and if they do 
something bad there’ll be talk of ‘Those fucking Kiwis/Aussies’. It does 
foster esprit de corps, esprit de Anzac – but definitely an underlying theme 
rather than overt campaign.  
Trent Scott 
 
Thus, during planning and operations, the desire to better each other could be used positively 
to encourage good work from Australian and New Zealand troops. Bob Breen described how 
                                                            
8 McDevitt, [phone interview]. 
9 Mortlock, [interview]. 
10 Batley, [phone interview]. 
11 Cosgrove, My Story, 436. 
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during the preparations for Bougainville there was constructive competition between the 
Australians in Sydney and the New Zealanders at Trentham. According to Breen, this was the 
Anzac spirit: ‘a rivalry that produces a good standard performance to better the other’ for the 
common good.12 
 
Understandably, one of the main ways this trans-Tasman rivalry was clearly expressed on 
operations was through sport. Australia and New Zealand have traditionally been fierce 
opponents in sporting events. National self esteem, particularly for New Zealand, can hinge 
on the outcome of a trans-Tasman rugby match. This competitive relationship is heightened 
in the military where sport is a central part of NZDF and ADF culture. As mentioned 
previously, sports matches were also an intrinsic part of Anzac Day celebrations. Peter 
Cosgrove gives an amusing example of the interplay of Anzac sporting rivalry from 
INTERFET: 
 
The Australians in INTERFET had sent a message of support to the 1999 
World Cup Wallabies. ‘I was extraordinarily thrilled when the Australian 
Rugby Union offered to send the World Cup, escorted by several Wallabies, 
for a quick visit to East Timor to show off the Cup to the Australian men 
and women of the force – an offer I accepted with alacrity. The Cup did the 
rounds down into the border areas and back to Dili, wherever there were 
large groupings of Australians. It must have been agony for the many Kiwis 
and fewer French men and women to watch the Cup triumphantly borne 
aloft, but everybody likes to exercise their boasting rights from time to 
time…Years later when my own retirement from the Army was imminent, 
my good friend, Air Vice Marshal Bruce Ferguson, the New Zealand Chief 
of the Defence Force, sent me a videotaped message in which he said very 
warm and welcome things about the military-to-military relationship 
between Australia and New Zealand as well as our own friendship. I 
noticed he was recorded standing next to the Bledisloe Cup, the ultimate 
prize in Australia and New Zealand rugby competition, and the Tri-Nations 
Cup. During an address of several minutes he never once referred to either 
of these trophies, but from time to time would pat one or the other like a 
favourite family pet. I got the message.13 
 
Cosgrove’s recollection shows the way sporting rivalry was used to reference the wise-
cracking competitiveness between Anzac neighbours. Indeed, Australian and New Zealand 
peacekeeping personnel would often make sports allusions and jokes with each other about 
                                                            
12 Breen, [interview]. 
13 Cosgrove, My Story, 297. 
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their national teams’ prowess.14 Sporting references allowed participants to acknowledge the 
close Anzac relationship while also expressing their unique national identity. 
 
Australians’ and New Zealanders’ shared interest in sport was also used constructively to 
forge relationships with the locals. In Bougainville, Roger Mortlock organised a pan-
Bougainville sports tournament in boxing and soccer. A mixed TMG team entered. The point 
was not to win (and indeed they did not) but to create a situation of trust and hope in the 
peacekeeping process.15 Likewise, in East Timor and Solomon Islands, Australians and New 
Zealanders played sport with locals in order to restore normality and engender confidence. 
Thus, the shared Australian and New Zealand interest in sport has a practical use in 
peacekeeping apart from cementing Anzac links. 
 
The third example of Anzac spirit in trans-Tasman peacekeeping that emerged from the 
participants’ accounts was the idea that New Zealanders had a better cultural understanding 
of the Pacific region. Almost every single respondent, whether from Australia or New 
Zealand reinforced this idea without any prompting. New Zealand’s Pacific advantage was 
obviously a deep rooted, and with the exception of a few thoughtful Australians and New 
Zealanders, uncontested belief. The following section outlines the main points of the 
argument of New Zealand’s superior cultural sensitivity, critically investigates the reasons for 
its prevalence and argues why its existence is another proof of an Anzac relationship between 
Australian and New Zealand forces. 
 
The main reasons given for New Zealand’s superior cultural sensitivity were that it is less 
guilty of re-colonising impulses and racism than Australia, and is familiar with Pacific culture 
due to its high population percentage of Maori and Polynesians. In Bougainville, New 
Zealand did not suffer from the taint of having helped Papua New Guinea fight against the 
Bougainvilleans, as Australia did.  Bougainvillean Ruth Spriggs pointed out that ‘we’ve had a 
colonial relationship with Australia and our experience was tarnished to some extent’.16 In 
Solomon Islands also, New Zealand’s smaller force made it a less threatening presence. 
Many respondents identified New Zealand’s superior race-relations history as the reason for 
their Pacific advantage. John Roughan felt that Pakeha New Zealanders had far more frequent 
                                                            
14 Hegarty, [interview]. 
15 Mortlock, [interview]. 
16 Spriggs, [interview].  
114 
 
contact with Maori and Polynesians than European Australians did with Aboriginal 
Australians and as a result were less racist. Vince McBride stated that Australians do not 
interact with Indigenous Australians at the same level as New Zealanders do with Maori.17 
And Clive Lilley and Ruth Spriggs both suggested that Australia’s greater distance from the 
Pacific was due to its unresolved mistreatment of the Australian Aboriginal people.18 
Interviewees also identified New Zealand’s familiarity with Maori culture as the reason for 
their success with Pacific Islanders. For example, Vince McBride and Tony McLeod related 
stories of New Zealanders interacting with locals while Australians stood off to the side, 
talking only to each other.19  Australian Trent Scott was impressed by New Zealand Maori 
serving in East Timor who lived in local villages.20 New Zealand policemen, Tony McLeod 
and Togimanu Annandale both felt that New Zealand saw itself as part of the Pacific in a way 
that Australia did not.21 All interviewees mentioned some of these arguments as to why New 
Zealanders had better relationships with Pacific Islanders than Australians during 
peacekeeping missions. 
 
In reality, the depiction of Australians as culturally insensitive and New Zealanders as having 
a Pacific advantage is a flawed stereotype. The Australian-led missions in East Timor and 
Solomon Islands did put in place strategies to encourage cultural sensitivity. Many Australian 
individuals, such as James Batley, were highly knowledgeable about Melanesian culture and 
society. Although they may have been the exception to the general Australian population, 
long stints serving in the Pacific have given some Australian diplomats, aid workers and 
defence staff a comprehensive understanding of the area. Likewise some New Zealanders 
were just as racist and guilty of inappropriate behaviour as Australians.22 In spite of public 
arguments to the contrary, New Zealand is not free from xenophobia or ignorance of multi-
culturalism. The generally unquestioning acceptance of New Zealand’s Pacific advantage 
needs to be investigated. The question needs be asked, why did New Zealanders continue to 
receive the majority of praise for sensitive conduct towards locals?  
 
                                                            
17 Roughan, [interview], McBride, [interview]. 
18 Lilley, [interview], Spriggs, [interview]. 
19 McBride, [interview], T. McLeod, [phone interview]. 
20 Scott, [interview]. 
21 T. McLeod, [phone interview], Annandale, [phone interview]. 
22 ‘A bit was made of the fact that Australian military were racist, and yeah they were but some of the guys from 
New Zealand gave as good as the Aussies would have.’ Rice, [interview]. 
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The first reason for New Zealand’s perceived cultural sensitivity is its routine inclusion of 
Maori protocol in the government’s and NZDF’s official duties.  It is expected for New 
Zealand officials, diplomats and politicians to use Te Reo Maori in their speeches and be 
conversant with Maori culture. For example, during the IPMT a visiting delegation of New 
Zealand politicians and election officials performed a haka for their Australian colleagues and 
Solomon Island hosts.23 The NZDF also holds Maori customs as an integral part of its 
internal culture. In 1994 the concept of Tu, the Maori War God, was officially introduced into 
New Zealand Army policy when the army was renamed Ngati Tumatauenga (‘Tribe of 
War’).  Accompanying the name change was the incorporation of traditional Maori elements 
of warfare and culture such as the haka, the Taiaha (Maori spear) and powhiri (welcome 
ceremony) into army doctrine. The concept of Ngati Tumatauenga has since been extended to 
the New Zealand Navy and Air Force.24 Thus, when on deployment in Bougainville, East 
Timor and Solomon Islands all NZDF personnel, whether Pakeha or Maori, participated in 
Maori ceremonies. New Zealanders performed the haka frequently and spontaneously. As Jan 
Gammage recalled from Bougainville ‘they [the New Zealanders] came in with their guitars 
and did the haka everywhere – people loved it – it was one way of giving something to the 
people. It left Australians rather flat-footed. We didn’t have anything so fun – only three 
bloody cheers’.25 In fact interviewees gave several accounts of Australians not joining in 
concerts while on operation because of their lack of a cultural contribution.26 A major reason 
New Zealand is seen as more sensitive than Australia is its use of Maori culture to form 
connections with Pacific Islanders. Australia has not included indigenous Australian culture 
in its defence force or government to the same extent and is unable to do so. 
 
A paradox of New Zealand’s Pacific advantage is that its good reputation is often a result of 
its lack of strategic intelligence and funding. Because it operates on a far smaller budget, 
New Zealand has less information available on the Pacific region than Australia. With 
Bougainville in particular, this contributed to New Zealand’s intervention. Bede Corry, a 
New Zealand MFAT official involved in New Zealand’s early negotiations with the BRA, 
reflected that New Zealanders’ familiarity with certain Bougainvillean individuals showed a 
degree of naivety. The New Zealanders did not realise the calibre of the people they were 
dealing with and their past crimes and thus took considerable risks. By comparison, the well-
                                                            
23 J. Gammage, [interview]. 
24 Gault, 'The New Zealand Intervention in the Bougainville Conflict', 131-4. 
25 J. Gammage, [interview].  
26 Mortlock, [interview], Ash, [interview]. 
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informed Australians were far more suspicious, concerned and cautious about security.27 
Fortunately, the naive approach worked to New Zealand’s advantage in Bougainville; it was 
perceived by Bougainvilleans as trust and a commitment to the peace process. Similarly, New 
Zealand prides itself on adaptability and innovation. While commendable, these virtues often 
arise out of necessity. A lack of funding forces personnel to find alternative solutions. In the 
Solomon Islands not much government direction was given to the New Zealand contingent. 
This however, allowed on-the-ground staff to modify plans for local conditions and needs.28 
New Zealand’s lack of resources often works in its favour, especially in the Pacific region, 
where personal relationships and flexibility are valued over highly detailed strategic tactics.  
 
Pacific Islanders partly contribute to New Zealand’s reputation by praising New Zealanders 
as more culturally sensitive than Australians. Often their response is sincere; however at other 
times it arises out of self-interest. Lance Beath believes that the Pacific Islanders know New 
Zealanders want to be praised for their ability in the Pacific and feed this back to them.29  
Paul Ash pointed out that sometimes locals request New Zealanders because they see them as 
‘an easier ride than the Aussies’. In James Batley’s experience, the depiction of New Zealand 
as more sensitive and Australia as more crude is a political commonplace rather than an 
objective judgement.30 And Togimanu Annandale found that Pacific Islanders could change 
their opinions according to the situation: ‘one day…they say they love the New Zealanders. 
The next day they say to an Australian they love Australians. They know don’t bite the hand 
that feeds you.’31  It is important to remember that Pacific Islanders’ comparative judgments 
of Australia and New Zealand may arise out of political expediency. 
 
The theme of New Zealand’s special ability in the Pacific is also partly due to self-
congratulation on New Zealand’s part. Lance Beath pointed out that New Zealand is not 
really as well informed on the Pacific as Australia. Nonetheless, New Zealand deludes itself 
that it has a superior understanding of the region: ‘it’s impossible for a visit of a New Zealand 
Foreign Minister to be described as anything but an outstanding success- in reality they are 
often ill-prepared and create great offence. But our reporting never reflects that. The system 
                                                            
27 Corry, [phone interview]. 
28 T. McLeod, [phone interview]. 
29 L. Beath, [phone interview], Wellington, 28-11-07. 
30 Batley, [phone interview]. 
31 Annandale,  [phone interview]. 
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goes into self-congratulatory mode’.32 Sometimes New Zealanders pat themselves on the 
back for ‘cultural sensitivity’ when in reality the opposite is true. Maori customs while 
similar to Polynesian culture can be different from Melanesian culture.  There is a risk of 
New Zealanders using Maori culture inappropriately in Melanesia. James Batley recalled that 
during the TMG a Kiwi commander introduced himself to a village as a Maori warrior, which 
‘freaked out’ the locals.33 Togimanu Annandale felt that New Zealanders can have too high 
an opinion of themselves and need to remember that Australians are learning from their 
peacekeeping experiences.34 Indeed, among the interviewees the most enthusiastic 
descriptions of New Zealand’s Pacific advantage came from New Zealanders. 
 
Stressed differentiation between Australians and New Zealanders is a long-standing aspect of 
the trans-Tasman relationship. Back in Egypt, Gallipoli and on the Western Front, New 
Zealanders characterised themselves as more gentlemanly than the Australians. The original 
Anzacs’ relationship was suffused by rivalry and national differentiation.35 In recent 
peacekeeping operations, New Zealanders have also sought to distinguish themselves from 
their Australian counterparts. The TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI have provided ‘proof’ for 
the argument that New Zealanders understand the Pacific better than Australians. New 
Zealanders feel they have shown themselves to be more culturally attuned to the Pacific; less 
brash and interfering than Australians. New Zealand’s Pacific advantage does have a basis in 
reality. Maori customs are an integral part of NZDF doctrine and New Zealand personnel 
have used this to their advantage in the Pacific. However, the less admirable reasons for New 
Zealand’s good reputation in the Pacific are generally ignored. New Zealanders stress their 
superior Pacific ability in order to make themselves look good, especially in comparison to 
Australians. Significantly, Australia is always the implicit point of reference for New 
Zealanders to judge their own conduct by. Cultural sensitivity is one area in which New 
Zealand seems to outperform Australia. So this aspect is stressed as part of the implicit 
rivalry between the two nations. Cultural sensitivity is New Zealand’s claim to uniqueness 
within the Anzac relationship.  
                                                            
32Beath, [phone interview]. 
33 Batley, [phone interview]. 
34 Annandale, [phone interview]. 
35 Mein Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand, p. 127., Pugsley, Gallipoli, pp, 12-13.  
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The wider implications of Anzac peacekeeping 
 
The Anzac relationships formed since Bougainville had an impact on wider trans-Tasman 
relations. The cooperation around these three peacekeeping missions caused an 
acknowledgement of the close ties that bind Australia and New Zealand at a political level. 
This is demonstrated in the transcripts from joint press conferences between the Australian 
and New Zealand Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The majority of the conferences have been 
between Alexander Downer from Australia and Phil Goff from New Zealand but the last few 
were between Winston Peters and Alexander Downer.36   In these transcripts there is a strong 
appreciation of the special relationship between Australia and New Zealand that has arisen 
out of their cooperation in regional peacekeeping. Interestingly, several of the Anzac trends 
that emerged from participants’ interviews are also present in the transcripts. Phil Goff tended 
to be more inclusive of the Pacific and less overtly nationalistic than Alexander Downer. The 
tenor of the conversation is jovial and bantering with frequent references to the sporting 
rivalry between the two nations. This suggests that the Anzac spirit is not contained to 
peacekeeping participants. 
 
In the press interviews Downer often stressed Australia’s contribution whereas Goff was 
more inclusive of the Pacific. Goff also sometimes also ameliorated Downer’s more 
stridently nationalistic comments. When talking to the press about the RAMSI intervention, 
Downer emphasised Australia’s lead role. On 29 June 2003 Downer stated that the 
intervention was ‘inevitably led by Australia, because of the size of Australia, Australia’s 
Defence Force, and economy and so on.’37 On 30 June, Downer repeated that Australia 
would ‘inevitably’ head up the operation. 38 When mentioning risks, Downer also tended to 
focus exclusively on Australia. On 29 June 2003 he said ‘if we’re going to make any of these 
sorts of deployments, we have to be very cautious about protecting Australian lives.  We’re 
                                                            
36 This analysis is based on the full transcripts of fourteen joint press conferences listed on the Australian 
Foreign Minister’s website, from 2000-2007. Nine interviews are reports on bilateral meetings of the Ministers, 
one is on the occasion of an Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum and four interviews are concerned with 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s intervention in Solomon Islands in 2003. 
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/>, accessed 8-8-07.   
37 A. Downer and P. Goff, '29 June 2003, Joint Press Conference with New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff - 
Adelaide Airport', [transcript], <http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030629_philgoff.html>, 
accessed 31-7-07. 
38 A. Downer and P. Goff, '30 June 2003, Joint Press Conference Following Pacific Island Forum Foreign 
Ministers Meeting, Sydney', [transcript], 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030630_pacificforum.html>, accessed 29-7-07. 
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not taking chances with Australian lives’.39 In August 2003, once again Downer justified 
the ‘strong and decisive military presence’ in Solomon Islands as necessary for securing 
‘Australian’ lives.40 Goff backed up Downer but softened his exclusive Australian 
nationalism and militaristic approach. For example, in the August 2003 article, after Downer 
had talked about the necessity of a strong Australian military presence, Goff emphasised the 
warm welcome given to the RAMSI force from Solomon Islanders: ‘the atmosphere was like 
Christmas Day. It was an atmosphere of celebration, of enjoyment, of welcoming. There is no 
shock and awe as far as the community is concerned’.41 At other times, when Downer 
focused on military and governance solutions, Goff would talk about improving the social 
and economic conditions of Solomon Islands.42 Goff also occasionally mentioned the Pacific 
Island Forum, UN and Commonwealth approval for RAMSI.43  
 
In the press conferences, the two ministers often begin and finish by making jovial banter 
about the relationship between Australia and New Zealand. This sort of conversation often 
revolves around sport, humorous put-downs and friendly one-upmanship. An example of this 
is found in a 2006 exchange between Downer and Peters: 
 
JOURNALIST:  Talking about differences, there's a significant sporting 
match on this evening.  Will you have an opportunity in your discussions to 
break to watch the rugby league test? 
MR PETERS:  Well Alexander is an Australian Rules man and we play the 
manly game of rugby here more than we play league, but I think we've got a 
good chance tonight. 
MR DOWNER:  Personally I think Australia will win. 
JOURNALIST:  But you know, taking it through the lens of this test, who 
has done better out of twenty years of CER…? 
MR DOWNER:  Economically?  Or sport? 
JOURNALIST:  No from the players on the field tonight... 
MR PETERS:  I tell you what's happened here, you've got our guy as your 
fullback for Australia and we've got your guy as fullback for New 
Zealand… 
JOURNALIST:  We've got five Australians… 
MR DOWNER:  Well it just shows how well we get on with each other… 
                                                            
39 Downer and Goff, '29 June 2003'. 
40 A. Downer and P. Goff, '1 August 2003, Doorstop Interview with Mr Downer and New Zealand Foreign 
Minister Phil Goff, Honiara, Solomon Islands', [transcript], 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030801_doorstop_honiara.html>, accessed 31-7-07. 
41 Ibid. 
42 For example, 29 June 2003, Downer talks about regional intervention force and Goff follows by talking about 
the importance of additional economic development, education and health care for the Solomon Islands. Downer 
and Goff, '29 June 2003'. 
43 Ibid. 
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MR PETERS:  And we've got an excuse if we lose…. 44 
 
This friendly banter reveals the similar cultural background of the two nations. The trans-
Tasman nature of the Australian and New Zealand league teams is proof of close 
connections, but also provides an opportunity to harass their opponents. In most of the 
interviews, Downer, Goff and Peters had a shared understanding of the enduring rivalry 
between Australia and New Zealand, particularly in sport.  
 
The Australian Foreign Minister took particular care to stress the closeness of the trans-
Tasman relationship. Alexander Downer was effusively positive about Australia’s 
relationship with New Zealand in almost every press interview. In 2000 he claimed that the 
bilateral connection between Australia and New Zealand had ‘never been in better shape’ and 
stressed the ‘extremely close and enormously successful’ cooperation between the two 
nations.45 In 2002, Downer stated that the Australian-New Zealand diplomatic relationship ‘is 
constantly underrated and underestimated.’46 In 2006, Downer continued to rhapsodize about 
the trans-Tasman relationship to Winston Peters, saying ‘Australia I think for our part, 
appreciates so much what New Zealand does to support the things we stand for. New Zealand 
has been a tremendous friend of Australia in recent times’.47 Goff and Peters did mention the 
close Australia-New Zealand relationship but at a more pragmatic level without such 
extravagant praise.48 Downer’s praise of New Zealand countered the common perception 
Australia and New Zealand were drifting apart. In 2005 he said, ‘I know the popular view is 
                                                            
44 A. Downer and W. Peters, '5 May 2006, Joint Press Conference with the Rt Hon. Winston Peters Mp', 
[transcript], <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2006/060505_joint_press_conf.html>, accessed 31-
7-07. 
45 A. Downer and P. Goff, '23 June 2000, Bilateral Meeting of Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers: 
Press Conference', [transcript], <http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2000/000623_ausnz_fmin.html>, 
accessed 8-8-07. 
46 A. Downer and P. Goff, '7 June 2002, Biannual Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers' Meeting: 
Press Conference ', [transcript], 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2002/020607_fa_biann_ausnz_formeet.htm>, accessed 8-8-07. 
47 A. Downer and W. Peters, '23 February 2006, Australia New Zealand Foreign Ministers Meeting, Bowen 
House, Wellington, New Zealand', [transcript], 
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2006/060223_nz_ministers_meetingl.html>, accessed 3-8-07. 
48 An example of the more pragmatic view of the relationship can be seen in this quote from Winston Peters: 
‘Well, we've got a window of our commensurate [inaudible], comparative [inaudible], and the reality is that we 
need to work with Australia, we need to work with others as well, but in conflating with others in the Pacific 
who [inaudible] we're going to get a better result for our money, we're going to have a far more - how shall I put 
it - influential regional result as a context of working with Australia. And [inaudible] is what we have sought to 
do in recent years, the policies may rise, and we would seek to expand upon them, but also to [inaudible] as 
well. These are international problems and Australia is more than pulling its weight, and we intend to do just 
that ourselves.’ A. Downer and W. Peters, '22 July 2006, Joint Press Conference with the Hon Winston Peters, 
New Zealand Minister for Foreign Affairs - Adelaide', [transcript], 
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2006/060722_joint_press_conference.html>, accessed 31-7-07. 
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that Australia and New Zealand are supposed to be drifting apart, and different perspectives 
of America, and those kinds of things [sic]. There's some truth in that, of course, but the big 
point I'd make is that there is still tremendous co-operation between Australia and New 
Zealand’.49  
 
Indeed, it is particularly with regard to the Pacific that Downer and his New Zealand 
counterpart stressed Australia’s and New Zealand’s close working relationship. Almost all 
the joint press conferences dwelt in depth on current Pacific issues. In 2000 at a joint press 
conference, Goff stated that Australia and New Zealand are both Pacific nations with a deep 
concern for what is happening in the neighbouring nations.50 During 2003, Downer and Goff 
held multiple joint interviews in which they stressed their cooperation with regards to 
RAMSI.  In the last few years the joint Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping operations 
in Bougainville and Solomon Islands have become the rhetorical keystones in the trans-
Tasman relationship. Goff referred to Bougainville in 2002 as ‘a success story for New 
Zealand/Australian relations’.51 In 2004, Goff, citing Bougainville and RAMSI as examples, 
argued that by working together Australia and New Zealand achieved more than they would 
have done separately.52 The following quote from Downer, made in February 2006, 
celebrated Australian and New Zealand teamwork in the Pacific to an even greater extent:   
 
As far as Australia is concerned, we very much appreciated what New 
Zealand has been doing. I mean I have been the Foreign Minister for 10 
years, in that 10 years I would pick up two or three things in our foreign 
policy which have been particular highlights, for example the Bougainville 
peace process. Now who was one of the key players in the Bougainville 
peace process? It was New Zealand and I actually don't think that that peace 
process, which we played a central role in as well, would have happened in 
the way it did if it hadn't been for New Zealand's contribution. Fast forward 
to 1998 – 99 and East Timor and who was there shoulder to shoulder with 
Australia and East Timor? It was New Zealand. Fast forward to the crisis in 
the Solomon Islands and the creation of RAMSI, the Regional Assistance 
Mission in the Solomon Islands which was kind of hard to put together and 
we had to build a Pacific consensus for it, and who was shoulder to 
shoulder with Australia? New Zealand. So I can tell you, I have found great 
                                                            
49  Downer and Goff,  '29 April 2005, Joint Press Conference, Australia and New Zealand Leadership Forum', 
[transcript], <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2005/050429_joint_anzlf.html>, accessed 8-8-07. 
50 Downer and Goff, '23 June 2000'. 
51 Downer and Goff, '7 June 2002'. 
52 A. Downer and P. Goff, '19 December 2004, Joint Press Conference with the Australian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Hon Alexander Downer, and the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon Phil Goff, at the 
Copthorne Hotel, Auckland, after Their Biannual Talks', [transcript], 
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friendship with New Zealand, and great support from New Zealand over the 
years.53 
For both Australia and New Zealand Ministers of Foreign Affairs, it was important to stress 
their nations’ exceptional cooperation in the Pacific. Although they are separate nations, in 
regional affairs they act in tandem, with a ‘no surprises’ policy.54 
The final point to note is that Goff and Downer both referred to Anzac in the context of the 
Australia-New Zealand relationship. In 2004, Downer, speaking in the context of the war 
against terror and RAMSI, stated that ‘the ANZAC spirit is very much alive and well.’55 In 
2005, Goff reinforced this interpretation and described the current Anzac tradition as being 
particularly important in the Pacific region. Goff affirmed that there is a ‘long ANZAC 
tradition of our two countries working alongside each other, and I’m very proud of the way in 
which both of us have been able to contribute to that tradition and work together, particularly 
in the Pacific’.56 Anzac is a term still in current use to describe the unique close relationship 
between Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Bougainville and the following peacekeeping missions in East Timor and Solomon Islands 
were Anzac peacekeeping operations. At the official level of joint organization, planning and 
force integration, Australian and New Zealand cooperation grew progressively closer and 
more harmonious following lessons learnt in the TMG. Interview participants’ memories of 
their time in trans-Tasman peacekeeping missions also revealed the existence of an Anzac 
spirit between Aussies and Kiwis. Just as at Gallipoli, the enforced closeness and shared 
hardships of peacekeeping missions created a strong connection between Australians and 
New Zealanders. Shared celebrations and rivalries renewed the Anzac bond. Even New 
Zealand’s desire to differentiate itself from Australians through claims of greater cultural 
sensitivity is a reaction to the close sibling-like relationship. A renewal of the Anzac spirit 
affected the general trans-Tasman relationship positively as seen in the transcripts between 
the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers. 
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Conclusion 
 
Recent experiences of Anzac peacekeeping in the Pacific region fit into longstanding 
historical trends.  Strategic experts’ and political advisors’ emphasis on the present and future 
means that the long term historical context of Australia’s and New Zealand’s  defence 
policies and involvement in the Pacific has often been forgotten.  Although contemporary 
commentators described Australia’s and New Zealand’s involvement in recent peacekeeping 
missions as ‘new interventionism’, from a historical perspective these operations fit into a 
pattern of long-term regional concern.  Australia and New Zealand have played, and continue 
to play, a leading role in the Pacific through their colonial administration, military 
interventions, foreign aid, diplomacy, and peacekeeping missions. 
 
Since colonial times, Australia and New Zealand have been concerned about their 
relationship to the Pacific and regional security.  Whether pressuring Britain to take on new 
imperial responsibilities, fighting against Axis forces in World War I and II, or discouraging 
communist encroachment, Australia and New Zealand have worked together to control  
external and internal threats in the Pacific. The peacekeeping missions in Bougainville, East 
Timor and Solomon Islands are a continuation of this tradition.  Increased internal conflict in 
Pacific Island countries since the end of the Cold War has once again involved Australian and 
New Zealand governments in the region. After the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 and the 
Bali bombings in 2002 Australian and New Zealand governments feared that the Pacific 
could become a hotbed of international crime and terrorism. Their recent intervention in 
internal conflicts, particularly in Solomon Islands, is due to the old fear of outside 
interference by unfriendly powers.  
 
A second longstanding historical precedent is New Zealanders’ belief that their cultural 
sensitivity in the Pacific is superior to Australia’s. It has been argued since the nineteenth 
century that New Zealanders’ relatively successful settlement with the Maori entitled them to 
a special role with other Polynesian and Melanesian peoples. By comparison, New Zealand 
commentators saw Australia’s mistreatment of Indigenous Australians as proof of their lack 
of sympathy with Pacific culture.  Even though New Zealand’s colonial record with its 
Pacific Island mandates was not always good and sometimes even inferior to Australia’s, 
New Zealand commentators continued to praise their nation’s cultural sensitivity. In the 
124 
 
TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI, New Zealand personnel did generally interact well with local 
peoples.  But, New Zealand’s achievements were lauded so frequently and uncritically that it 
became clear the same self-congratulatory mode was in place. Favourable comparison with 
Australia remained a key part of the discourse. For many New Zealanders, cultural 
correctness remained an important area in which New Zealand could outdo their Anzac 
rivals, Australia. 
 
Indeed, the third continuing historical theme is the significance of the Anzac tradition to 
Australians and New Zealanders.  Early commentators created the mythology of the 
courageous, hardy, innovative and loyal Anzac soldier. Although this mythology has faced 
revisionist arguments since then there is still a general agreement on the importance of the 
meaning of Anzac to Australian and New Zealand national identity. Particularly in Australia, 
where the idea of Anzac as an element of the national character is strong, there has been 
much recent interest in this topic. By highlighting the revival of ‘Anzac spirit’ as part of 
Pacific peacekeeping, this thesis contributes to this historiographical tradition, but instead of 
taking a nationalist approach, adopts a trans-Tasman viewpoint. 
 
 An overview of relevant literature also reveals historiographical continuities from the past 
into the present. The factors of who is writing, their reasons for doing so, and the mode used 
may change over the years but often certain assumptions remain constant. For example, the 
idea that the Pacific south of the Equator is Australia’s and New Zealand’s sphere of security 
and responsibility has endured. While types of intervention may alter over time, authors 
continue to accept the idea that Australia and New Zealand have a right to act in the Pacific 
region. Likewise, suppositions that New Zealand has a better cultural understanding of the 
Pacific than Australia, and that unfriendly foreign nations must be denied access to the region 
are found throughout the historiography. 
 
The historiographical overview in chapter two also highlights Australia’s lengthier 
historiography on the region and the lack of transnational history. Australian historical 
writing, especially on defence and Anzac-related topics, is far more extensive than its New 
Zealand equivalent.  While this is partly due to Australia’s larger academic community, it is 
also due to the greater prominence of these two themes in Australian life. From the colonial 
period onwards, Australia has been more preoccupied with the possibility of invasion, more 
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concerned with defence topics and more nationalistic about its Anzac forces than New 
Zealand.  
 
Australian and New Zealand historiographies have each generally been written with a 
‘national history’ focus that this thesis aims to revise on by adopting a trans-Tasman 
viewpoint. After the 1960s in particular, finding a ‘national identity’ became important to 
both Australia and New Zealand. Accounts of the past described the unique situations and 
histories of Australia and New Zealand rather than focusing on the exchange of information 
and culture within the region. Even political scientists and defence analysts on both sides of 
the Tasman often ignored their neighbour and focused on individual threat perceptions. 
Perhaps because the strong Australia-New Zealand relationship was taken for granted, little 
in-depth investigation was made of the close links between the trans-Tasman neighbours in 
defence, Pacific affairs, and even the Anzac tradition. Thus, part of the reason for examining 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s joint participation in regional peacekeeping is to illuminate 
wider aspects of the trans-Tasman defence relationship.  
 
Over the years, the trans-Tasman defence relationship has at times been weakened under 
conditions of inaction, differing goals or a perceived lack of mutual support. For example, in 
the interwar years with no shared combat operations Australian and New Zealand defence 
relations slackened off.  In World War II, New Zealand’s decision to leave its troops in 
Europe frustrated the Australians who felt the Pacific should be the main area of concern. The 
crisis around ANZUS in 1985, while not weakening the Australian and New Zealand defence 
relationship, did reveal differences between the two nation’s defence priorities. Likewise, the 
New Zealand government’s decision in 2000 to disband the combat arm of the New Zealand 
Air Force (which had previously exercised with the Australian Navy) upset Australian 
defence officials and prompted claims of ‘drifting apart’. Moreover, Australia and New 
Zealand are not each other’s only, or even most high profile, defence allies. Certainly, New 
Zealand’s most important defence partner is Australia.  On the other hand, Australia still 
prioritises its connections with other nations over New Zealand.  In recent Australian Defence 
White Papers and reports, the United States, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Middle 
Eastern countries are given more attention than New Zealand. This however, is either because 
these nations pose a greater risk to Australian security, or are higher maintenance allies. 
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 In the Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand mutually realise the importance of close 
cooperation in diplomacy, military operations and aid policies. In regional operations, a joint 
Australian-New Zealand response is expected. Part of the value of New Zealand’s and 
Australia’s defence relationship is that it is understood and sustained without overt fuss. The 
legacy of the Anzac past has left an underlying knowledge of each other’s reliability as a 
defence ally. 
 
Shared trans-Tasman peacekeeping has considerably ameliorated defence ‘drift’, especially 
on an operational level. In Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands, Australia’s and 
New Zealand’s defence relationship was active, largely supportive and working towards the 
same goals. Part of the reason for the importance of Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
participation in regional peacekeeping missions is the consequential strengthening of trans-
Tasman defence relations. Since the Bougainville peace meetings at Burnham in mid-1997, 
Australia and New Zealand have increasingly collaborated in order to prevent internal 
instability in the Pacific.  INTERFET in 1999 and RAMSI in 2003 built on previous contacts 
and greatly increased trans-Tasman cooperation. The missions in Bougainville, East Timor 
and Solomon Islands were relatively large and long-term, requiring significant funding and 
periodic planning meetings from Australia and New Zealand. The result of this frequent 
contact is that Australian and New Zealand diplomats, politicians, defence and police 
personnel and aid workers gained more experience at working with each other.   
 
This thesis emphasises Bougainville because the TMG was the first regional peacekeeping 
mission and as such set important precedents for the Australian and New Zealand defence 
relationship. In the initial stages of the TMG there were conflicts between Australia and New 
Zealand. The unarmed style of operation and the NZDF’s somewhat makeshift planning 
troubled the safety-conscious ADF. There were fraught relations between some Australian 
and New Zealand personnel. New Zealand’s faulty equipment and logistic inadequacies 
caused frustrations. But, these problems highlighted the areas in which the NZDF needed 
improvement and encouraged the New Zealand government Cabinet to approve future 
capability acquisitions. Moreover, in Bougainville, New Zealanders and Australians were 
drawn together on the ground because of their shared responsibilities and hardships. Close 
relationships formed between Australians and New Zealanders. The positive outcome of the 
Bougainville peace process and the operational lessons learnt gave Australia and New 
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Zealand the experience and confidence to plan larger, more ambitious missions in East Timor 
and Solomon Islands. 
 
Indeed, recent Pacific peacekeeping missions revived the Anzac bond between Australia and 
New Zealand. The TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI brought about a renewal of the Anzac 
relationship on an official operational level.  Joint planning meetings, integrated capabilities 
and mixed teams of Australian-New Zealand personnel functioned increasingly smoothly 
after Bougainville. Government officials, diplomats, civilians, defence personnel, police 
officers and aid workers all met to discuss contributions. Because of their shared national 
interest in preventing the spread of violence and internal disorder in the Pacific region, 
Australia and New Zealand were willing to contribute significant time, money and resources 
to these operations. Indeed, in comparison with Gallipoli, the links were tighter and more 
widespread.  
 
Moreover, interviews with participants from the TMG, INTERFET and RAMSI revealed that 
the Anzac spirit was revived between Australians and New Zealanders serving in these 
peacekeeping missions.  Although Pacific peacekeeping missions largely lacked the sacred 
themes of sacrifice and death found at Gallipoli, they were still stressful, tiring and 
potentially explosive. During Anzac celebrations in the field, Australians and New 
Zealanders not only remembered the sacrifices of past Anzacs, but also felt a bond, forged 
through their shared hardships, with their trans-Tasman colleagues. In day-to-day activities 
this Anzac spirit was played out through competitiveness. Australians and New Zealanders 
vied to better the other in sporting events and the carrying out of duties. A less obvious 
expression of the Anzac spirit was New Zealanders’ desire to differentiate themselves from 
Australians. They did this through emphasising their superior aptitude for cultural sensitivity 
in the Pacific region. Just as New Zealand soldiers perceived themselves to be more 
gentlemanly than the Australia larrikins while training in Cairo in 1914, so New Zealand 
peacekeepers felt they were more in tune with Pacific peoples than the ‘brash Aussies’ while 
on operation in Bougainville in 1997. The last ten years have seen the emergence of a new 
Anzac peacekeeping force. 
 
There are, however several qualifications to this new Anzac peacekeeping relationship. 
Firstly, Anzac peacekeeping was forged out of Australia’s and New Zealand’s separate 
national interests. Because it was in the Pacific, it suited both nations’ separate security 
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agendas to intervene.  Australia and New Zealand, however, are not bound to act similarly on 
all international defence issues. New Zealand declined to join the invasion of Iraq, whereas 
Australia made a significant contribution to the American-led force. Regional instability drew 
Australia and New Zealand together because national self-interest justified the expense of 
joint planning and force integration. One would hope that the Anzac relationship could be 
sustained in peaceful circumstances. The reality is that it is shared threats which have always 
united the trans-Tasman neighbours.  
 
Secondly, New Zealand’s good Pacific reputation is subject to caveats. Its creativity and 
flexibility are the result of a narrow resource base that forces New Zealanders to be 
innovative and adaptable.  Sometimes New Zealand’s boldness in Pacific peacekeeping has 
been due to lack of intelligence about the region and political naivety. New Zealand was also 
extremely fortunate that Maori culture had been integrated into government and NZDF 
protocol before the Burnham peace talks in 1997. The use of Maori culture was often routine 
rather than carefully planned, and its positive impact realised only after the event. Moreover, 
the predominance of the view of New Zealand’s superior cultural sensitivity and its lack of 
critical attention has revealed the strength of New Zealand’s desire for uniqueness in 
comparison to Australia.  
 
 So what of the future of Anzac peacekeeping and lessons learnt? Every peacekeeping 
mission in the Pacific has required a unique type of intervention so far. It is difficult to 
foresee which existing tensions in the Pacific will simmer over into situations prompting 
peacekeeping interventions. Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands provide clues as 
to what works in the Pacific but are not infallible models. Accordingly, Australia and New 
Zealand will need to keep intelligence on, and relationships with, the Pacific region a high 
priority. The Pacific may be small in population, but its significance to Australia and New 
Zealand in terms of national security, the environment, and international reputation is great. 
Throughout history, Australia and New Zealand have marked the Pacific region as their 
‘patch’ and this remains true today. Although the Anzac relationship is important it must 
continue to be compatible with Australia’s and New Zealand’s responsibilities to the wider 
Pacific region.  
 
Moreover, too much emphasis on New Zealand’s uniqueness in Pacific peacekeeping is 
unhelpful. There is a fine line between Anzac differentiation and arrogance. While New 
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Zealand’s strengths are extremely valuable in Anzac peacekeeping, commentators should not 
accept them unreservedly or dismiss Australian efforts. In many cases, Australians have 
worked successfully to adapt their proceedures to local culture. Moreover, New Zealanders 
also need to be careful to avoid complacency about their cultural ability. There is always 
more to learn and New Zealand personnel are not innocent of cultural insensitivity. New 
Zealand is fortunate with its integration of Maori culture into official protocol but should not 
take it for granted. Moreover, it is important to remember that New Zealand could not operate 
without Australia’s financial backing, logistical support and information-gathering skills in 
most joint operations. New Zealand’s cultural sensitivity in Pacific peacekeeping operations 
has been largely enabled by Australia. 
 
Anzac peacekeeping relies on a continued close interaction between Australian and New 
Zealand personnel. At the moment, there are groups of Australians and New Zealanders, 
though significantly reduced in number, serving in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon 
Islands. If these existing missions finish and there are no Australian and New Zealand joint 
peacekeeping missions for some time undoubtedly these Anzac connections will fade. 
Individual officer exchanges will continue but not on the same scale as during operations 
where hundreds of soldiers, police and government officials work with their trans-Tasman 
equivalents. Interoperability between Australia and New Zealand should be fostered as much 
as possible, but without regular deployments this will be more difficult.  
 
However, the recent Pacific peacekeeping missions have created a pool of Anzac resources 
that can be drawn upon. This was demonstrated in the New Zealand-led, trans-Tasman 
response to the Tongan crisis in 2006. A joint force of NZDF and ADF personnel were able 
to deploy extremely quickly due to their familiarity with each other and the region.1 Even if 
Australia and New Zealand do experience a hiatus in joint operations, their cultural 
similarities, and historical links will provide a base on which to build yet another Anzac 
force. Whether the next Anzac force will be a continuation of the existing peacekeeping 
tradition or a reincarnation into something new will depend on the circumstances. Whatever 
happens, the Anzac relationship will continue as long as Australians and New Zealanders 
work together towards a common purpose. 
                                                            
1 ‘New Zealand Led Joint Task Force heads to Tonga’, 
<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/tonga/articles/2006/20061119-nzljtfhtt.htm>, accessed 7-2-08. 
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Appendix 1: Table of Interviewees 
 
Interviewee Time and place of 
Interview 
Interviewee’s involvement in 
Bougainville/East Timor/ Solomon Islands 
peacekeeping operations 
Captain John 
O’Reilly (NZDF) 
10 August, 2007 
(phone call to 
Wellington ) 
-Involved in Operation Lagoon, 1994, 
debriefed NZ personnel 
-Assisted with peace talks at Burnham in 
1997 
-Member of first rotation of TMG, 1997, in 
intelligence role 
-Senior NZDF role in RAMSI, July 2004 – 
November 2004 
John Roughan 16 August, 2007, 
Christchurch 
-Long-time civil society advocate in 
Solomon Islands  
-Secretary to Solomon Island’s past Prime 
Minister, Manasseh Sogavare 
James Batley 
(DFAT) 
30 August, 2007, 
(phone call to Suva, 
Fiji) 
-In Bougainville during Operation Lagoon, 
1994 
-Senior Australian, Leader of Civilian 
Contingent and Deputy Leader to Roger 
Mortlock in first rotation of TMG, 1997-
1998 
-Chief Negotiator (essentially the same role) 
in PMG, 1998 
- Australian High Commissioner to Solomon 
Islands – 1997-1999 
-Second Special Coordinator of RAMSI, 
August 2004 -2006 
- Currently, Australian High Commissioner 
to Fiji 
Group Captain 
Athol Forrest 
(NZDF) 
4 September, 2007, 
Wellington 
-Defence Attaché in Port Moresby, 1995-
1999. Present for arrival of reconnaissance 
group 
-Visited Solomon Islands in 2000 in work 
for MFAT 
- coordinated and recorded eyewitness 
account for Peace on Bougainville: Truce 
Monitoring Group 
Major General 
Clive Lilley 
(NZDF, retired) 
5 September, 2007, 
Wellington 
-Chief of Staff at NZDF Headquarters Land 
Force Command, Takapuna. Involved in 
planning TMG mission 
-Commander of reconnaissance force for 
TMG, 1997 
Paul Ash (MFAT) 5 September, 2007, 
Wellington 
-Deputy Special Coordinator of RAMSI, 
2005-2006 
Jim Rolfe 5 September, 2007, 
Wellington 
-New-Zealand Australian Defence expert, 
Senior Fellow of Centre for Strategic 
Studies. 
131 
 
-Did article on TMG in 1999 for which he 
conducted interviews with Don McKinnon, 
Major A. Fitzsimons, Bede Corry, Colonel 
Jerry Mateparae, Brigadier Roger Mortlock 
and Don McKinnon (to which I was given 
access) 
Neil Robertson 
(MFAT) 
6 September, 2007, 
Wellington 
-New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner 
in Port Moresby, September 1995 – 
November 1998 
Vince McBride 
(formerly MFAT) 
6 September, 2007, 
Wellington 
-Member of Pacific Division, MFAT, for 28 
years, during which time he was Deputy 
Head from 2000-2004 
-Current Director of Pacific Cooperation 
Foundation 
Brigadier Roger 
Mortlock (NZDF, 
retired) 
7 September, 2007, 
Wellington 
-Chief of Operations, NZDF, at time of 
TMG.  
-Involved in strategic planning and 
negotiation with Bougainvilleans in 
preparation for the TMG 
-Commander of TMG in first rotation, 1997-
1998 
Superintendent 
Tony (Togimanu) 
McLeod (NZP) 
1 October, 2007 
(phone call to 
Wellington) 
-Chief of Operations for IPMT, 2002 
-New Zealand Police Liaison Officer on AFP 
planning team (5 weeks in Canberra) for 
RAMSI, 2003 
-Staff Officer for Togimanu Annandale 
during first three months of RAMSI, 2003. 
This was the second in command position 
for New Zealand Police contingent 
-Carried out security review of police 
mission in Bougainville, 2005 
Superintendent 
Togimanu (Tony) 
Annandale (NZP) 
2 October, 2007, 
(phone call to 
Wellington) 
-Team Leader of Bougainville Community 
Policing Project, 1999 
-Involved in project design of Solomon 
Islands Policy project, pre-RAMSI 
-Assistant Commissioner of Royal Solomon 
Islands Police, Chief of Operation Support 
and Commander of New Zealand Police 
contingent for RAMSI, 2003 
Bede Corry 
(MFAT) 
2 October, 2007 
(phone call to 
Wellington) 
-Private Secretary to Don McKinnon, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, from 
1996 
Lieutenant Colonel 
Trent Scott (ADF) 
8 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-worked in East Timor as part of UN 
advance force to set up UN Headquarters in 
1999 and served again in 2002 
-involved in planning of RAMSI and served 
as J3, the Operations Officer of Force in first 
rotation of RAMSI, 2003 
David Hegarty 
(formerly DFAT) 
8 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-Leader of IPMT, January to July, 2001 
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Jan Gammage 
(formerly AusAid) 
9 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-Australian civilian truce monitor on Buka 
team site during first rotation of TMG, 1997-
1998 
Brigadier Jeff 
Wilkinson (ADF, 
retired) 
9 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-Australian Services Contingent Commander 
during second rotation of TMG, under 
Colonel Jerry Mateperae, 1998. Had a 
logistics background 
Andrew Rice  10 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-Australian civilian truce monitor on Buka 
team site during second rotation of 
TMG,1998 
Ruth Spriggs 10 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-Member of Bougainville Tech Negotiation 
Team that worked with PNG, for two years.  
-Delegate at Lincoln meeting, 1998 
-Member of Inter-Church Forum and 
Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom 
Steven Henningham 
(DFAT) 
10 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-Chief Negotiator on Bougainville, 
December 2000-March 2001 
Stewart Firth 10 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-ANU academic specializing in Australia’s 
foreign affairs and pacific relations 
Alan Behm 11 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-Head of Strategic International Policy 
Division in Australian Defence, at the time 
of TMG, 1997 
Bob Breen 12 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-contracted by ADF Land Headquarters to 
provide operational advice for TMG 
-Currently working on volume on 
Bougainville and Solomon Islands for 
Official Australian Peacekeeping History 
Richard Feakes 
(DFAT) 
12 October, 2007, 
Canberra 
-Current Head of Solomon Islands Division 
in DFAT 
Greg Moyle (NZDF 
territorial force) 
24 October, 2007 
(phone call to 
Auckland) 
-Senior National Officer for NZDF and 
Operations Officer in RAMSI, December 
2005-May 2006 
-UN Military Liaison Officer, East Timor, 
December 2006- May 2007 
Assistant 
Commissioner Ben 
McDevitt (AFP) 
25 October, 2007 
(phone call to 
Canberra) 
-Member of TMG and Law Enforcement 
Advisor in Bougainville, 1998 
-Commander of Participating Police Force 
(PPF) and Deputy Commissioner of Royal 
Solomon Islands Police in RAMSI, for 12 
months , 2003-2004 
Major General John 
Sanderson (ADF) 
30 October 2007 
(phone call to 
Canberra) 
-Commander of UNTAC  Force in 
Cambodia  in 1992 
-Chief of the Australian Army in 1997, 
present at talks on Australian involvement in 
the TMG 
Martyn Dunne 
(NZDF) 
2 November 2007 
(Phone call to 
Wellington) 
-attended Australian Defence College in 
1998 and subsequently appointed head of 
NZDF planning team for INTERFET in 
Brisbane 
-Senior National Officer for New Zealand in 
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INTERFET. 
-Appointed Brigade Commander of Dili 
Command Headquarters 
Lance Beath 28 November 2007 
(phone call to 
Wellington) 
-Head of Strategic and International Policy 
in MFAT in 1997.  
-Previously, in early 1990s, head of 
Australian Division of MFAT 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
Interview Questions 
 
I have three main areas of interest when interviewing: personal involvement, the 
Australian/New Zealand connection and perceptions of ANZAC links. I have 
included a number of questions under each heading for your prior interest. However, I 
understand that you are undoubtedly very busy and do not have time to answer all 
these questions. Indeed some of the questions may be irrelevant to your experience. 
What I would really appreciate is if you could consider the three themes and then 
reflect on some kind of appropriate response. I may bring up some of the questions if 
I feel they are particularly relevant, however, hopefully the conversation can be an 
opportunity for you to talk, tell some stories and share your reflections on the TMG, 
INTERFET and RAMSI. 
 
Your personal involvement 
 
1. Could you tell me a bit about yourself, what your role in preparing and working in 
the Bougainville/ East Timor/ Solomon Islands peacekeeping operations was? 
2. What responsibilities and actions did this role require of you? 
3. Do you feel that as a New Zealander/Australian you bought any unique special 
qualities to the planning and if so what were these qualities? 
4. I’m also interested in whether there was any type of policy changes in trans-
Tasman peacekeeping from the 1997 TMG in Bougainville in 1997 to RAMSI in 
2003. What aspects of the operation you were involved in, do you feel could have 
been improved on? What particular lessons were learnt from Bougainville/East 
Timor/Solomons? 
5.  To what extent was pre operation planning and policy carried out in on-the-
ground operations? 
6. What is your opinion about the success or otherwise of the operation? 
Relationship with Australian colleagues and the Australian Defence Force 
 
1. I’m really interested in the tenor of the Australian and New Zealand working 
relationship in these peacekeeping missions. How would you characterise your 
relationship with your Australian/New Zealand colleagues; both on a personal and 
policy-making level? 
2. How frequently did you meet with your Australian/New Zealand counterparts in the 
planning process? When and where were these meetings? 
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3. To what extent were there differences between the New Zealand and Australian 
approaches to the operation? 
4. How were these differences reflected in the decision-making process? 
5. Bougainville was a New Zealand-led process, and RAMSI an Australian-led one. To 
what extent do you think this meant that there were differences or parallels between 
the two operations? 
6. Were there any differences or similarities between the New Zealand and Australian 
relationships with local residents during the operation and if so, why do you think 
these occurred? 
7. To what extent do you think the national defence styles of New Zealand and Australia 
are complimentary or opposite? 
8. How would you define New Zealand and Australia’s general defence relationship 
(subordinate, partnership, important, etc.)? 
Anzac questions 
 
1. Could you please explain whether you felt any awareness of an ANZAC relationship 
or ANZAC spirit throughout your involvement in the operation? If so, or if not, why 
do you think this was? 
2. What are the perceptions of Pacific Islanders in Bougainville/East Timor/Solomon 
Islands regarding ANZAC? 
3. How do you think Pacific Island militaries in these deployments have seen themselves 
regarding the concept of ANZAC? 
4. To what extent do Pacific countries celebrate Anzac Day? Did the operation you were 
involved in celebrate Anzac Day while on deployment and if so how?  
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